

The following is a draft of the second chapter of *The Trinity in History*.

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2 The Starting Point

1 The Four-point Hypothesis: Its Significance and Limitations

1.1 The Hypothesis

I have appealed to a four-point systematic-theological hypothesis expressed by Lonergan in *Divinarum personarum* and again in the revision of that document that constituted the *pars systematica* of *De Deo trino*.¹ I have also called attention to the earlier appearance of the hypothesis in class notes written for a course in 1951-52. Despite its heavy overdose of Scholastic language, which must undergo fairly massive transposition in the contemporary context,² the hypothesis contains the core systematic conceptions around

1 On the significance of some of the differences between the two texts, see my three articles: 'The First Chapter of *De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica*: The Issues'; '*Intelligentia Fidei* in *De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica*'; and 'The Truth of Theological Understanding in *Divinarum Personarum* and *De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica*,' *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 18 (2000) 27-48; 19 (2001) 35-83; 20 (2002) 33-75. These are now available on the website www.robertmdoran.com.

2 The notion of transposition appears repeatedly in *Method in Theology* (latest printing; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), but the dynamics entailed are not spelled out. See also his 1979 paper, 'Horizons and Transpositions,' in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) at 426-

which other special theological categories can be integrated.³ Again, as I phrased the matter in the first chapter, the hypothesis names the core elements in the dogmatic-theological context of further theological statements.

Once again, the hypothesis reads:

31. Something of the dynamics involved in transposition can be found in Matthew L. Lamb, 'Lonergan's Transposition of Augustine and Aquinas,' presently unpublished paper delivered at a meeting of the Lonergan Philosophical Society, 2004. A contribution is also made by Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer, 'Sanctifying Grace in a "Methodical Theology,"' *Theological Studies* 68:1 (2007) 52-76. Further reference to Jacobs-Vandegeer's essay will be made later in this chapter. A necessary addition to Jacobs-Vandegeer's contribution has been made by Jeremy Blackwood, 'Sanctifying Grace, Elevation, and the Fifth Level of Consciousness: Further Developments within Lonergan Scholarship,' which is as yet unpublished. I will be drawing on Blackwood's work in this chapter.

³ Special categories are the categories peculiar to theology, while general categories are those that theology shares with other disciplines. On general and special theological categories, see Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 285-91. The issue of the categories, general and special, and of their sources and interrelations, remains the most significant methodological question in theology, as it has been ever since the Augustinian-Aristotelian conflicts in the late Middle Ages. In terms that really are too general, and so that can easily be misunderstood, the issue of just how important the general categories are for theology determines the difference between Platonic and Aristotelian, Bonaventurian and Thomist, and perhaps Balthasarian and Lonerganian emphases in theology. But the present concern is with the special categories.

... there are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore there are four very special modes that ground the external imitation of the divine substance. Next, there are four absolutely supernatural realities, which are never found uninformed, namely, the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. It would not be inappropriate, therefore, to say that the secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and so has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a participation of active spiration, and so has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a participation of passive spiration, and so has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a participation of sonship, and so in a most perfect way brings the children of adoption back to the Father.⁴

The hypothesis thus speaks of four absolutely supernatural ways of imitating God through a created participation in the divine relations. One of these (the created term of the created relation of the humanity of Jesus to the eternal Word, a participation in the eternal relation of paternity) is peculiar to Christ. Two (sanctifying grace and charity, participating in active and passive spiration, respectively, and so in the entire life of the Trinity) are given to us in this life. I began to transpose this position in the first chapter, but will have a good deal more to say about that question here. The final way (the light of glory, participating in filiation) is promised to us in the life to come. Because there are four real divine relations, because God *is* four real divine relations, three of which are really distinct, there are four special ways in which created realities can imitate God: special, because in each of them the creature attains God as God is in Godself. Each of

⁴ Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 471, 473.

the four ways is a created participation in one of the four divine relations, where ‘participation’ must be understood analogously.⁵ Thus:

(1) the secondary act of existence of the incarnate Word, which is the created term of a created relation of the assumed humanity of Jesus to the eternal divine Word, participates in and imitates the uncreated divine relation of paternity;

(2) sanctifying grace, *gratia gratum faciens*, the reception of divine love as including us and becoming our love, participates in and imitates active spiration, that is, the Father and the Son together as they ‘breathe’ the Holy Spirit;

(3) the habit of charity, which in *Insight* is an antecedent universal willingness,⁶ and for which I want to reserve the expression that Lonergan assigns to sanctifying grace, namely, the dynamic state of being in love without qualifications or restrictions or reservations, proceeds from the reception of divine love in sanctifying grace and participates in and imitates passive spiration, the proceeding Love ‘breathed’ by and proceeding from the Father and the Son; and

(4) the light of glory participates in and imitates filiation.

In perhaps more accessible terms,

(1) in the Godhead the Word does not speak but is spoken; the incarnate Word speaks, but he speaks only what he hears from the Father; thus, the relation of the assumed humanity to the eternal divine Word is a created participation in and imitation of the Father’s eternal relation to the Word, that is, the relation of *Dicens*, which is divine paternity; moreover, as Lonergan put it in his notes on grace in 1951-52, the foundation of the relation is that, as *Dicens* is paternity generating its Word, the eternal Son, so the Incarnation is a regeneration in which there proceeds, not a new person, as in divine

⁵ See below, pp. xx-xx.

⁶ See Lonergan, *Insight* 646-48, 720-22, 747, 762.

generation, but a new nature that has been joined to the already existing person of the divine Word;⁷

(2) the reception of divine love as love for us that becomes our love as we yield to it is a created participation in and imitation of the Father and the Son as together they ‘breathe’ the Holy Spirit;

(3) the disposition that we know as charity, which in the terms of Lonergan’s *Insight* is a universal antecedent willingness that embraces the return of good for evil in an abiding friendship with God, and to which there should be predicated Lonergan’s expression regarding unrestricted being in love, is a created participation in and imitation of the proceeding Love, the Holy Spirit, breathed by the Father and the Son; and

(4) the light of glory is a created participation in and imitation of the divine Son as he brings all of us, his brothers and sisters, children by adoption, to the Father.

This four-point hypothesis is the beginning of the efforts in systematic theology that will be offered here.

In this work I have to assume the positions expressed by Lonergan in chapters 2 through 5 of *The Triune God: Systematics*: positions expressing a systematic understanding of the divine processions, relations, and persons. I am writing here a theology of the divine missions, one that presumes that previous systematic understanding and moves on from it, neither going back *on* it or, for the most part, going back *to* it in order simply to repeat it.⁸ Chapter 6 of *The Triune God: Systematics* and

7 ‘Divina paternitas ... est divinus intellectus qua dicens Verbum suum et ita intellectualiter Filium suum generans. Quam generationem quodammodo imitatur eiusdem Filii Incarnatio; Incarnatio enim regeneratio quaedam est in qua non oritur nova persona sed personae existenti advenit nova natura.’

8 A parallel commentary on *The Triune God: Systematics* will appear on my website: www.robertmdoran.com.

texts related to it, texts that treat the divine missions, constitute the immediate basis in Lonergan's writings for what I am saying. In particular, I am grounding my work in the hypothesis just mentioned, along with the more detailed treatment of the hypothesis in Lonergan's earlier notes of 1951-52.

1.2 The Place of the Four-point Hypothesis in a Unified Field Structure for Systematics

In *What Is Systematic Theology?* I appealed to the hypothesis in an attempt to articulate what I called a *unified field structure* for systematic theology,⁹ that is, a heuristic core around which a systematic theology can be organized. As I said there,

The unified field structure would be ... an open and heuristic set of conceptions that embraces the field of issues presently to be accounted for and presently foreseeable in that discipline or functional specialty of theology whose task it is to give a synthetic understanding of the realities that are and ought to be providing the meaning constitutive of the community called the Church. The unified field structure would be found in a statement, perhaps a quite lengthy one, perhaps even one taking up several large volumes, capable of guiding for the present and the foreseeable future the ongoing genetic development of the entire synthetic understanding of the

⁹ My former colleague at the Lonergan Research Institute, Daniel Monsour, who remains my colleague in editing Lonergan's Collected Works, is responsible for the expression 'unified field structure,' though the conception of this structure offered in *What Is Systematic Theology?* as well as here is my own. See also my paper 'The Unified Field Structure for Systematic Theology: A Proposal,' to be found on www.robertmdoran.com. The paper was delivered several times in 2002-2003 in different forms; the form uploaded to the website is the final version.

mysteries of faith and of the other elements that enter into systematic theology. It would guide all work at bringing these elements into a synthetic unity.¹⁰

In terms that Lonergan employs elsewhere and that I used in the first chapter, the unified field structure includes the articulation at any given time of the most fundamental elements in what happens to be the contemporary dogmatic-theological context. But it includes them in a manner that makes systematic development possible. Thus, the four-point hypothesis would constitute only part of the unified field structure, not the whole of it. The unified field structure goes beyond the contemporary articulation of the dogmatic-theological context in that it consists of the four-point systematic-theological hypothesis *integrated with a theological theory of history*, a theory that flows from complicating the basic structure of Lonergan's intentionality analysis.¹¹ More concretely, the second

10 Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?* 62.

11 The complication of the structure is offered in a compendious form in chapter 10 of *What Is Systematic Theology?* It can also be found in a paper that I offered to the Boston College Lonergan Workshop in 2004 and that will be uploaded on www.robertmdoran.com. The title of the paper is "'Complicate the Structure': Notes on a Forgotten Precept.' In its fuller details, the complication is offered in my book *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. The cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and fundamental existential ethics presupposed there are all Lonergan's work. The basic heuristic of history (progress-decline-redemption) is also his, but the amplification and development of the structure in terms of an analogy of dialectics of subject, culture, and community and in terms of the scale of values is my own responsibility. These are rooted in my suggestions of a psychic conversion to complement Lonergan's religious, moral, and intellectual conversions, and in the consequent affirmation of aesthetic-dramatic as well as intellectual, rational, and

component of the unified field structure, the component added to the four-point hypothesis, is what Lonergan calls the *Grund- und Gesamtwissenschaft*, the basic and total science, that consists in (1) cognitional theory, (2) epistemology, (3) the metaphysics of proportionate being, and (4) existential ethics.¹² In this sense, it includes the whole of *Insight* and much of *Method in Theology*, in addition to the complementary material on psychic self-appropriation found in my own work. These would play a role in a contemporary systematics analogous to the role played by Aristotle's metaphysics in the systematics of Thomas Aquinas. As Aristotle's metaphysics provided Aquinas with his general categories and Philip the Chancellor's theorem of the supernatural grounded Aquinas's special categories, so Lonergan's 'basic and total science' as complemented with the material on psychic conversion would ground today's general categories, and his four-point hypothesis would ground today's special categories. But the general categories will consist in the philosophic contributions of a basic and total science *precisely as they give rise to a theory of history*, the kind of theory of history articulated in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. As I indicated in the first chapter, Lonergan says in some notes that he wrote around the time of his breakthrough to the notion of functional specialization that the mediated object of the functional specialty 'doctrines' is redemption in history, and the mediated object of the functional specialty 'systematics' is *Geschichte*.¹³ The theory of history emergent from the cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and existential ethics proposed by Lonergan, joined with the insistence in

deliberative operators of human development: symbols, feelings, interpersonal relations, and love. None of this, of course, is in the least bit foreign to Lonergan. I have been drawing out materials for which the room is already provided in his work.

12 Bernard Lonergan, 'Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response,' in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980* 355-57.

13 For a brief account of some of these notes, see *What Is Systematic Theology?* 149-56.

chapter 2 of *Theology and the Dialectics of History* on the duality of consciousness and the need for psychic as well as intentional self-appropriation, provides systematics with the structure of its general categories, that is, the categories that theology shares with other disciplines.¹⁴ The four-point hypothesis, again, contains the structure of the special categories, the categories peculiar to theology. When integrated into a position on redemption in history, the two components together yield a vision of the reign of God that the incarnate Son preached and established. A position on what constitutes the reign of God may thus be said to constitute the unified field structure of systematic theology.¹⁵

Why is the addition of a theory of history required? Why is the four-point hypothesis not enough to provide a statement of the dogmatic-theological context that can get a contemporary systematics started?

If the four-point theological hypothesis were left to stand alone, the theology that would be built around it would be abstract and relatively static. The hypothesis would ground only the use of special categories, that is, of categories peculiar to theology, and not of those general categories that theology shares with other disciplines. This, it seems,

14 This insistence on the duality of consciousness is at the heart of almost all of my work.

Lonergan's students tend to neglect the psychic component; students of various depth psychologists tend to neglect the 'spirit' component. I have had trouble convincing both camps!

15 This systematic position, of course, can be checked against the results of the best New Testament exegesis in our time. I will not repeat this exegesis here, but as I indicated in chapter 1 will turn the reader primarily to the work of Ben F. Meyer, N.T. Wright, and Raymond Schwager. Correlating *Theology and the Dialectics of History* with the results of such scholarship regarding the reign of God will be a major task. Help is provided by the thorough list of relevant biblical references at the end of Wright's *Jesus and the Victory of God*.

is a perennial theological temptation. The theology that would be developed around the hypothesis alone would be like a soul without a body: perhaps something like Bonaventure without Aquinas, or Hans Urs von Balthasar without Bernard Lonergan.¹⁶ On its own the hypothesis is not able to account concretely and historically for the sets of relations between the divine and the human that formed the focus of Jesus' public ministry, that are the meaning of his death and resurrection, and that, precisely for these reasons, constitute the core intelligibility of a systematic theology. In that sense it cannot provide on its own an articulation of a unified field structure. The hypothesis provides categories for speaking about the divine and about created supernatural realities that enable human beings to reach the very being of God in love, but very little to guide our understanding of the human precisely as nature and as history. The theory of history

16 Conversely, of course, Aquinas can benefit from Bonaventure, and Lonergan from von Balthasar. It is not a question of either/or, but of the appropriate integration of general and special categories in theology. As Aquinas and Lonergan excelled in the use of the general categories within their respective contexts, while not neglecting the special categories, so Bonaventure and von Balthasar have made major contributions to the development of theology's special categories in their respective contexts. But they are weak on the general categories. As I stated above, the appropriate integration of the realities named by general and special categories is the major methodological problem for systematic theology. It plagued the late Middle Ages in the Aristotelian-Augustinian conflict. The extremes to which it is prone can be found in relatively contemporary theology in some variants of the method of correlation, on the one hand, where special categories are collapsed into general categories, and at the other extreme in John Milbank's 'radical orthodoxy,' with its rejection of the significance of the general categories. See Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

provided in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* attempts to add such guidance, precisely by relating ‘religious values’ (which I am now grounding in the four-point hypothesis) to the rest of the scale of values proposed by Lonergan and developed further in that book: personal, cultural, and social values, and the equitable distribution of vital values to the entire community. Together, the hypothesis and the theory of history yield a theological synthesis regarding the kingdom or reign of God in the world.

Since the hypothesis articulates a series of created participations in the divine processions and relations, the integration of the hypothesis with a theory of history would articulate the manner in which historical reality participates in divine life; more precisely, it would articulate the structure of that participation. Such an articulation would constitute what I am looking for, the unified field structure for a systematic theology. Systematic theology, which in its entirety at any one time is always located in a community of inquirers and not in any single individual, is concerned primarily with the participation of historical humankind in divine life. While its principal function is the imperfect and analogical understanding of the mysteries of Christian faith, today that understanding will take the form of a theological theory of history.

Still, the hypothesis does name some of the specifically theological realities or central special categories of the theology that we are here constructing, some of the core categories peculiar to theology. In fact, it names those special categories to which all other special categories must be explicitly related if they are to qualify as special categories in Christian theology.¹⁷ It is for this reason that it forms the dogmatic-

¹⁷ Lonergan speaks in *Method in Theology* (pp. 290-91) of five sets of special theological categories. It is clear from his 1968 lectures at Boston College, where he introduced the functional specialization of *Method in Theology*, that he had been thinking that the five sets would be derived, respectively, from (1) complicating the structure of conscious intentionality, (2) turning to concrete instances of it, (3) filling it

theological context for work in all other areas of systematic beyond Trinitarian theology,

out, (4) differentiating it, and (5) setting it in motion. But what eventually became the third set is not accounted for by filling out the basic structure. If anything, it is the first set of categories in *Method in Theology*, the set having to do with religious experience, that is a function of filling out the basic structure. For the third set, it seems, Lonergan came to see that he had to appeal not to the subject in his or her interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, and so not to the basic structure, but to the other dimension of foundations (see *Method in Theology* 267), namely, the tradition as mediated by the functional specialties of research, interpretation, history, and dialectic. Thus the third set, the one that is pertinent to the present discussion, is expressed in *Method in Theology* (291) as follows: ‘The third set of special categories moves from our loving to the loving source of our love. The Christian tradition makes explicit our implicit intending of God in all our intending by speaking of the Spirit that is given to us, of the Son who redeemed us, of the Father who sent the Son and with the Son sends the Spirit, and of our future destiny when we shall know, not as in a glass darkly, but face to face.’ This set, thus outlined, incorporates each of the elements contained in the four-point hypothesis. Work remains to be done on the movement in Lonergan’s own thought from the 1968 directives for deriving the special categories to the actual sets that are proposed in *Method in Theology*. There are some overlaps among the sets suggested in the two presentations, but there is also a development whose progression is not yet clear in all its details. (The 1968 lectures here referred to are available on audio compact disc in Lonergan’s own voice, produced by Greg Lauzon: ‘Transcendental Philosophy and the Study of Religion.’ These are now available on the Lonergan Archive website www.bernardlonergan.com, starting at 48100A0E060. A transcript will appear in vol. 22 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method 1.*)

Christology, and Pneumatology. And so the first task before us is to offer as thorough and systematic a treatment of the realities contained in that hypothesis as we are able to provide. While I will emphasize that the unified field structure in its entirety constitutes the starting point of systematic theology, an elaboration of the four-point hypothesis is essential to such a beginning, constituting as it does the dogmatic-theological context for the rest of specifically theological system.

Such a statement, of course, is made from a ‘macro’ point of view. The hypothesis explicitly embraces the doctrines of the triune God, the incarnate Word, the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit, and the last things, and it does so in such a way that the mysteries affirmed in these doctrines are related systematically or synthetically to one another. Thus it presents in a systematic order some of the principal realities named by the special categories that a systematics will employ, indeed (it may be argued) the central or core specifically theological realities affirmed in Christian faith. To unpack the hypothesis is a major enterprise, one to which much of a work entitled *The Trinity in History* is devoted. But the systematics also constantly relates the hypothesis to the structure of history, and only that relation constitutes the unified field structure and the starting point of systematic theology.

2 Two Requirements

If I am to be faithful to my own prescriptions in *What Is Systematic Theology?* and to those of Bernard Lonergan, whose method I am following and amplifying and whose efforts in systematics I am attempting to sweep up into the perspective of a theological theory of history, two requirements must be met. Brief mention was made of these in chapter 1, but a fuller argument is required.

2.1 Interiorly and Religiously Differentiated Consciousness

The first requirement is that the objects intended in systematics must be identified, as far as possible, in categories that are based in elements in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness. The metaphysical terms and relations of an earlier theology, while still helpful and in my view necessary if the turn to interiority is not to be a reversion to common sense, are not enough. For such terms and relations, if they are valid, are derived from operations and states of the conscious subject in his or her authenticity, and a methodical theology is methodical precisely and only insofar as it grounds such terms and relations in those conscious operations and states.

The significance of this prescription is momentous. The very meaning of the terms used to name the metaphysical elements will be different depending on whether or not this prescription is followed. As Lonergan himself writes, ‘Empiricism, idealism, and realism name three totally different horizons with no common identical objects.’ When it is a matter of the metaphysical elements – potency, form, and act – ‘realism’ in this sentence must be distinguished into naive realism and critical realism, for a Gilsonian Thomist and a student of Lonergan have different meanings for these terms. The difference affects primarily the term ‘form,’ but because potency is potency for form, and act is act of form, the difference affects these terms as well. Lonergan alone among roughly contemporary Aristotelian-Thomist thinkers has related the metaphysical elements intimately to modern science. For Lonergan the form corresponding to, say, ‘tree’ is not known by seeing several trees and abstracting ‘tree.’ The formal intelligibility of a tree is known hypothetically in the science of botany, and that knowledge is expressed, not in the word ‘tree,’ but in complex scientific formulae that will differentiate trees from other botanical species and different kinds of trees from one another. Such ‘trees,’ as explained, cannot be imagined, let alone seen and pointed to. That difference is rooted in an appropriation of the difference between commonsense and theoretical knowing, that is, in the critical exigency that emerges once the two realms

have been distinguished, and in the complementary meanings of 'real' in the two domains. In Lonergan's words:

Is common sense just primitive ignorance to be brushed aside with an acclaim to science as the dawn of intelligence and reason? Or is science of merely pragmatic value, teaching us how to control nature, but failing to reveal what nature is? Or, for that matter, is there any such thing as human knowing? So man is confronted with the three basic questions: What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it? With these questions one turns from the outer realms of common sense and theory to the appropriation of one's own interiority, one's subjectivity, one's operations, their structure, their norms, their potentialities. Such appropriation, in its technical expression, resembles theory. But in itself it is a heightening of intentional consciousness, an attending not merely to objects but also to the intending subject and his acts. And as this heightened consciousness constitutes the evidence for one's account of knowledge, such an account by the proximity of the evidence differs from all other expression.¹⁸

It is this withdrawal into interiority that is required if we are to make the necessary distinctions of common sense from science and to provide the general basic terms and relations of both philosophy and theology. Again, '... general basic terms name conscious and intentional operations. General basic relations name elements in the dynamic structure linking operations and generating states. Special basic terms name God's gift of his love and Christian witness. Derived terms and relations name the objects known in operations and correlative to states ... *For every term and relation there will*

¹⁸ Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 83.

*exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness.*¹⁹ I would qualify the emphasized portion somewhat, though not in the manner that some might prefer, namely, by claiming that Lonergan is exaggerating when he says ‘every.’ He is not. Nor am I in following him. Rather, the qualification is to the effect that the corresponding conscious element is most often found in intentional consciousness, but it may also be found in nonintentional conscious states. This is particularly the case with the basic gift of God’s love, which, insofar as it is not a response to an apprehended object, is in its originating moment nonintentional. One is first *in* love because one has been loved and has yielded to a love that becomes one’s own because it has been given. One is in love before one understands who or what it is that one is in love with. In its originary moment, this gift, as consciously received, is nonintentional, from the human standpoint. The intentionality that it certainly has is God’s intentionality, the intentionality of the giver, something not clearly available as such to the human recipient of such a gift. If the gift may be identified with St Ignatius Loyola’s ‘consolation without previous cause,’ that is, consolation with a content but without any apprehended object to which it responds, as Karl Rahner proposed and as Lonergan seems to agree, it is pure gift. This is why Lonergan constantly cites Romans 5.5, ‘God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us.’ That is why I find 1 John 4.19 just as foundational a scriptural text. ‘We are to love, then, because God loved us first.’

Such a conclusion makes sense only in that we are talking about a consolation that is not a response to an *apprehended* object. And it is in itself an incomplete conclusion. It rings partially true, but not completely true to our religious experience of such consolation. Lonergan provides what we need to solve the conundrum. This consolation comes from God and is the fruit of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit from the Father and

19 Ibid. 343, emphasis added. In the previous chapter, I added the category ‘special basic relations,’ which are found in the reciprocal relations of sanctifying grace and charity.

the Word, and so at its source it is God's own response to God as God apprehends God. That is thoroughly intentional. In that sense, this consolation without a previous cause *does* proceed from knowledge, but that knowledge is not ours, but is identical with the eternal Father and the Father's only begotten Son, the eternal Word of the Father, the *verbum spirans amorem*. But we do not know that simply by experiencing it.

The theological significance of this first prescription or requirement, that of grounding every term and relation in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, is multiform, but for now we can limit our consideration to two matters of importance. In *Theology and the Dialectics of History* and elsewhere, I have insisted that interiorly differentiated consciousness includes both intentionality and psyche, and that insistence is particularly significant for grounding that part of the unified field structure that presents a theory of history. The two matters of importance that I wish to stress here refer to other issues: the psychological analogy, and the constitution of what Lonergan calls religiously differentiated consciousness. The two are interrelated, since I wish to suggest that religiously differentiated consciousness, in the form of an appropriation of the relation of sanctifying grace to charity, would enable the articulation of a new development on the so-called psychological analogy.

2.1.1 The Psychological Analogy

The first matter to be considered is the future of what has been called the psychological analogy under the conditions that I am proposing. The basic point of the psychological analogy, as it has been proposed by Augustine and developed by Aquinas and most completely by Lonergan, is that the divine relations, which are at the core of the four-point hypothesis, are conceived on an analogy with human dynamic consciousness. Such consciousness, then, must be accurately understood in its immanent terms and relations, and the understanding must be presented as thoroughly as possible. For this that there is

no substitute for a long and repeated struggle with the texts first of Lonergan's *Insight* and then of *The Triune God: Systematics*, along with the background in Lonergan's work on *verbum* in Aquinas, which enables an articulation of the psychological analogy that is far more detailed than Aquinas's own presentation of *emanatio intelligibilis*. There is no excuse for not going to the most highly developed instance of the analogy if we want to understand its potential contribution. Our 'macro' perspective assumes the four-point hypothesis into the starting point of a systematic theology. That starting point itself consists in the elaboration of the unified field structure of a theological heuristic of history. But the initial task involved in unpacking the hypothesis is to provide a hypothetical understanding of the four divine relations, and this will entail rehabilitating the psychological analogy. That analogy can be rehabilitated only by engaging in the self-appropriation to which one is invited in *Insight* and then applying that self-appropriation to the construction of an analogy for understanding procession in God.

The psychological analogy has fallen on hard times in theology. Part of the reason for that, I believe, is that it has rarely been understood. What has not been understood very well in the history of theology is how act proceeds from act in the autonomous spiritual dimension of human consciousness, and in particular how different acts of understanding ground a series of inner words. Nothing has more potential to revive academic and intellectual culture in general than to awaken a sense of this dimension of human spirituality. The transcendental notions of the intelligible, the true, and the good would become the heart of such a culture. The opposition to the psychological analogy on the part of both Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar, two great theologians otherwise not united on many fronts, is due to their respective failures to grasp precisely this procession in consciousness of word from understanding and its significance for a remote analogical understanding of the procession of the divine Word.

Moreover, as a result of Lonergan's later reflections on the analogy, there is available to us a possibility of reorienting the analogy in a more existential and

religiously significant way. But we can do that only once we have grasped the cognitive emphasis that is to the fore in the Trinitarian theologies of Aquinas and the early Lonergan. The traditional emphasis found in Aquinas and made much more explicit in the early work of Lonergan concentrates on how the act of understanding grounds a proceeding inner word, and on how understanding and inner word together ground acts of love.

While it is true that neither of these dimensions of the dynamism of consciousness moving ‘from below,’ that is, neither the cognitional nor the existential, has been adequately grasped in the history of theology subsequent to Aquinas, and so that Lonergan’s retrieval of these emphases is one of the most welcome features in the whole of twentieth-century thought, still it must also be emphasized that these presentations of the analogy for the Trinity, once they have been understood in their own right, can be supplemented by another version of the analogy that, while related to the analogy ‘from below,’ will be more appealing at least to some students of theology and perhaps more pertinent for the pastoral communication of the gospel message. Lonergan explicitly acknowledged in his late reflections on Trinitarian theology the possibility of another approach to the psychological analogy, one in which love, not knowledge, is the starting point. Love is not simply the end result of spiritual procession, as in the analogy as it was presented by the early Lonergan. Love propels the entire set of autonomous spiritual processions. And so we have a great deal of work to do, not simply to retrieve the analogy in its Augustinian and Thomist forms, but to develop it and to make it better. I hope to provide contributions to both of these tasks in the present work.

Perhaps we will find something of an internal inconsistency in Lonergan’s own presentation of the analogy in his early Trinitarian work. For even in his Trinitarian treatises written at the Gregorian University in the 1950s and 1960s, the inner word that provides an analogue for the divine Word is not a concept, not even a judgment of fact, but a judgment of value; and yet his unpacking of the processions is still in terms of the

emanation of a purely cognitional judgment, a judgment in which there is formed (in Thomas's words) a *likeness (similitudo)* of what is known to be. The truth of a judgment of value cannot be expressed in this way, for a true judgment of value may disapprove of what is and approve of what is not, and then there is not formed in the judgment of value a likeness of what is known to be. The work of elaborating in what the truth of a judgment of value consists, even when that judgment is generated in a movement from below, remains to be done. An overhauling even of the early analogy 'from below' is required, once it is acknowledged that the relevant inner word is a judgment of value. What makes for the truth, not of a judgment of fact, but of a judgment of value? The appropriation of the emanation of a word that is a judgment of value is by no means as clear in Lonergan's work as is the appropriation of the procession of a true judgment of fact, which, once one has caught on to what Lonergan is about, is really very clear. In a question-and-answer session following his lecture at Marquette University of 1965, 'Dimensions of Meaning,' Lonergan states, 'The approach in *Insight* is existential in the sense of existential philosophy but it has dimensions that are not acknowledged ordinarily in existential philosophy, namely, this level of judgment and the possibility of judgments of value being true.'²⁰ This is true. But the process of arriving at a true judgment of value is not articulated in *Insight* or anywhere else by Lonergan in a fashion that is as clear and thorough as his treatment of reflective insight grasping the sufficiency of evidence for a judgment of fact. We must try to shore up what is still inchoate in his writings, even in the later writings, where a new notion of value emerges.

Again, even the retrieval of the earlier forms of the analogy, and especially of the emanation of word from understanding, is made more difficult today by the one-way emphases of much philosophy of language, whether analytic, Heideggerian, or

20 See www.bernardlonergan.com at 43200DTE060 (audio at 43200A0E060).

poststructuralist,²¹ and by the consequent neglect that the science of spirituality, precisely as spirituality, has suffered. The linguistic idealism that has neglected the dependence of inner and outer word upon understanding is the culmination of a trajectory of decline in philosophy and theology alike that was initiated by Scotus and Ockham and others. A rehabilitation of the psychological analogy involves as well a massive reversal of centuries of philosophic decline in this one area, even as gains were undoubtedly made in others.²²

Again, what is the character of an analogy that begins, not from knowledge but from love? It complicates the matter quite thoroughly that there are actually two psychological analogies in Lonergan's writings, two analogies drawn from the dynamic consciousness of the intelligent creature, and that one of these, the purely cognitional analogy, is natural, while the other, the one that begins with love, is open to being an analogy in the supernatural order, that is, when the love with which it begins is God's love poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. The cognitional analogy has been worked through by Lonergan, even if with the inconsistency pointed out above, but it is the supernatural analogy, I believe, that is really the one to which a future systematics might want to hitch its star. We must go beyond the

21 For an effort at balance see Robert M. Doran, 'Reception and Elemental Meaning: An Expansion of the Notion of Psychic Conversion,' *Toronto Journal of Theology* 20:2 (2004) 133-57; 'Insight and Language: Steps towards the Resolution of a Problem,' *Divyadaan* 15:3 (2004) 405-26; 'Empirical Consciousness in *Insight*: Is Our Conception Too Narrow?' in *The Importance of Insight*, ed. David Liptay and John Liptay (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 49-63. These will all be uploaded to www.robertmdoran.com.

22 For Lonergan's succinct statement of the problem and of the essential elements of a response, see *Method in Theology* 253-57.

analogies that have been offered us in relatively detailed fashion by Augustine, Aquinas, and the early Lonergan, even as we acknowledge that developing these analogies promoted permanent achievements in human self-understanding and that we must rely on these achievements even as we move on from them to develop an analogy that was only hinted at by Lonergan in his late reflections.

For all that, though, we must follow Lonergan in articulating the analogy from nature first, the cognitional analogy. Only on that basis can we take up the challenge that he presented late in life to develop an analogy in the supernatural order. By following through on his work in this way, we will locate the inconsistency and the relative deficiency of the earlier analogy, but we will also have the best opportunity we could ask for in a systematic theology to present the extraordinary analysis of cognitive and existential interiority that Lonergan has offered us. Since this analysis grounds all our general categories, it must be featured from the outset in our efforts to construct a systematics. While I cannot repeat the work of *Insight* every time I write something new, I can subsume it into the new work and point to its abiding significance. In a Trinitarian theology, the way to do this is to review the work that Lonergan himself has done in moving toward an acceptable psychological analogy for Trinitarian processions. I will attempt to do that in these volumes, while reminding the reader that a fuller commentary on Lonergan's earlier Trinitarian systematics will soon be placed online.

Perhaps I need to say a bit more about the precise issue at stake here.

As we have seen, the First Vatican Council speaks of theological understanding in the following manner: 'Reason illumined by faith, when it inquires diligently, reverently, and judiciously, with God's help attains some understanding of the mysteries, and that a highly fruitful one, both from the analogy of what it naturally knows and from the interconnection of the mysteries with one another and with our last end' (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132). Lonergan appeals repeatedly to this statement of the Council in his various attempts to explain what the systematic part of theology is all about. This is the

case both before and after he reached the highly differentiated account of theological operations that constitutes his notion of functional specialization. Thus, in his 1954 review article ‘Theology and Understanding,’²³ in which he engages with both respect and qualifications Johannes Beumer’s book *Theologie als Glaubensverständnis*, he finds himself in agreement with the author on the interpretation of the Council but in disagreement with Beumer’s interpretation of the texts of St Thomas Aquinas that have to do with theological understanding. On Lonergan’s interpretation, Aquinas’s position and practice are entirely in keeping with the later teaching of the Council and provide a clear example of what the Council was talking about. Again, in the 1957 *Divinarum personarum conceptio analogica* and its 1964 revision *De Deo trino: Pars systematica*, the teaching of the Council frames Lonergan’s view of what he is doing as he works out a systematic understanding of the Church’s Trinitarian dogmas. These writings all appeared before Lonergan made the great methodological breakthrough to functional specialization, where systematics becomes but one of eight differentiated sets of theological operations. Despite that breakthrough, the principal task of systematics remains what it was before Lonergan arrived at the notion of functional specialization, namely, the promotion of the kind of understanding of the mysteries that is spoken of in the conciliar document.²⁴

Now, in a very late statement regarding the nature of an analogy to assist us in gaining some imperfect but highly fruitful understanding of the mystery of the divine processions, the divine relations, and the divine persons, Lonergan at least potentially opens the possibility of a different kind of analogy from that emphasized by the Council,

23 Bernard Lonergan, ‘Theology and Understanding,’ in *Collection*, vol. 4 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 114-32.

24 Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 336.

an analogy not based on natural knowledge, at least not proximately, but grounded in the supernatural life of grace, a certain kind of analogy of faith, if you wish, or better, an analogy of grace. The Council spoke of understanding the mysteries of faith not only by analogy with what reason knows naturally but also through the interconnection of the mysteries with one another. But the statement to which I am referring goes beyond both of these avenues to theological understanding, in that it evokes the possibility of an analogy between various mysteries of faith. It is the possibility of such an analogy that I am emphasizing.

The late statement of Lonergan's to which I refer appears in his 1975 lecture at Laval University in Quebec City, 'Christology Today: Methodological Reflections.' Lonergan asks one of the same questions he posed in *De Deo trino*, namely, 'Can one speak intelligibly of three distinct and conscious subjects of divine consciousness?' His answer is, 'I believe that one can, but to do so one must take the psychological analogy of the Trinitarian processions seriously, one must be able to follow the reasoning from processions to relations and from relations to persons, and one has to think analogously of consciousness.'²⁵ Thus far there is no difference from the position expressed in his earlier works on the systematics of the Trinity. The difference appears when he unfolds the nature of the psychological analogy. The analogy that he presents in 'Christology Today' differs in one very significant way from the analogy that he employed in *The Triune God: Systematics*, even though there are obvious correspondences as well. This is what he writes in 'Christology Today':

The psychological analogy ... has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in

25 Bernard Lonergan, 'Christology Today: Methodological Reflections,' *A Third Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985) 93.

love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.²⁶

How does this ‘analogy found in the creature’ provide some dim glimpse of the divine processions, relations, and persons? Lonergan continues:

Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named *ho Theos*, who is identified with *agapē* (1 John 4.8, 16). Such love expresses itself in its Word, its Logos, its *verbum spirans amorem*, which is a judgment of value. The judgment of value is sincere, and so it grounds the Proceeding Love that is identified with the Holy Spirit.

There are then two processions that may be conceived in God; they are not unconscious processes but intellectually, rationally, morally conscious, as are judgments of value based on the evidence perceived by a lover, and the acts of loving grounded on judgments of value. The two processions ground four real relations of which three are really distinct from one another; and these three are not just relations as relations, and so modes of being, but also subsistent, and so not just paternity and filiation [and passive spiration] but also Father and Son [and Holy Spirit]. Finally, Father and Son and Spirit are eternal; their consciousness is not in time but timeless; their subjectivity is not becoming but ever itself; and each in his own distinct manner is subject of the infinite act that God is, the Father as originating love, the Son as judgment of value expressing that love, and the Spirit as originated loving.²⁷

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid. 93-94.

I am fastening here on the statement that ‘the psychological analogy ... has its starting point in ... the dynamic state of being in love.’ This alone differentiates this position from the earlier one, where the starting point was a cognitional grasp of the sufficiency of evidence to ground a judgment of value regarding the subject’s existential self-constitution, some such judgment as ‘This is what it would be good for me to be.’ I wish to argue that the new starting point renders possible a new dimension of analogical understanding, one that begins not in the natural but in the supernatural, graced order. We may contrast this starting point with the starting point of Lonergan’s earlier expression of the psychological analogy as well as with the corresponding starting point in the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas. But we must also suggest what the process is within the order of grace from the gift of *gratia gratum faciens* through judgments of value grounded in that gift to acts of loving and a habit of charity. This will amount to the articulation of the relation of sanctifying grace and charity, which themselves are created imitations of and participations in the divine relations of active and passive spiration. It is in this sense that the analogy within the order of grace takes shape.

2.1.2 Religiously Differentiated Consciousness

The starting point of the analogy is claimed to be ‘the dynamic state of being in love.’ How does Lonergan understand that dynamic state? For an answer to this question, I turn to *Method in Theology*, where being in love is affective self-transcendence, as distinguished from intellectual and moral self-transcendence. One is self-transcendent affectively when one falls in love, and that happening is described as follows by Lonergan: ‘when the isolation of the individual [is] broken and he spontaneously [functions] not just for himself but for others as well.’²⁸

28 Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 289.

Now if we return to the analysis presented in our first chapter, there would seem to be grounds for distinguishing this event into two intimately related components, often distinguish to distinguish: to use the language of the citation just mentioned, there is the breaking of the isolation of the person, and there is the release of a new way of being, so that one spontaneously functions not just for oneself but for others as well. The two components are causally related. Spontaneous functioning with affective self-transcendence is not possible until something has released one from one's isolation. What releases one from one's isolation is the conscious experience, whether articulate or not, of being on the receiving end of a love that one can trust. It is clear from our first chapter that I wish to stress the twofold character of this event, perhaps more than Lonergan himself does, and that this stress is central to my position and to what I would maintain is the correct appropriation through interiority of the relation between sanctifying grace and charity. There is a two-step process here, and it is essential to grasp it.

This insistence on my part puts me in the awkward position of finding my mentor's late reduction of the four-point hypothesis to a three-point statement to be too compact, in fact to be something of a reversion from theoretically differentiated consciousness to common sense. In my view (and in Lonergan's) that is not what interiorly differentiated consciousness is all about. Such consciousness is *post*-theoretical, subsuming theory into a new realm of being. The self-affirmation of the knower in chapter 11 of *Insight* is explanatory, not descriptive, and this sets the standard for all further developments upon this initial step in self-appropriation, including developments in the realm of grace and supernatural life. This insistence is also entirely continuous with the phenomenology and causal analysis presented in chapter 8 of my *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, where I insist on the need for being released from isolation as the condition of the possibility of habitual loving. It is also consistent with the emphasis in my paper delivered at the 2008 Lonergan Workshop at Boston College, 'Preserving Lonergan's Understanding of Thomist Metaphysics: A Proposal and an Example,' in

which I insisted that, while metaphysics becomes derivative in the third stage of meaning, it remains essential for the control of meaning. From this standpoint, then, further differentiations will have to be introduced into Lonergan's account of what he calls being in love with God.

Lonergan distinguishes three forms of affective self-transcendence. There is 'the love of intimacy, of husband and wife, of parents and children,' where in many instances key events with a far larger significance occur. The mother's smile welcoming her infant into the universe can be a medium of communicating a love that prevents isolation. Next, here is 'the love of mankind devoted to the pursuit of human welfare locally or nationally or globally.' Finally, there is a love that [is] other-worldly because it [admits] no conditions or qualifications or restrictions or reservations.' Lonergan claims that this other-worldly love, when considered 'not as this or that act, not as a series of acts, but as a dynamic state whence proceed the acts ... constitutes in a methodical theology what in a theoretical theology is named sanctifying grace.'²⁹ As sanctifying grace is for Thomas Aquinas's metaphysical or theoretical theology an entitative habit rooted in the essence of the soul, so for Lonergan the dynamic state of being in love without qualifications or reservations or conditions is an elevation of 'central form,' that is, an elevation of that by which a human being is constituted as intelligibly one unity-identity-whole, and so in effect an elevation of the person in his or her conscious and unconscious totality. The elevation is to participation in Trinitarian life. In the refinements that I am suggesting, *gratia gratum faciens* is the communication of the divine love that welcomes one into Trinitarian life, and the dynamic state of being in love is the habitual charity that flows from that gift, mediated by the judgment of value that breathes such love, a judgment that participates in the Word's role in active spiration.

29 Ibid.

Sanctifying grace, then, is a created share in the active spiration that is Father and Son breathing the eternal Spirit of Love, while the habit of charity, the antecedent universal willingness that is disposed to return good for evil, the dynamic state that proceeds from the gift of divine love, is a created share in the passive spiration that is the Holy Spirit. This willingness is itself a gift that discloses itself in the succession of free acts of ‘originated loving’ to which the dynamic state of being in love, the judgments of value born of that state, and the willing of the end in charity give rise. We have here the entire dramatic scenario for locating in human religious experience *gratia operans* and *gratia cooperans*, in the orders of both habitual and actual grace.

Given these refinements, then, the analogy that Lonergan suggests in ‘Christology Today’ undergoes several modifications. It might be said that it undergoes a reduplication. For there is an analogy from reception of divine *agapē* to a judgment of value and from these together to the proceeding habitual state of being in love, and there is a further analogy from that habitual state of being in love now constituted as a created relation to Father and Son, through judgments of value, to acts of loving that proceed from *agapē* and its word of value, its *verbum spirans amorem*.

Now it is true that Lonergan’s initial sketch in ‘Christology Today’ of a Trinitarian analogy that begins with love does not necessarily imply a supernatural analogy, an analogy within the order of grace, the analogy of created participations in active and passive spiration, since there are other forms of being in love besides the other-worldly love that is sanctifying grace. But neither does it exclude the possibility of such an analogy, and this possibility is what I propose to pursue here. Any of the three kinds of love may function in an analogy that starts from love, but it seems antecedently likely that Lonergan would be partial to an analogy that is based on the total self-transcendence that is the gift of God’s own love. **B**eing on the receiving end of unqualified love gives rise to judgments of value that one would not utter were one not gifted in this way, and these judgments ‘spirate’ the universal willingness that alone can

meet the problem of evil in self-sacrificing love. The first analogy in the supernatural order moves from the state of being on the receiving end of a love that is without conditions, qualifications, restrictions, reservations, to a judgment of value or a set of judgments of value that proceeds from such giftedness, and from these considered together to the antecedently habitual universal willingness that cumulatively gives rise to acts of loving that coalesce into an ever firmer disposition of charity. The *agapē* received as a love without conditions is the graced analogue for the divine Father, the judgment of value that proceed from that state of being loved without conditions constitutes the graced analogue for the divine Word, and these two considered together function in graced consciousness in a manner remotely analogous to the way active spiration functions in divine consciousness, precisely because they are a created participation in the divine Father and Son together breathing the Holy Spirit. As from being gifted with love and a consequent judgment of value there proceeds the antecedent willingness that coalesces free acts of loving into an ever firmer disposition of charity, so from divine paternity and filiation together there proceeds the Love that is the Holy Spirit. Such is the analogy of grace I am suggesting, building on Lonergan's shift of the significance of the psychological analogy from what it had been in the tradition to a new level of exposition and relevance.

2.1.3 The Earlier and Later Analogies and the Times of Election

What, then, is the difference between this position and the analogy found in Thomas's *Summa theologiae*, *Prima pars*, questions 27 through 43, and in a far more expansive form in Lonergan's earlier systematics of the Trinity? The difference between the two analogies is basically the difference between Lonergan's earlier and later accounts of judgments of value and decision: the earlier analogy corresponds to the earlier account of

these realities, the account found in *Insight*, while the later analogy corresponds to the later account, that presented in *Method in Theology*.

There are, then, two quite distinct treatments of judgments of value and decision in Lonergan's writings. In *Insight*, in Lonergan's own words, the good is 'the intelligent and reasonable.' A good decision is a decision that is consistent with what one *knows* to be true and good. The decision-making process is very similar to the cognitional process, adding only the further element of free choice. Decision is simply an extension of intelligence and reason into the realm of action. In the process one assembles the data, one has a practical insight into what is to be done, one grasps that the evidence supports the practical insight, one judges that this is to be done, one freely chooses to do it. Again, the good is the intelligent and reasonable. There is no explicit mention of a fourth level of consciousness, a level beyond the three cognitional levels of experience, understanding, and judgment, but if in fact there is a fourth level latent in this account, it lies only in the free choice and consequent action.

In *Method in Theology*, on the other hand, the good is, as Lonergan says, a notion distinct from the intelligent and reasonable. This does not mean, obviously, that the good is the stupid and silly, but that it is intended in a kind of question that is distinct from the question for intelligence, What is it? and the question for judgment, Is it so? The question that intends the good is rather something like, Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? Is it better than such and such an alternative way of proceeding? The good is aspired to in an intentional response of feeling to values. Possible values are apprehended in feelings. The judgment of value that knows the good proceeds from a discernment of these feelings in which possible values are apprehended, in order to determine which are the possible values that are apprehended by love and which are ambiguous or not at all to be acknowledged from the standpoint of performative self-transcendence or personal authenticity. Such discernment is a very precarious affair. We are easily subject to illusion and deception. Still, when these judgments of value are made

by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience, or even better by a person in love in an unqualified fashion, by one who is in the dynamic state of being in love with God, what is good is clearly known. The good is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions. And all of this, from the intending all the way up to and through fidelity, belongs to a fourth level of consciousness, a level beyond the three levels constitutive of cognitional process, that is, experience, understanding, and judgment of fact. Thus, there are significant differences between the two presentations of decision. The second account offers a much fuller expansion of consciousness, especially at the fourth level. The difference is found precisely in the following sentences from *Method in Theology*: 'Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feelings. The feelings in question are not ... non-intentional states, trends, urges, that are related to efficient and final causes but not to objects. Again, they are not intentional responses to such objects as the agreeable or disagreeable, the pleasant or painful, the satisfying or dissatisfying. For, while these are objects, still they are ambiguous objects that may prove to be truly good or bad or only apparently good or bad. Apprehensions of value occur in a further category of intentional response which greets either the ontic value of a person or the qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements.'³⁰ These intermediate apprehensions of possible values in feelings are not mentioned anywhere in the account of decision in *Insight*.

Now it is often thought that the treatment in *Method in Theology* represents an alternative position to the treatment in *Insight*, and that in Lonergan's view the presentation in *Insight* should be discarded in favor of that which appears in *Method*. I have long resisted this position, even if Lonergan himself may have held it (and there is

30 Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 37-38.

some evidence that he did).³¹ In my view each of Lonergan's articulations of the dynamics of decision has its own limited validity. The two articulations complement each other. The first is not overshadowed by the second. Rather, they mark distinct times of making decisions, where the times are a function of the disposition of the existential subject. They are both permeated by love and grace. And the criteria of both accounts must be satisfied in every decision that we make.

The basis for my position is found not in Lonergan, but in St Ignatius Loyola. I have argued elsewhere that Lonergan's two approaches to decision-making present the general form of two of the three times of election in the Ignatian *Spiritual Exercises*.³² The account in *Insight* presents the general form of St Ignatius's third time of election, and the account in *Method in Theology* the general form of the second time. In the second time, 'much light and knowledge is obtained by experiencing consolations and desolations, and by experience of the discernment of various spirits,' whereas 'the third time is one of tranquility: when one considers, first, for what one is born, that is, to praise God our Lord, and to save one's soul; and when, desiring this, one chooses as the means

31 See Bernard Lonergan, 'Insight Revisited,' in *A Second Collection*, ed. William F.J. Ryan, S.J., and Bernard J. Tyrrell, S.J. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 277.

32 See Robert M. Doran, 'Ignatian Themes in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan,' *Toronto Journal of Theology* 22:1 (2006) 39-54. This paper was revised and expanded for presentation at the 2006 Lonergan Workshop at Boston College, and the revised and expanded version has been published in the proceedings of the Workshop, *Lonergan Workshop 19*, ed. Fred Lawrence (Boston College, 2006) 83-106 with the title 'Ignatian Themes in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan: Revisiting a Topic that Deserves Further Reflection.' Both of these will soon be available on the website www.robertmdoran.com.

to this end a kind or state of life within the bounds of the Church, in order that one may thereby be helped to serve God our Lord, and to save one's soul. I said a time of tranquility; that is, when the soul is not agitated by divers spirits, but enjoys the use of its natural powers freely and quietly.'³³ As there is a complementarity between the second and third times in St Ignatius, so there is a complementarity between the two presentations of decision in Lonergan. That is, the judgment of value and the decision that one arrives at in Ignatius's second time, by discerning affective pulls and counterpulls ('divers spirits'), must be able to be adjudicated as well by the criteria of intelligence, reason, and responsibility that are explicitly appealed to in the third time; conversely, the judgments of value and decisions that are arrived at in the third time must produce the same 'peace of a good conscience' on the part of a virtuous person that would result from the proper discernment of affective pulls and counterpulls in the second time. So too, the decisions that one arrives at by employing intelligence and reason as outlined in *Insight* must be confirmed by the peace of a good conscience, whereas the decisions that one reaches by the discernment of affective pulls and counterpulls, as in the account in *Method in Theology*, must be able to be adjudicated by the criteria of intelligence and reasonableness, however much these may be modified by the life of grace, where what seems foolishness to the wise of this world may be really the wisdom of God.

The account of decision in *Insight* explicitly prescind from any discussion of affective involvement, and so it at least implicitly presupposes that the person making a decision is not agitated in such a way that one is prevented from employing his or her natural powers of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. In this account one's decisions are good decisions if in fact they are harmonious with what one knows to

33 *The Text of the Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius*, trans. Henry Keane, S.J.

(London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1952) §§ 175-78.

be true and good. Moral integrity is a matter of generating decisions and consequent actions that are consistent with what one knows, that is, that are consistent with the inner words of judgments of fact and judgments of value that one has sufficient reason to hold to be true. If this is the case, then Lonergan's account in *Insight* would remain as permanently valid as St Ignatius's account of the third time of election. It just is not the only account, because it names only one of the times of making a good decision.

In contrast, in the presentation that is found in *Method in Theology* it is self-transcendent affectivity, affectivity that matches the unrestricted reach of the transcendental notion of value, the affectivity of a person in love, in the limit the affectivity of a person in love in an unqualified fashion, with God's own love poured out in one's heart through the Holy Spirit that has been given one (Romans 5.5), that provides the criteria for the decision. Which course of action reflects, embodies, incarnates the self-transcendent love that matches the reach of the transcendental notion of value, especially as that unrestricted intention reaches fulfilment in God's gift of God's own love as embodied in the incarnate Word of God, in his life, death, and resurrection from the dead? The answer to that question gives the indication as to the direction in which one is to go as one heads towards a judgment of value and a consequent decision. This presentation, again, corresponds to St Ignatius's second time of election.

Now these two accounts of decision provide, respectively, the elements also of Lonergan's two distinct but complementary approaches to a psychological analogy for a systematic understanding of the divine processions and relations. At this point the Trinitarian mysticism of Lonergan joins and – if I may be so bold as to suggest it – advances the Trinitarian mysticism of St Ignatius. If I am right about the correspondence of Lonergan and Ignatius on times of decision, then we can say that Lonergan relates the Trinity to St Ignatius's moments for making decisions that proceed from authentic judgments of value.

In the first psychological analogy found in Lonergan's work, which is presented in intricate detail in the systematic part of his work *De Deo trino (The Triune God: Systematics)*, the analogue in the creature is found in those moments of existential self-constitution in which we grasp the sufficiency of evidence regarding what it would be good for one to be, utter the judgment of value, 'This is good,' and proceed to decisions commensurate with that grasp of evidence and judgment of value. From the act of grasping the evidence there proceeds the act of judging value, and from the two together there proceeds the love that embraces the good and carries it out. The analogy follows completely the account of decision presented in *Insight*: from grasp of evidence to judgment of value, and from grasp of evidence and judgment of value together to good decision.³⁴ So too in divine self-constitution, from the Father's grasp of the grounds for affirming the goodness of all that the Father is and knows (including the divine economy of our salvation), there proceeds the eternal Word of the Father saying Yes to it all, and from the Father and the Word together there proceeds the eternal mutual Love of Father and Son that is the Holy Spirit. This theology of God's own self-constitution in

34 To be precise, I should indicate that Lonergan does not use the expression 'judgment of value' in this context in *Insight* (completed for all practical purposes in 1953). But in *Divinarum personarum* (1957) he says 'iudicium practicum seu iudicium valoris,' 'a practical judgment or judgment of value,' and in *De Deo trino: Pars systematica* (1964) 'iudicium practicum' is dropped to leave only 'iudicium valoris.' Judgments of value are spoken of in *Insight* only in chapter 20, in the analysis of belief. There is needed a study of the development of Lonergan's language on this matter. The 'iudicium valoris' of 1964 is not exactly the same as the judgment of value in *Method in Theology*, for the second account of the process of decision had not yet found articulation. 'Iudicium valoris' in the 1964 text is simply a slightly nuanced expression for the 'judgment' referred to in *Insight's* account of the process of making a decision.

knowledge, word, and love is informed by an analogy with human rational self-consciousness as Lonergan has understood it in *Insight*. One's self-appropriation of one's rational self-consciousness in the form in which it is presented in *Insight* – and it is such consciousness that functions without technical self-appropriation in St Ignatius's third time of election – will ultimately entail recognizing those processes, those processions, as constituting an *image* of the Trinitarian processions themselves, the *imago Dei*. And of course we must emphasize with the Fourth Lateran Council that 'one cannot note any similarity between Creator and creature – however great – that would obviate the need always to note an ever greater dissimilarity.' In this instance, the ever greater dissimilarity is shown in part in the fact that the human analogue is constituted by the procession of act from act. The judgment of value is an act distinct from the act of grasping evidence, and the act of loving decision is an act distinct from both the act of grasping evidence and the act of judgment of value. But in God there are not really distinct acts but really distinct relations within the one infinite act that God is. The linking of consubstantiality with emanation or procession is the heart of the mystery. We are not able to penetrate any further than this. We are asked simply to affirm that this is the way it must be and bow before the mystery.

Now in his later work Lonergan proposes or at least suggests the distinct psychological analogy for the Trinity that I have already cited. This analogy is more closely related to the account of decision in *Method in Theology* and so to St Ignatius's second time of election. As moral integrity, according to the presentation in *Method in Theology*, entails generating the judgments of value of a person who is in love, and as religious integrity entails generating the judgments of value of a person who is in love in an unqualified way, without reservations or conditions, and as those judgments of value are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving, so the Father now is infinite and eternal being-in-love, an *agapē* that generates a Word, the eternal Yes that is the Son, a

Word that breathes love, a Yes that grounds the Proceeding Love that is breathed forth from *agapē* and from its manifestation in such a Word.

In *De Deo trino*, where the earlier analogy is developed more extensively perhaps than at any other point in the entire history of theology, Lonergan repeats over and over again the affirmation of the First Vatican Council that we are able to attain an imperfect, analogical, developing, and most fruitful understanding of the divine mysteries by proceeding from analogies with what we know by natural knowledge. It is clear from this constant repetition of the Council's statement that he intends the analogy that he is presenting in *De Deo trino* to be an analogy from nature. It is a commonplace interpretation that, while the earlier analogy proceeds from below upwards in human consciousness, the later analogy proceeds from above downwards. But there is the much more important difference that we have already noticed. Each of the analogies is an analogy found in the creature, but the earlier analogy is found in our natural powers of understanding uttering a word of assent and of love proceeding from understanding and word, while the created analogue in the second analogy allows for the possibility of a basis in the supernatural order, in the experienced gift of God's own love, the felt sense of being on the receiving end of an unqualified love and of being invited to participate in that love wherever such participation will take one. As I said earlier, this is the felt sense, as it were, of 'gratia gratum faciens,' and so is the conscious manifestation of what theology has traditionally called sanctifying grace. It releases the dynamic state of being in love in an unqualified way, the state that corresponds to what theology has traditionally called the habit of charity. In Lonergan's theology sanctifying grace is a created participation in, and imitation of, the active spiration of Father and Word lovingly breathing the Holy Spirit, while the habit of charity that flows from sanctifying grace is a created participation in, and imitation of, the passive spiration, the divine Proceeding Love, that is the Holy Spirit. To repeat what I introduced in chapter 1, more concretely for Christians sanctifying grace is a created participation in, and imitation of, the

Incarnate Word, the incarnate *Verbum spirans amorem*, whose humanity is itself a participation in, and imitation of, the one he called ‘Abba, Father,’ the imitation of whom Jesus characterizes in the words, ‘... love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you; in this way you will be children of your Father in heaven, for he causes his sun to rise on the bad as well as the good, and his rain to fall on honest and dishonest alike’ (Matthew 5.44-45). *That* is being in love in an unqualified fashion. As the Holy Spirit proceeds from the *agapē* that is the Father and from the Word that the Father utters in saying Yes to God’s own goodness, so the habit of charity – a love that extends to enemies and that gives sunshine and rain to all alike – flows from our created participation in, and imitation of, that active spiration, that is, from the entitative change that is the grace that makes us not only pleasing to God, *gratia gratum faciens*, but somehow imitative of the divine goodness because participants in it. ‘You must therefore be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect’ (Matthew 5.48). Again, it is in this participation and imitation, this mimesis of God, if you will, that we are moved beyond the otherwise endless cycle of violence, recrimination, judgment, blame, accusation, murder, hate, and false religion. Such is the state of grace understood as an intersubjective situation whose founding subjects are the three divine subjects as they have chosen to come and dwell in us and with us.³⁵

In the first, natural analogy, the analogy that recognizes in human nature an image of the Trinitarian processions, love flows from knowledge and word, as Lonergan emphasizes over and over again in *De Deo trino*. In the second, supernatural analogy, the analogy that recognizes that grace makes us not only images of but also participants in the Trinitarian relations, the felt sense of being on the receiving end of unqualified love precedes a knowledge that in Lonergan’s late work is explicitly called ‘faith,’ where faith is understood as the knowledge born of love. More precisely, this knowledge entails the

35 See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 512-19.

grasp of evidence that is possible only for one aware of such love and the judgments of value that proceed from that grasp. In its perfection this reflective act of understanding is the grasp of evidence for nonviolent resistance even to hatred and evil rather than for violent return of evil for evil, and faith's judgments of value are judgments that proceed from that grasp. From this felt sense of unqualified love and its *verbum spirans amorem* there flows the dynamic state of being in love that is charity.

More radically, however, it must be said that here too love flows from knowledge. The felt sense of being on the receiving end of unqualified love flows, not from our knowledge but from the eternal *Verbum spirans Amorem*, the Word breathing Love, that is the image of the eternal Father, the Word who himself proceeds from eternity as the Father's judgment of value pronouncing an infinite Yes to God's own goodness, to the goodness of one who makes his sun to rise on the bad as well as the good, and his rain to fall on honest and dishonest alike. And the dynamic state of being in love that is charity proceeds from the faith that is the knowledge born of the felt sense of 'gratia gratum faciens.'

In this case the psychological analogue for the Trinitarian processions, while it is still a created analogue, is no longer a natural one. For the felt sense of 'gratia gratum faciens' that is the analogue for the divine Father is itself the conscious representation of the supernatural created habitual grace that we have known as sanctifying grace. And so the psychological analogy now provides, not simply an image of the Trinitarian processions, but a participation in them and *an imitation, a mimesis, of them*. We can say this even as we remember once again the strictures of the Fourth Lateran Council: 'one cannot note any similarity between Creator and creature – however great – that would obviate the need always to note an ever greater dissimilarity.' In this instance the dissimilarity is obvious. Who of us can honestly claim that he or she is spontaneously always ready to conform to the evangelical injunction to imitate the divine Father in allowing 'sun and rain' to be given to those who hate us as well as to those who love us?

But this is a constitutive element in the kingdom of God, the reign of God, whose structure constitutes the unified field structure of our systematic theology.

To return for a moment to St Ignatius's times of election: (1) in the third time, we employ our natural powers of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding to arrive at good decisions, and in so doing we are embodying the natural analogue for the divine processions, where we are images of the Trinity; Lonergan's account of decision in *Insight* provides the general form of such a set of operations; (2) in the second time, we are discerning the pulls and counterpulls of affective resonances, so as to arrive at decisions that will promote in us not only an image of the Trinity but participations in the divine loveliness uttering the eternal Yes and with that Yes breathing the eternal Proceeding Love, and so that will enable us to be not only images of but also participants in the divine processions; Lonergan's account in *Method in Theology* presents the general form of this quite distinct process of decision; and (3) in St Ignatius's first time, of which I have not yet spoken, that conscious representation of 'gratia gratum faciens' and its word of value judgment are so dominant that the loving decisions and actions flow spontaneously forth from them in a way that admits no doubt as to where they come from or whose life is being reflected in them: 'I live, now not I, but Christ lives in me.' This corresponds to Lonergan's adoption of the Augustinian maxim, 'Ama Deum et fac quod vis, Love God and do what you will.' In these instances, the apprehension of values in loving affectivity stands to judgments of value, not as direct insight, which may be right or wrong, but rather as reflective insights, grasping the fulfilment of conditions, stand to judgments of fact. Whereas in the second time the apprehension of values in feelings is an apprehension of *possible* values, in the first time there are no further questions, and one knows that this is the case.

The analogy grounded in love, especially when that love is God's love poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us, opens onto the second point of significance for the requirement of interiorly and religiously differentiated

consciousness. For, since the four-point hypothesis speaks of realities that are named in special categories, the base of these categories in religiously differentiated consciousness must also be specified as carefully as possible. This is particularly true for the second and third points of the hypothesis, those having to do with sanctifying grace and the habit of charity as created participations, respectively, of active and passive spiration. In fact, our understanding of the first and fourth points of the hypothesis (the secondary act of existence of the incarnate Word and the light of glory) can be had only by extrapolation from and modification of our understanding of the second and third points. These created participations in active and passive spiration are precisely the area in which the supernatural creaturely analogy for the Trinitarian relations is developed. Thus such efforts will be providing something of significance, I believe, for the theological treatment of spirituality. What, in terms derived from religiously differentiated consciousness, is such a created participation in divine life? How can we name terms and relations in religious experience that express created participations in active and passive spiration? And, since active spiration is identical with paternity and filiation considered together, the question reflects our participation in Trinitarian life *in toto*. That is the question. That is the task.

2.2 *History*

There is a second requirement. I indicated in *What Is Systematic Theology?* and I have repeated here that the systematics that I want at least to begin will assume the general form of a theology of history, and this means not only that the realities named in its special categories must be mediated with those named in its general categories – this would be the case no matter what the option regarding the overall form of systematic theology – but also that the general categories will be focused around the complex dialectical process of human history. These categories are at present partly supplied by

Loneragan (most subtly but also most completely in his late paper ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’³⁶) and partly, I hope, by my book *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. But no doubt there are more categories to be generated on the basis of these still early reachings for a comprehensive heuristic of history. I think in particular of Lonergan’s efforts to develop a macroeconomic theory in the context of his notion of the dialectic of history.³⁷

In *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, relying on Lonergan, I add or develop the following notions: (1) the analogy of the dialectics of the subject, community, and culture, (2) distinct dialectics of contraries and contradictories in each of these realms, and (3) the scale of values as explaining the intelligible ongoing relations in history among these three complex dialectical processes.³⁸ The mediation of general and special categories in a theology of history would also enable us to generate theological doctrines regarding creation, revelation, original sin, redemption, Church, sacraments, and praxis, which are not explicitly included in the core ‘focal meanings’³⁹ contained in the four-

36 Bernard Lonergan, ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,’ in *A Third Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985) 169-83.

37 See the two volumes in Lonergan’s *Collected Works* devoted to macroeconomic theory: *Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis*, vol. 15, ed. Frederick G. Lawrence, Patrick H. Byrne, and Charles C. Hefling, Jr. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) and *For a New Political Economy*, vol. 21, ed. Philip J. McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).

38 A summary and development of the understanding of the scale of values is presented in chapter 10 of *What Is Systematic Theology?* (sections 3.3-3.5).

39 The expression ‘focal meanings’ is David Tracy’s. See *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (New York: Crossroad, 1981) passim.

point hypothesis, and to submit to systematic consideration these doctrines, as well as those that are explicitly mentioned in that core statement. But that mediation itself will primarily be a matter of bringing the supernatural realities affirmed in the four-point hypothesis, realities that constitute the core of religious values, to bear on the other levels of value: personal, cultural, social, and vital. The mediation will bring human participation in Trinitarian life into the very heart of the dialectical process of history. It will give a contemporary theological meaning to the expression ‘reign of God.’ Such a move, I believe, is essential if in fact the functional specialty ‘doctrines’ is to be organized around the theme of redemption in history and if the mediated object of the functional specialty ‘systematics’ is to be *Geschichte*.⁴⁰

The implications of such a procedure can already be dimly glimpsed. It is one thing to transpose, for example, Trinitarian theology into categories dictated by interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness. Such a transposition is essential for a contemporary systematic-theological understanding of the mystery we profess in faith. But we are already familiar with the historical precedents of such a transposition. The psychological analogies of Augustine, Aquinas, and the early Lonergan provide successive developments of the analogy from nature, culminating in Lonergan’s understanding in terms of interiorly differentiated consciousness; and a different analogy, suggested by Lonergan late in his life, begins as we have seen with the supernatural state of being in love in an unqualified fashion; this is a second psychological analogy, one developed from religiously differentiated consciousness. It is another thing to add to this

40 For Lonergan’s recommendations in these directions, see Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?* 152. See also Robert M. Doran, ‘System Seeking Method: Reconciling System and History,’ in *Il Teologo e la Storia: Lonergan’s Centenary (1904-2004)*, ed. Paul Gilbert and Natalino Spaccapelo (Rome: Gregorian University Press 2006) 278-79.

requirement of self-appropriation, which in one form or another and to a greater or lesser extent is already followed by or rooted in the Trinitarian theologies of Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan, the additional requirement of formulating all this material eventually in terms of a theory of history. This adds a new dimension to the theology of the Trinity. The direct impact, of course, is on that dimension of Trinitarian theology that treats the divine missions. But

(1) when intelligent, reasonable, and responsible emanations in the order of nature and emanations from the dynamic state of being in love in the supernatural order become the source of the making of history, of historical progress, of healing and creating in history,⁴¹

(2) when these emanations are conceived as the analogue according to which we are to approach some imperfect understanding of the processions within God of Word and Spirit, and

(3) when the missions are identified with the processions linked to an external term as consequent condition of the procession being also a mission, the full implication is something like this:

(a) the emanations of Word and Spirit in God, linked to their appropriate contingent external terms in history (the *esse secundarium* of the Incarnate Word, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and – beyond history but proleptically within it in the form of hope – the light of glory), are the ultimate condition of possibility of any consistent and sustained intelligent and responsible emanations in human beings, precisely through the gift of the Holy Spirit which is the eternal emanation of the Spirit in

41 See Bernard Lonergan, 'Healing and Creating in History,' in *A Third Collection* 99-

God linked to its external term in history and proceeding not only from the eternal Father and Word but also from the same Word as incarnate and as sent by the Father;⁴² and

(b) such a collaboration of autonomous spiritual processions, divine and human, is the condition of the possibility of the consistent authentic performance of that normative source of meaning that, building on Lonergan's analysis in 'Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,' I have already identified with the taut dialectical tension of psyche and intentionality in human conscious acts – that very normative source that is the origin of progress in history, whether in a creative mode 'from below upwards' or a healing mode 'from above downwards.'⁴³

42 Thus the explicit theological significance of the general theorem from my analysis of the scale of values in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, to the effect that religious values condition the possibility of functioning schemes of recurrence in the sphere of personal value. The statement (a) in the text will require greater precision in regard to the relation between the mission of the Word and the mission of the Spirit.

43 Thus the significance of the theorem that personal value conditions the possibility of functioning schemes of recurrence in the spheres of cultural, social, and vital values. In his later work on the dialectic of history, Lonergan emphasizes the two dimensions of the normative source of meaning in history, intentional and psychic. See Lonergan, 'Natural Right and Historical Mindedness' 174-75, where in addition to the precepts of authentic intentional performance there is reference to a dimension that can be called 'psychic': 'a tidal movement that begins before consciousness, unfolds through sensitivity, intelligence, rational reflection, responsible deliberation, only to find its rest beyond all of these' in love; see also Lonergan, 'Mission and the Spirit,' in *A Third Collection*, at 29-30, where the same dimension is called 'the passionateness of being' that 'underpins and accompanies and reaches beyond the subject as experientially, intelligently, rationally, morally conscious.' The articulation of this

The starting point for a systematic theology, then, consists in the elaboration of the unified field structure. The first step lies in unfolding the four-point theological hypothesis, with the help of analogies drawn from cognitional and ethical theory and from religious experience. The second step relates that unfolding in greater detail to the complex dialectical process of history, though the first step will itself incorporate a large amount of material relevant to the theological theory of history. The general character of this unified field structure is found in the title of the project, *The Trinity in History*. For the four-point hypothesis presents an analogical understanding of Trinitarian doctrine, where the analogy is twofold, natural and supernatural, and the theory of history completes the unified field structure precisely by locating the realities named in the four-point hypothesis in the dynamic unfolding of human history.

3 The Character of the Starting Point

If the unified field structure in its entirety is the beginning, then the beginning of the beginning lies in a systematic understanding of the doctrine of the triune God. But this systematic understanding will differ from those of Aquinas and the early Lonergan in two important and far-reaching respects.

Like those theologies, it will proceed by analogy from naturally known realities to an obscure understanding of divine mystery.

Like those theologies, it will follow the way of teaching and learning rather than the way of discovery, and so it will begin with those realities whose understanding does not presuppose the understanding of anything else, but which, once understood, render

psychic dimension and of its integration with the operations of intentional consciousness is the meaning of most of my earliest published work.

possible the understanding of everything else. In Trinitarian theology this means starting with the divine processions.

But unlike those theologies, it will, almost from the beginning and not simply at the end of the entire systematic Trinitarian treatise, appeal also to an analogy with created realities in the supernatural order, that is, to an analogy with what we know only by revelation, to an analogy with realities in the order of grace: realities that enable us consciously to participate in, and so to imitate, the conscious inner life of the very God whose mystery we are attempting to understand. I say ‘*almost* from the beginning’ because even these analogies from created supernatural realities, precisely as humanly constructed analogies, are themselves grounded in analogies from what is naturally known. And it should be emphasized that the imitation of God’s life is at first and for a long time in most people’s lives not a deliberate mimesis, but a function of the participation in divine life that is given to us in grace.⁴⁴

The first difference from the classic expositions of the psychological analogy, then, is that there are not only natural analogues for the divine processions and relations but also supernatural analogues in the realm of created grace, and that both of these sets of analogues can and should be drawn upon in the elaboration of a systematic understanding of this most central mystery of faith. While we will begin, as we must, with the natural analogues, the introduction of the supernatural analogies encouraged by Lonergan’s later remarks on Trinitarian theology opens the possibility for the following developments:

(1) What a metaphysical theology calls the secondary act of existence of the assumed humanity of the incarnate Word, the relation of that assumed humanity to the eternal divine Word, is a supernatural analogue for the divine relation of paternity, a

44 There are explicit links to be drawn here with the mimetic theory of René Girard. I will begin to develop these in chapter 3.

created participation in and imitation of the Father, of the one who speaks the Word, of 'Abba.' 'Whoever has seen me has seen the Father' (John 14.9). Again, the divine Word as immanent in God does not speak; the divine Word is spoken by the Father; the incarnate Word speaks, but he speaks only what he hears from the Father.

(2) What a metaphysical theology calls sanctifying grace includes the felt sense of being on the receiving end of an unqualified being in love. It is a supernatural analogue for divine active spiration, a created participation in and imitation of the Father and the Son as the one principle from which the Holy Spirit proceeds. As the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit, so sanctifying grace, as elevating central form and as providing an orientation that favors evidence for affirming the goodness of being and that issues in an affirmation of value and an openness to ever greater mystery on the part of one who is in love in an unqualified fashion and so with a participation in God's own love, gives rise to the loving acts that coalesce into a habit of charity.

(3) What a metaphysical theology calls the habit of charity is a supernatural analogue for divine passive spiration, a created participation in and imitation of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son. As the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, so the habit of charity proceeds from sanctifying grace, from the created and tacitly experienced participation in the *notionaliter diligere* of Father and Son breathing proceeding Love.

And (4) what a metaphysical theology calls the light of glory is a supernatural analogue for divine filiation, a created participation in and imitation of the Son, the Word, whose entire being is a relation to the eternal Father from whom he proceeds and to whom he refers, subjects, brings home all things.

This is part of the significance of accepting the four-point hypothesis as the special-categorical component of the unified field structure of systematic theology.

Obviously the second and third of these supernatural analogues will be the most prominent, and it is to them that we refer when we develop Lonergan's later analogy.

Only by extrapolating from our own participation in divine life can we find some structural understanding of the human Jesus' created participation in divine paternity (first analogue) and of the saints' participation in the divine Son (fourth analogue).

The second difference in the systematic understanding of the triune God that I am proposing vis-à-vis the classical psychological analogies of Aquinas and the early Lonergan is that this Trinitarian theology initiates a theology of history. It spells out the religious values that are the condition of the possibility of an integral functioning of the entire scale of values, where personal, cultural, social, and vital values are related to one another in such a way as to yield the structure of history. This vision of history has been spelled out at least inchoately in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* and will be both summarized and developed here. When placed into the context of a systematic theology, it yields a doctrine of social grace.

4 Theological Development

I am proposing here an instance of what in *What Is Systematic Theology?* I called the genetic sequence of systematic theologies.⁴⁵ Precisely because of the Trinitarian theologies of Aquinas and the early Lonergan, theologies which begin with the processions, move to the relations, progress to the persons, and end with the missions, we are now able to come full circle and begin a systematics of the Trinity somewhere else: namely, with a synthetic position that treats together both the divine processions and the divine missions. The missions are the processions in history, the processions linked with a created consequent condition that makes it possible that the procession be also a mission. This relation will be treated in greater detail later in the systematics.

⁴⁵ See Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?* 39, 78-79, 92, 144-46, 203.

This ‘somewhere else’ does not depart from the starting point that is to be found in Aquinas and the early Lonergan, but sublates that starting point into a more comprehensive dogmatic-theological context that has emerged partly as a result of their work. The four-point hypothesis itself is part of our starting point, not our conclusion, and that hypothesis aims at an obscure understanding not only of divine processions but also of divine missions and of the created consequent conditions of divine missions – the secondary act of existence relating the assumed humanity to the eternal divine Word, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory – as a new set of analogues from which we can gain an obscure understanding of the processions and relations immanent in God’s being. Theology is an ongoing enterprise, and what was not possible for Aquinas, simply because of the historical limitations of the dogmatic-theological context of his time, and what Lonergan arrived at toward the end of his systematics of the Trinity, may well be the starting point for another generation, precisely because of Aquinas’s own gains in understanding and Lonergan’s firmer rooting of these gains in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.

Thus, as the way of discovery that Lonergan outlines in *De Deo trino: Pars dogmatica*⁴⁶ ended with Augustine’s psychological analogy, which then became the starting point of the way of teaching and learning, so Lonergan’s particular embodiment of the way of teaching and learning ended with a four-point hypothesis that now informs the starting point of a new venture along the same kind of path, the *ordo doctrinae*. If we are beginning our systematics in its entirety where Lonergan ended his systematics of the Trinity, it is only on the basis of the development found in his own Trinitarian theology

46 Bernard Lonergan, *De Deo trino: Pars dogmatica* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964), now presented with English translation as *The Triune God: Doctrines*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 11, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (University of Toronto Press, 2009).

that we are able to do so. He began with the processions. We begin, on a 'macro' level, with the processions and missions together, affirming with Lonergan's assistance that they are the same reality, except that the mission adds a created contingent external term that is the consequent condition of the procession being also a mission.

As is clear from the foregoing, we must, of course, also relate these supernatural analogues of divine life to operations and states identified in our own interiority and to our participation in the historical dialectic. We are obliged to this

(1) by the core meanings expressed in the passage that we have taken as central to our systematics, the four-point hypothesis,

(2) by the stress on interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, and

(3) by the insistence that a systematic theology must be a theology of history.

It will be crucial, then, to pinpoint just what we are talking about by identifying it with operations and states in interiority. And that is not easy, especially in the case of the supernatural analogy. A phenomenology of grace has barely begun to be composed.

In fact, in the case of the secondary act of existence of the incarnate Word, there are available to us no data whatever for such a phenomenology, even if the affirmation of the *esse secundarium* can be shown to be isomorphic with human acts of reasonable judgment, and even if we are able to conclude from dogmatic premises something about the consciousness and knowledge of Jesus.

Nor is there available any material that would enable us to compose a phenomenology of the light of glory and the beatific vision.

In the case of both the secondary act of existence and the light of glory, then, we must move by extrapolation from what is available to us, namely, the dynamic state of being in love in an unqualified sense and the operations of charity, of the originated loving, that follow habitually from such a state.

Thus, only in the realm of the supernatural analogues of active and passive spiration do we have the data for a phenomenology of grace; and even there, only with great difficulty.

Thus too, pneumatology will become, in such a systematic theology, the source of much of Christology and eschatology. That too is a function of the evolving dogmatic-theological context. Only today is the theology of the Holy Spirit emerging into its own in systematic theology: only in a day when perhaps the very future of the human race depends on our being able to specify with a precision sophisticated in the way of religious interiority just how we can affirm that the Holy Spirit is poured out on all people and is found in religions other than Christianity as well as in the Christian Churches. This will not entail, for example, the kind of ‘Spirit-Christology’ that sets itself up as an alternative to ‘Logos-Christology.’ It is the assumed humanity of the Incarnate Word that we will attempt to understand by extrapolating from the gift of the Holy Spirit in sanctifying grace and the habit of charity and then making the necessary adaptations demanded by the dogmatic tradition.

Lonergan’s systematic treatment of Trinitarian doctrine in *The Triune God: Systematics* proceeds according to the same *via systematica* that Aquinas follows in his *Summa theologiae*, questions 27-43, in that, like Aquinas, he begins the systematic treatment with the divine processions, for understanding how processions can be said to exist in God does not presuppose an understanding of the other elements that will be treated in a systematics of the Trinity, but rather grounds our analogous and imperfect understanding of these other elements: relations, persons, notional acts, missions. ‘For the processions are the basis for the relations, and in accordance with our manner of conceiving, the divine persons are conceived subsequently to conceiving the relations.’⁴⁷

47 Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 125. The ‘conceiving’ to which Lonergan is referring is the *systematic* conceiving of divine relations and persons.

Thus, like Aquinas, Lonergan moves in the order: from processions to relations; from processions and relations to persons in themselves; from the foregoing to persons in relation to one another; and from all of these to the divine missions of Word and Spirit. This order is just the reverse of the order of discovery through which the Church arrived at its Trinitarian doctrines: missions, persons, relations, processions. The New Testament begins with the missions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit and moves to the three divine persons. Early theology, and especially the Cappadocian Fathers, realized that the persons had to be understood as relations. Augustine and then Aquinas came to the conclusion that an understanding of procession in God was the key to understanding the divine relations. Aquinas reversed the order of ideas, and began his Trinitarian theology by asking whether there are processions in God and answering how such could be the case.⁴⁸

Our procedure here will also follow the *ordo doctrinae* or *via systematica*, but we take as our fundamental statement the unified field structure presented in chapter 7 of *What Is Systematic Theology?* and developed in the present chapter, namely, the four-point theological hypothesis linked to the theory of history proposed in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. The four-point hypothesis links the processions and the missions, so that our Trinitarian starting point is the unity of these two. For reasons linked to the limitations of human thought and language, each of these components must be treated separately before they can be united into one *unified* field structure. But the consequence for our procedure here is that if we begin with the natural analogy for understanding divine processions, namely, the intelligent emanation of a word of ‘yes’ from the grasp of sufficient evidence for a judgment of value and the responsible emanation of self-transcendent decision and love from that grasp and judgment considered as one principle of the latter emanation, we also move on from there to identify in the order of grace

48 The twofold order of theological ideas is treated in some detail in Lonergan, *ibid.* 58-

certain correlates, indeed participations and imitations, that correspond in some way to the divine mystery that we confess and are attempting to understand. This requirement is imposed by the dual standard of grounding everything in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness and constructing systematics as a theology of history.

Thus, if there is a divine relation of paternity, we must understand it not only by analogy with the grasp of evidence giving rise to the judgment of value but also from the very participation in and imitation of divine paternity that is found in history, namely, in the secondary act of existence of the incarnate Word, Jesus of Nazareth.

Again, if there is a divine relation of active spiration, which itself is identical with paternity and filiation together ‘breathing’ the Holy Spirit, we must understand it not only by analogy with the combined influence of the grasp of evidence and the word of a judgment of value that proceeds from it, as these are the principle of acts of love and of good decisions; we must also understand this divine relation in the very participation in active spiration, in paternity-filiation, that is found in history, namely, in the entitative habit radicated by ‘*gratia gratum faciens*’ in the essence of the soul, or rooted in the very core of our being, that initiates our sharing in the very *notionaliter diligere* of God; from this sharing there proceed in human consciousness ‘from above,’ through faith and hope, the loving acts coalescing into the habit of charity that is our historical participation in and imitation of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as *amor procedens* from the Father and the Son.

In other words, in the supernatural analogy the grasp of evidence that is not only an analogy for the Father but also the created participation in and imitation of paternity, and the consequent ‘yes’ that is not only an analogy for the Son but also the created participation in and imitation of filiation, are themselves in the supernatural order. They are the grasp of evidence (understanding) and the consequent ‘yes’ (judgment) of a person already on the receiving end of God’s own love (tacit, even ineffable, experience). What an earlier theology called sanctifying grace is an elevation of central form, of the

unity-identity-whole of the human person, manifest consciously in a habitual orientation to the grasp of evidence and a consequent habitual 'yes' on the part of one who is in love with God's love freely given in a gift that makes one pleasing to God. Together the grasp of evidence and the affirmation that constitute the conscious dimension of this entitative habit spirate the habitual performance of loving acts. This grasp and affirmation are themselves habitual, the manifestation of what the medievals saw to be an entitative habit rooted at the deepest and most intimate core of our being. The latter is a habit that is a gift from God operating a person's participation in, and imitation of, divine active spiration. This habit is rephrased by Lonergan as the conscious dynamic state of unqualified being-in-love. But if we are going to continue to distinguish sanctifying grace from the habit of charity, as the four-point hypothesis invites us to do, it is important to specify some distinction in consciousness here; and I suggest that the distinction is one between this entitative habit manifesting itself in an orientation to the habitual grasp and affirmation of the lover and, on the other hand, the habitual state of originated loving that flows from the grasp and affirmation. The divine love is the starting point, since it is the gift of divine love that orients us to the habitual grasp of evidence for a global judgment of value that determines our entire life. The grasp of evidence and the judgment of value are the grasp and affirmation of one who already is in love, entitatively. And they ground the habitual dynamic state that we call the habit of charity. To repeat, the distinction corresponds to the Trinitarian distinction between the *notionaliter diligere* that is Father-and-Son as one principle and the *amor procedens* that is the Holy Spirit.

Again, if there is a divine relation of passive spiration, identical with the Holy Spirit who proceeds from Father-and-Son as one principle of divine emanation, we must understand that relation from the beginning not only (a) by analogy with the acts of love that proceed in human consciousness from the combined influence of evidence grasped and consequent judgment of value, but also (b) by analogy with the very participation in

and imitation of passive spiration that is the habit of charity and the acts of unqualified love that proceed from the habit in a regular sequence of schemes of recurrence.

Finally, if there is a divine relation of filiation, which itself is identical with the eternally proceeding Word of God, we must understand it from the beginning not only by analogy with the word of a judgment of value that says yes to evidence grasped as conclusive regarding our own existential self-constitution as authentic human persons. We must understand it also by analogy with the very participation in and imitation of divine filiation that is the light of glory that enables the perfect return of all God's children to the divine Father in the inheritance promised to us in the incarnate Son and confirmed by the pledge of the gift of the Holy Spirit.

In other words, the basic hypotheses that will have a profound effect on the remainder of our systematic theology are more complex than those found at the beginning of Aquinas's or Lonergan's Trinitarian systematics. That greater complexity is a function of a theological history decisively influenced by Aquinas and Lonergan themselves. This history now permits us, from the very beginning, to add to the natural analogies employed in understanding the divine processions and relations the graced participations in those relations, and so to begin a Trinitarian systematics with the processions and missions as one piece. In the context of the theory of history constituted internally by the scale of values and the three dialectical processes of subjects, cultures, and social communities (that is, the theory proposed in *Theology and the Dialectics of History*), these graced participations constitute the realm of religious values.⁴⁹ The theory of history based on the scale of values displays precisely what the historical significance and influence is of these religious values, these participations in and imitations of divine relations. For from above, grace conditions personal integrity and authenticity, which

49 See the presentation of the scale of values in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* passim, but most compendiously in chapter 4.

itself is the condition of possibility of genuine and developing cultural values. The latter, in turn, influence the formation of integrally dialectical communities at the level of social values, and only such communities functioning in recurrent schemes of a good of order guarantee the equitable distribution of vital goods to the entire community. The resultant of such an analysis will be a doctrine of social grace. I am suggesting a way of going about that task, a way that also connects with Lonergan's redefinition of what we have called 'the state of grace.' As we have seen, for Lonergan the state of grace is not an individual but a social reality. It is the divine-human interpersonal situation that resides in the three divine subjects giving themselves to us. That gift itself, while 'intensely personal, utterly intimate,' still 'is not so private as to be solitary. It can happen to many, and they can form a community to sustain one another in their self-transformation and to help one another in working out the implications and fulfilling the promise of their new life. Finally, what can become communal, can become historical. It can pass from generation to generation. It can spread from one cultural milieu to another. It can adapt to changing circumstances, confront new situations, survive into a different age, flourish in another period or epoch.'⁵⁰

This position is not a denial of the analogies from nature that provided Aquinas and Lonergan with an initial glimpse of the divine mysteries. Quite the contrary. These analogies are required if we are to have any understanding, however imperfect it may be, of the supernatural life itself that is our participation in the divine relations. Sanctifying grace, again, orients us to the elemental habitual grasp of evidence (understanding) and the elemental habitual consequent yes (judgment) that flow from being invested with a share in divine love (elemental experience): the horizon of the graced person. Thus, if we are really to understand anything at all about sanctifying grace, we will have to

50 Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 130-31.

understand what is meant by ‘elemental or tacit or ineffable experience,’ by ‘a grasp of evidence’ and by a ‘consequent yes,’ and that means understanding the natural analogy.

Still, in his later work Lonergan proposes, not only a natural analogy but also the possibility of a supernatural one, where, again, the psychological analogy ‘has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.’ But that ‘higher synthesis ... that is the dynamic state of being in love’ (enabling the grasping of evidence that can only a lover can grasp) and the manifestation of that love in an attitude that is a habitual judgment of value may themselves be created participations in divine paternity-filiation, in active spiration, from which created participation there proceed in a habitual fashion the acts of love of a person who *is* in love. We could not understand these supernatural participations if we did not have the natural analogy that is provided, possibly for all time, in Lonergan’s work on insight, *verbum*, and the divine processions themselves. That work will provide the analogy not only for our understanding of the Trinitarian processions but also for the habitual grasp and habitual judgment of value and habitual proceeding love in us that are themselves created participations in the divine relations. These supernatural realities, which themselves provide a psychological analogy for the divine processions, can themselves be understood only by analogy with what we know by nature regarding the spiritual dimensions of the dynamics of human interiority.

5 Conclusion

The starting point of the systematic theology that I envision is the elaboration of the basic set of special and general categories of that theology. The basic set of special systematic categories is found in the four-point hypothesis suggested some fifty years ago by

Bernard Lonergan. The basic set of general systematic categories will consist of a theory of history derived from and grounded in Lonergan's cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and existential ethics, and in the complement to these that I have tried to suggest in speaking of psychic conversion. The basic sets are bound together by the scale of values suggested by Lonergan in *Method in Theology* and worked out in greater detail in my *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. Together these basic sets of categories constitute a unified field structure for systematic theology in its present state of evolution, the basic dogmatic-theological context for a systematic theology on the level of our time, a contemporary theological doctrine of the kingdom or reign of God. Once these sets of categories are elaborated in their integration with one another, they will enable a fuller systematic presentation of the other doctrines that enter into the Church's constitutive meaning: creation, revelation, original sin, redemption, Church, sacraments, praxis. The elaboration will also consolidate the permanent achievements in the theological tradition to the present time, and the consolidation will be the point of departure for the next advances in the genetic sequence of systematic theologies. For questions will arise out of the elaboration of the unified field structure that cannot be answered on the basis of that elaboration itself. Those questions will be the operators of further systematic-theological development.