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7 Generation and Spiration

The first of Lonergan's three assertions on the divine processions establishes the generic notion of the kind of intellectual and intelligible ('because and insofar as') or autonomous spiritual emanation that can serve as the basis for a psychological analogy for understanding the Trinitarian processions. But nothing specific has yet been said regarding the immanent constitution of the operations that would provide the appropriate analogy. The assertion offers one way of conceiving how there might be processions in God, but how many processions, how many intellectual and intelligible emanations there are in God, and what precisely they are, has not yet been determined. The second and third assertions address these issues by specifying what up to now has been the generic notion of intellectual emanation or 'autonomous spiritual procession.' That generic notion of procession as emanation is differentiated in the second assertion, which maintains that there are two and only two divine processions that can be conceived by analogy with human intellectual emanation or autonomous spiritual procession, namely, the procession of the word from the act of understanding that utters the word, and the procession of love both from the act of understanding that utters the word and from the uttered word itself.¹ It is in this way that we are made in the image and likeness of God.

1 'Per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis duae et tantummodo duae processiones divinae concipi possunt, nempe verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque.' Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 180.

And the third assertion will clarify these specific notions by asserting that the divine emanation of the word, but not the emanation of love, is properly called generation.²

In this chapter I will attempt to state the assertions in Lonergan's own reformed Scholastic context and will begin to transpose them as I can into categories derived from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness in the context of a theology of history and against the backdrop of our appropriation of Girardian mimetic theory into a Trinitarian systematics. This will involve transferring the insights gained by this interplay of related notions to the analogy that we are seeking to develop in the order of grace itself. This task will continue into the next chapter. The chapters are long and involved. Moreover, they treat not only the second and third assertions but also four questions with which Lonergan concludes the chapter on the divine processions. These four questions are of utmost importance for our project, but they too must be transposed into the contemporary terms that will move this type of Trinitarian theology forward.

1 Two Processions

1.1 Terminology

Lonergan's treatment of the second assertion is brief. Regarding the terms employed in the assertion, what an intellectual emanation or autonomous spiritual procession is has already been established; what needs definition are the terms 'speaker' or 'what utters' (*dicens*), 'word' (*verbum*), 'love' (*amor*), and a term not employed in the wording of the assertion itself but in its elaboration, namely, 'spirating' (*spirans*).

² 'Divinam verbi emanationem, non autem emanationem amoris, consequitur ratio generationis proprie dictae.' Ibid. 188

First, then, *dicens* and *verbum*. The Father is *Dicens*, the One who utters, the One who speaks, and as such is the principle of the procession of the divine Word. But the Father is principle precisely because and insofar as the unrestricted act of understanding and love precisely as understanding and loving utters a Word, a Word that receives the divine nature in the utterance, and so that receives the unrestricted act itself from the Father precisely as the Father utters the Word, thus being constituted as *Verbum spirans Amorem*, the Word that breathes Love. The Father utters the eternal Word, in a manner remotely analogous to the way in which our act of insight is also *dicere*, grounding our inner word, whether that inner word be conceptual, as in a commonsense supposition or a scientific hypothesis flowing from direct insight, or judgmental, as in an affirmation proceeding from reflective understanding, or existential, as in a judgment of value issuing from the equivalent in the order of value to the grasp of the virtually unconditioned in the order of fact.³ In fact, the analogy is best conceived in terms of the existential judgment of self-constitution and the decisions that flow from such a judgment regarding personal value. *Verbum* is the immanent term of such an intelligent emanation, of such an utterance. In us it is the inner word grounded in and proceeding from insight insofar as insight also utters the inner word.⁴ In us there is a twofold inner word, corresponding first to the twofold operation of human intellectual cognition as it operates in both the order of fact and in the order of value: the word of definition or hypothesis or supposition that flows from an act of direct insight, and the word of affirmation or negation that flows from an act of reflective understanding in which we grasp evidence sufficient to enable us to pronounce judgment. In us that twofold process operates both in the order of the knowledge of fact and in the order of the knowledge of value, based on the knowledge of

3 '*dicens*: principium emanationis intelligibilis quatenus per actum intelligendi determinatur.' Ibid. 180.

4 '*verbum*: immanens terminus emanationis intelligibilis ex dicente.' Ibid.

fact. But in God, whose essence it is to be, there is one infinite act of understanding, and so there is but one Word. That one Word is sufficient to express all that the Father is, all that the Father knows, that is, everything about everything, and all that the Father loves, again, everything about everything.⁵ More precisely, the primary intelligible that the Father knows is the unrestricted act of understanding itself, and the secondary intelligible is everything else that is contained in the idea of being that is the content of that unrestricted act. The one Word also understands and loves, of course, but precisely *as* the Word uttered, not as the Speaker who utters, nor as the Love that proceeds from the eternal exchange of the Speaker and the Word. When in the four-point hypothesis Lonergan speaks of the grace of union or secondary act of existence of the Incarnation as a created participation in and imitation of paternity, this is part of what he means: the incarnate Word is also a Speaker who utters, but who utters only what he hears from the Father.

On the twofold inner word in us, Lonergan refers us to the second appendix of the book, ‘De actu intelligendi,’ section 2, ‘De obiecto intellectus ut fine et termino.’ A brief summary of what he says there may be helpful; a fuller discussion will be given below in section 4.1. (The main source, of course, is *Verbum*, the study of which is essential for anyone who wishes to delve deeply into the position that we are here summarizing from Lonergan’s work.)

If ‘object’ means ‘end’ or ‘objective,’ then the object of human intelligence is being in its entirety, everything that is, everything about everything. In Scholastic terms, *intellectus* is that by which we can do and become all things (*omnia*), where the term

5 ‘Duplex esse verbum interius sicut et duplex est operatio nostri intellectus ... In Deo, tamen, sicut idem est esse quod essentia, et unica infinita est intelligendi operatio, ita unum est verbum.’ Ibid. note 23.

omnia is not limited to any genus.⁶ In the transposed terms of *Insight*, being is the objective of the pure desire to know.⁷ As God is unrestricted understanding, understanding of everything about everything, so we are unrestricted desire, the desire to know everything about everything. And ‘everything about everything’ is being. The objective of our intelligence is what God actually is and understands, that is, the knowing of everything about everything. Our intelligence is, first, our desire to know. While the desire to know is manifested in our questions for intelligence and for reflection, which head for being, that desire is not the verbal utterance of the questions, not the conceptual formulation of the questions, not any insight or thought, not any reflective grasp or judgment. Rather, it is ‘the prior [that is, preconceptual, preverbal] and enveloping drive that carries cognitional process from sense and imagination [and all presentations, including linguistic presentations of ordinary meaningfulness] to understanding [in the sense of original meaningfulness], from understanding to judgment, from judgment to the complete context of correct judgments that is named knowledge.’⁸ If it is not a concept of

6 We are referred here to Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 79, a. 7 c.:

‘Intellectus ... respicit suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis; eo quod intellectus possibilis est *quo est omnia fieri*.’

7 Lonergan, *Insight* 372.

8 Ibid. For my qualifications in terms of linguistic presentations and ordinary and original meaningfulness, see Robert M. Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) 124-43. On the distinction between original meaningfulness and the ordinary meaningfulness of everyday language, and so for what in principle indicates Lonergan’s response to objections based in Wittgenstein to his position (and Augustine’s and Aquinas’s) on insight and inner word, see Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 254-57. I have made use of this material above, in chapter 3. Note that the opening pages of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical*

being nor an idea of being, perhaps it can be called a notion of being, where ‘notion’ has the precise meaning assigned to it by Lonergan in most of his employments of the term, that is, the conscious, heuristic, intelligent, and reasonable anticipation of an unrestricted objective, that is, a transcendental notion.

A similar structure obtains in the relation between the transcendental notion of value and its objective, the good. The good, or value, is ‘what is intended in questions for deliberation, just as the intelligible is what is intended in questions for intelligence, and just as truth and being are what are intended in questions for reflection.’⁹ As knowledge of being is gained incrementally in every true judgment of fact, so knowledge of the good is gained incrementally in every true judgment of value. The judgment of fact and the judgment of value are both inner words, but the relevant inner word for the Trinitarian analogy will be found, as we will see, in a particular type of judgment of value. This is true even in Lonergan’s early presentation of the analogy, even though the implications are not drawn clearly until later.

Thus, besides meaning ‘objective’ or ‘end,’ and so referring to being and the good, the word ‘object’ can mean ‘a term produced within the intellect,’ that is, what is produced when the incremental steps in the cognitional and evaluative processes have come to ‘term.’ In this sense, the object of our unrestricted desire consists in the various inner words (*verbum cordis seu verbum interius*) that are uttered along the way to knowledge of being and the good. And since there are two operations constitutive of such knowledge, there are two immanently produced terms in each order, that is, two terms in

Investigations contain a severe critique of the Augustinian position, which is the basic or grounding position on this matter in the tradition in which Lonergan stands.

Lonergan’s response in *Method* is typical: he advances the position in the Wittgensteinian position before reversing the counterposition.

⁹ Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 34.

the order of the knowledge of fact and two terms in the order of the knowledge of value. There is the simple word of hypothesis, consideration, supposition, definition, or possible value (the latter often affectively mediated), and there is the compound or complex word of affirmation or negation; in straightforward language, the two inner words are (1) conceptual interrelations or syntheses, which in the order of value are often highlighted affectively,¹⁰ and (2) judgments, whether of fact or of value. These are treated in Thomist terms and with regard to the knowledge of fact in the first two chapters of *Verbum*, which are requisite reading for anyone who wishes to pursue these matters in greater detail. The material of those chapters is transposed into the contemporary context in the first ten chapters of *Insight*. The evaluative aspects are added in one context in chapter 18 of *Insight* and in another in chapter 2 of *Method in Theology*. As was mentioned above in chapter 2, I have related the two evaluative contexts to one another by drawing upon the Ignatian notion of the times of election and the Ignatian ‘rules’ for discernment.¹¹

Inner words are not to be confused, then, with acts of understanding or for that matter even with *acts* of thinking, defining, supposing, considering, affirming, denying. The inner word is rather *what is intended* through these latter acts, where ‘intended’ is used in the phenomenological sense of ‘intentionality’: by thinking, defining, supposing, considering, there becomes present what is thought about, defined, supposed, considered; and by affirming and denying, there becomes present what is affirmed or denied. What is considered and affirmed or denied, in its ‘natural’ reality, is mediated by its ‘intentional’

10 ‘Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feelings.’ Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 37.

11 See Robert M. Doran, ‘Ignatian Themes in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan,’ *Toronto Journal of Theology* 22 (2006) 39-54; ‘Ignatian Themes in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan: Revisiting a Topic That Deserves Further Reflection,’ *Lonergan Workshop* 19, ed. Fred Lawrence (Boston College, 2006).

reality, that is, by the inner word that emanates from the act of understanding, whether direct or reflective. The inner word is what is intended, in its ‘intentional’ being. This ‘intentional being’ is the medium in which the thing itself is known: its formal intelligibility is expressed in the first inner word, and its actual intelligibility in the second. The inner word itself is not *noēsis* but *noēma*, not *la pensée pensante* but *la pensée pensée*, not *intentio intendens* but *intentio intenta*, not *intentio intelligentis* but *intentio intellecta*: not act but content. The acts of understanding, thinking, affirming, and so on, are *noēsis*, *la pensée pensante*, *intentio intendens*, *intentio intelligentis*.¹² But the respective inner words are the expression of what is known in these acts.

12 I am reminded here of the wonderful passage from *Insight*: ‘Besides the *noēma* or *intentio intenta* or *pensée pensée* illustrated by the lower contexts *P*, *Q*, *R*, ... and by the upper context that is Gödel’s theorem, there also is the *noēsis* or *intentio intendens* or *pensée pensante* that is constituted by the very activity of inquiring and reflecting, understanding and affirming, asking further questions and reaching further answers. Let us say that this noetic activity is engaged in a lower context when it is doing mathematics or following scientific method or exercising common sense. Then it will be moving towards an upper context when it scrutinizes mathematics or science or common sense in order to grasp the nature of noetic activity. And if it comes to understand and affirm what understanding is and what affirming is, then it has reached an upper context that logically is independent of the scaffolding of mathematics, science, and common sense. Moreover, if it can be shown that the upper context is invariant, that any attempt to revise it can be legitimate only if the hypothetical reviser refutes his own attempt by invoking experience, understanding, and reflection in an already prescribed manner, then it will appear that, while the *noēma* or *intentio intenta* or *pensée pensée* may always be expressed with greater accuracy and completeness, still the immanent and recurrently operative structure of the *noēsis* or *intentio*

To get hold of insight, inner word, and the distinction between the two is, of course, a demanding chore. The scholarship manifest in Lonergan's articles on *verbum* is overwhelmingly convincing, yet philosophers and theologians continue to go about their work paying little or no attention to what can only be called a permanent achievement in the understanding not only of Aquinas but also of ourselves. John Henry Newman's *Grammar of Assent* has helped many (including Lonergan himself) to grasp what Lonergan calls reflective understanding, the grasp of sufficient evidence, as the ground of judgment, and so not only the act of reflective understanding and the judgment but also the distinction between them. If one wishes to root one's appropriation of these matters in the Christian and Catholic tradition, Lonergan's *Verbum* and Newman's *Grammar* are probably the best places to start. The matter is more obscure with direct insight and the conceptual inner words that follow upon it or emanate or proceed from it – hypotheses, hunches, suppositions regarding fact or value – than with reflective understanding and judgment. We are aware of the inner words, of course, but what easily escapes us is how, when they are original, they are grounded in acts of direct insight. In a number of lectures, Lonergan appeals to the example of the first proposition of the first book of Euclid's *Elements*, where the insight is clear but the conceptual justification took centuries for geometers to work out.¹³

If some variant on the relation between *dicere* and *verbum* in human conscious procession will provide the appropriate, though extremely remote, analogy for the procession of the Son, some variant on the relation between *spirans* and *amor* will give

intendens or *pensée pensante* must always be one and the same.' Lonergan, *Insight* 19-20.

13 See, for example, Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, vol. 5 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) 23-24.

us a remote and obscure analogical understanding of the procession of the Holy Spirit. The remoteness in each case is based on the difference between unrestricted act in God and unrestricted desire, only incrementally satisfied, in us.

The language of ‘spirating’ and ‘spirated’ emerged in the course of the tradition in an effort to express the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. The Father and the Son together are *Spirans*, the Ones who together ‘breathe,’ ‘spirate.’ As such together they are, in their mutual recognition as Father and Son, paternity and filiation, *Dicens* and *Verbum*, the principle of a distinct intelligible emanation or autonomous spiritual procession or opposed relation. The Father and the Son, *Spirans*, are active spiration of proceeding Love. The originated reciprocal relation that proceeds from their mutual recognition, the Holy Spirit, *Spiratus*, is passive spiration. In the analogy the term *spirans*, what ‘spirates,’ what breathes, means within us the act of understanding-and-consequent-inner-word together that are the principle of an intelligent emanation or autonomous spiritual procession that is determined by both the act of understanding and the word spoken. What flows from that combined principle in us is a form of love, *amor*. In the language of the faculty psychology in which the analogy was expressed by Aquinas, *amor* is the fundamental act of the will. Just as an inner word is the immanent term of an intelligent emanation or autonomous spiritual procession from an act of understanding, so love is the immanent term of an intelligible emanation or autonomous spiritual procession from the combined principle of the act of understanding and its consequent inner word. This love, as ‘spirated’ or breathed, is received; it is a gift of understanding and word; as such it is the analogue for the divine relation that the tradition has called passive spiration, which is identical with the Holy Spirit, who is the Father’s and the Son’s Gift to one another. Active spiration is their *giving* to one another, while passive spiration is their mutual gift. Although in us the love that is the analogue for the Holy Spirit is received not in the intellect but in the will (to use the Scholastic categories that Lonergan still employs in his early work), still it occurs within intellectual

consciousness, since the will is an intellectual appetite, that is, an appetite that follows upon intellect.¹⁴ In the Trinitarian reality that we are attempting to understand through the analogy, ‘*Spirans*,’ Lonergan tells us in an important footnote, is the same as the ‘notionaliter diligere’ of *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 37, a. 1, c. ad fin., and what proceeds from it is the *amor procedens* of that same text. Aquinas’s magnificent text, containing virtually the whole of Trinitarian systematics, is as follows: ‘... in quantum in amore vel dilectione non importatur nisi habitudo amantis ad rem amatam, amor et diligere essentialiter dicuntur, sicut intelligentia et intelligere; in quantum vero his vocabulis utimur ad exprimendam habitudinem eius rei quae procedit per modum amoris ad suum principium et e converso, ita quod per amorem intelligatur amor procedens et per diligere intelligatur spirare amorem procedentem, sic Amor est nomen personae et diligere vel amare est verbum notionale, sicut dicere vel generare.’¹⁵

This, too, is a difficult matter to get hold of; it is no easier to grasp in our own consciousness the active loving that, characterizing understanding and word, grounds proceeding acts of love, and the distinction between these, than it is to grasp the act of understanding that grounds the proceeding inner word, and the distinction between these; but doing so will provide the analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit. A good deal of the remaining material in the second chapter of *The Triune God: Systematics* is concerned with this analogy as Lonergan understood it at the time. And a good deal of

14 ‘*amor*: fundamentalis actus voluntatis: cf. *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 20; I-II, qq. 26-28; II-II, qq. 23-33. Qui quidem amor, quamvis non in intellectu sed in voluntate recipiatur, sane est intra ipsam conscientiam intellectualem, cum voluntas sit appetitus intellectum sequens seu intellectualis. Quare sicut verbum est immanens terminus emanationis intelligibilis ex dicente, ita amor est immanens terminus emanationis intelligibilis ex spirante.’ Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 180.

15 See *ibid.*, note 24.

our transposition of the analogy to the order of grace will be concerned with a new articulation of precisely that analogy, relying on the identification of the analogue for active spiration with the elevation of human central form that consists in the gift of God's love without qualifications and with the judgments of value that proceed as inner word from that gift, and the analogue for passive spiration with the conjugate form of charity, the dynamic state of being in love as proximate ground of habitual loving acts. But first we have to grasp Lonergan's analogy in its own context and transpose it into the appropriate interior terms and relations precisely as an analogy in the order not of grace but of nature.

It is of the utmost importance to highlight that the relevant inner word that can function as contributing to the principle of the emanation of love is not a concept, not a judgment of fact, not even a practical judgment, but a judgment of value.¹⁶ That statement represents a major development in Lonergan's own understanding, and a most important ingredient in his own developing Trinitarian analogy. A careful study is needed of the emergence in Lonergan's writings of the notion of judgment of value. The qualification that *spirans amorem* is characteristic of a judgment of value is Lonergan's own. It is not found as such in Aquinas, nor is it mentioned again in *The Triune God: Systematics*. Its appearance here signals a development that occurred in Lonergan's own understanding after *Insight*, but a development that was still inchoate at the time *De Deo trino: Pars systematica* was published in 1964. In *Insight* judgments of value are spoken of only in chapter 20 (and so not in the generic discussion of decision in chapter 18). The development moves through *Divinarum personarum* (1957, 1959), where what spirates

¹⁶ '*spirans*: principium emanationis intelligibilis quatenus determinatur tum per actum intelligendi tum etiam per consequens verbum *quod est iudicium valoris*.' Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 180, emphasis added.

love is *iudicium practicum seu iudicium valoris*,¹⁷ a practical judgment *or* judgment of value, and it concludes with the position on fourth-level structures where judgments of value are quite distinct from practical judgments. The fact that the expression occurs only once in the 1964 *De Deo Trino: Pars systematica* would seem to indicate that even then he was still very much in the process of thinking out the structure of judgments of value and their relation to other operations of intentional consciousness. Nonetheless, the characterization of the divine Word as remotely analogous to a judgment of value will be important in our considerations.

1.2 Lonergan's Argument

Lonergan's argument has two steps. First, two divine processions can be conceived on the analogy of intelligent emanation. Second, only two processions can so be conceived.

First, then, at least two divine processions can be conceived on the analogy of intelligent emanation or autonomous spiritual procession. Why? God is (1) being by essence and the very act of understanding (*ipsum intelligere*), (2) truth by essence and the very act of affirming (*ipsum affirmare*), and (3) goodness by essence and the very act of loving (*ipsum amare*). Now every affirmation that we know of is true insofar as it emanates from an intelligent grasp, and all spiritual love is right and holy insofar as it proceeds from a true affirmation of the good (the equivalent at this point in his development of what is meant by 'judgment of value'). Therefore, if any intelligent emanations can be conceived in God, at least the emanation of the affirming word from intelligent utterance and the emanation of love from both intelligent utterance and affirming word can be conceived. Nor can these two be reduced to one, for love emanates from the word while the word does not emanate from itself but from the understanding

¹⁷ See Lonergan, *Divinarum personarum* 69.

that speaks the word. To emanate from the word and not to emanate from the word are contradictories, and since contradictions can be posited in God, the emanation of the word and the emanation of love cannot be posited as one and the same emanation. Therefore two divine processions can be conceived on the analogy of intelligent emanation.¹⁸

Second, *only* these two emanations can be conceived. Why is that so? Lonergan uses a syllogism to argue this second step.

When the argument is expressed in syllogistic form, the major states that in God there can be conceived only one act of understanding, one word, and one act of love, for (1) by reason of act, God is utterly simple and so in God there is only one act, and (2) by

18 ‘... Deus est ens per essentiam et ipsum intelligere, verum per essentiam et ipsum affirmare, bonum per essentiam et ipsum amare. Fieri enim non potest ut in summo ente desit perfectio intelligentiae, ut in summo vero desit verum formaliter (quod est affirmare), ut in summo bono desit bonitas ipsius amoris.

‘Iam vero omne affirmare, quod cognoscimus, eatenus verum est quatenus ex intelligente emanat; et omnis amor spiritualis, quem cognoscimus, eatenus rectus sanctusque est quatenus ex vera boni affirmatione procedit.

‘Quare, si ullae emanationes intelligibiles in Deo concipi possunt, sane emanatio verbi a dicente et emanatio amoris ab utroque concipi possunt.

‘Neque hae duae, si in Deo ponuntur, in unam solamque reducuntur. Nam contradictorie opponuntur duo haec: ex verbo emanare; ex verbo non emanare. Sed amoris est ex verbo emanare. Et verbi non est ex se ipso sed ex intelligente et dicente emanare. Iam vero in Deo poni non potest contradictio; et ideo in Deo ita poni non possunt et emanatio verbi et emanatio amoris ut una solaque sit emanatio. Duae ergo processiones divinae per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis concipi possunt.’

Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 186, 188.

reason of object, by the infinite act of understanding there is attained all being, by the infinite act of affirming there is attained all truth, and by the infinite act of loving there is attained all good, and so there is no need for another act of understanding, or for another word, or for another act of love.¹⁹

The minor is to the effect that there is only one emanation of one love, and only one emanation of one word, and that the divine act of understanding cannot itself intelligibly proceed from some other principle. The first two points are obvious: the one divine act is eternal and immutable, and in that act there can be only one emanation of one word and one emanation of one love. The third point requires us to distinguish human from divine understanding. There is in us an intelligible procession of the act of understanding itself, since as intellectually conscious beings we inquire, investigate, and reason in order to arrive at an act of understanding. But this cannot be so in God, since God is not reduced from potency to the act of understanding.²⁰ *Ipsum esse subsistens* is *ipsum intelligere subsistens*.

19 ‘... in Deo concipi non possunt nisi unum intelligere, unum verbum, unus amor ...

Maior constat tum ratione actus tum ratione obiecti. Ratione actus, cum in Deo simplicissimo nisi unus actus non sit. Ratione obiecti, quia per actum infinitum intelligendi attingitur omne ens, per actum infinitum affirmandi attingitur omne verum, per actum infinitum amandi attingitur omne bonum.’ Ibid. 188.

20 ‘Sed unius amoris non est nisi una emanatio; unius verbi non est nisi una emanatio; neque intelligere divinum ex quodam alio principio emanare potest intelligibiliter.

‘Ergo in Deo concipi non possunt nisi duae processiones inquantum ad similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis attenditur ...

‘*Minor* est evidens, quatenus asseritur in unico actu aeterno et immutabili emanatio una unius verbi, et emanatio una unius amoris. In nobis autem aliquantulum invenitur intelligibilis emanatio actus intelligendi, quatenus intellectualiter conscii

2 Generation and Spiration

Lonergan's third and final assertion on divine processions maintains that the divine emanation of the Word, but not that of Love, can properly be named generation.²¹ The Word, then, is properly named 'Son,' and the Speaker 'Father.'

The core intelligibility of generation must be grasped first, and then the notion of what would constitute generation in the spiritual order. The latter step requires that the divine nature be acknowledged precisely as intellectual, and that the difference be grasped in such a nature between the emanation of the word and the emanation of love.

2.1 Generation

Generation, strictly so called, is the origin of something alive from a conjoined living principle, with a resulting likeness in nature (*origo viventis a principio vivente coniuncto*

inquirimus, investigamus, ratiocinamur ut ad actum intelligendi perveniamus. Sed hoc in Deo esse non potest, cum Deus non reducatur de potentia in actum intelligendi.'

Ibid.

(Actually, there is not found in us an *intelligible emanation* of the act of understanding, *if* intelligible emanation is defined as the autonomous procession of act from act. It would have been more accurate for Lonergan to have said '*In nobis autem aliquo modo invenitur processio actus intelligendi.*' It can be said, however, that in the definition of terms for this thesis he uses the word *emanatio* more broadly than he did earlier in his discussion of *emanatio intelligibilis*, defining it here simply as *quaecumque origo*).

21 'Divinam Verbi emanationem, non autem emanationem Amoris, consequitur ratio generationis proprie dictae.' Ibid.

in similitudinem naturae).²² While each and every element in this definition must be verified if we are to speak of something as generation, special attention has to be paid to the phrase ‘with a resulting likeness of nature,’ which does not mean only that what emanates or proceeds must be like in nature but also that *this likeness in nature must arise in virtue of the emanation itself* (*haec in natura similitudo oriri debet vi ipsius emanationis*).²³ The likeness in nature is communicated to what emanates, precisely by reason of the emanation itself. In the instance of divine emanation, the Father communicates to the Son the divine nature precisely in and through the eternal procession itself. If the Son has indeed become incarnate, it is entirely appropriate for him to say, ‘Whoever has seen me has seen the Father’ (John 14.9)

2.2 *The Divine Nature as Intellectual*

If the likeness of nature, thus understood and communicated, is so important, then attention must be paid to the divine nature and how we conceive it. What is the divine nature that is communicated to the Son in the eternal generation from the Father?

‘Nature’ can be understood to mean either (1) an immanent principle of movement and rest²⁴ or (2) essence. But in either case there is a difficulty in conceiving the *divine* nature. As to (1), the notion of nature as an immanent principle of movement and rest would seem to have no place in God, for God is entirely simple, and so there can be in God no real distinction between a principle of movement or operation and the

22 Ibid. 190-91.

23 Ibid. 192-93.

24 The definition is Aristotle’s; more fully, ‘principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens.’ Ibid. 192-93, with a reference to Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 1, 192b 23.

movement or operation itself, so that ‘nature’ in this sense has no place in God. As to (2), if ‘nature’ is taken to mean ‘essence,’ then while we can acknowledge nature in God in this sense, the divine nature cannot be known to us, for in this life we do not know what God is; while we use the word ‘God’ to mean the divine nature, this word is not taken from a known nature; the most proper name of God, says Aquinas, is *Qui est*, precisely because this name is taken from the *esse* of God, omitting every determining form, so that it signifies an infinite ocean of substance.²⁵

Lonergan responds to the second point first. St Thomas says that God’s act of understanding *is* God’s substance (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 14, a 4), that the nature of God *is* God’s act of understanding (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 18, a. 3 c. ad fin.), and that intellectual creatures are in the image of God because they possess a specific likeness precisely in their intellectuality (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 93, aa. 2-4). How is it possible for him to say this, if we cannot know what God is? We cannot know the divine nature in this life, for we do not understand God through a species proportionate to the divine essence (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 12, aa. 2, 4, 5, 11), but this does not mean that we cannot have some analogical knowledge of God in this life, and so order the analogically known realities as to place something first in the order of our conceptions. In this sense, then, for Lonergan the nature of God is the unrestricted act of understanding, of which we have only a heuristic notion: the understanding of everything about everything. On this

25 ‘Si autem sumitur natura pro essentia, ita natura in Deo agnosci potest ut tamen eam non cognoscamus. Nam hac in vita nescimus quid sit Deus. Quamvis enim nomen, Deus, imponatur ad divinam naturam significandam, ipsum tamen nomen non a cognita natura sumitur; et ideo nomen, Qui est, maxime proprium Dei nomen videtur, quia hoc nomen ab esse Dei sumitur et omnem formam determinantem omittit ut significet quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum.’ Ibid. 192-95, with reference to Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 13, a. 8 c. and ad 2m; a. 11 c. and ad 1m.

there follow, in the order of our conceptions, God's infinity, aseity, simplicity, and whatever else there is in God that is not known to us. The 'following' here is not in the order of causality but in that of intelligibility. There can be an order of 'reasons' in our affirmations about God, even though there is no order of causes in God.

It may be worth noting that this ordering is Lonergan's, not Aquinas's; St Thomas, it seems, at least in the first part of the *Summa theologiae*, places divine simplicity first, not divine infinity. This difference is related to the fact that for Lonergan the affirmation of God as the unrestricted act of understanding, as *ipsum intelligere*, precedes, in the order of 'reasons,' the affirmation of God as *ipsum esse subsistens*. Given that priority, Lonergan's argument for his own ordering makes eminent sense. That argument is as follows.

(1) *Infinity* belongs to the nature of intellect in such a way that intellect in act with respect to the totality of its object is itself infinite, the unrestricted act of understanding. For (a) intellect is *quo est omnia fieri*, and (b) the term '*omnia*' admits no generic or specific limitation, so that (c) the object of intellect is all of being, *ens totum* (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 79, a 7). For this reason (d) human intellect tends toward its object in such a way that it does not rest until it sees God *per essentiam* (*ibid.* q. 12, a. 1; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8; q. 5, a. 5; *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, cc. 25-63). For this reason, too, (e) every created intellect is a passive potency (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 79, a. 2) and (f) every created act of understanding is other than the substance of the creature, other than the creature's act of existing, and other than the creature's operative potency (*ibid.* q. 54, aa. 1-3). On the same grounds, (g) an intellect that is in act with respect to its complete object is itself infinite being (*ibid.* 1, q. 79, a 2).

(2) Infinite being cannot be from another, and so an intellect in act with respect to its entire object is *a se*, from itself.

(3) The infinite excludes potency, for what is in potency to a further perfection *eo ipso* falls short of infinity.

(4) Intellect in act is the intelligible in act, so that intellect differs from the intelligible only insofar as both are in potency (ibid. 1, q. 14, a. 2); but the infinite excludes potency, and so (a) the act of understanding that is in act with respect to its total object is not distinct from the intellect that understands, (b) the infinite qua intelligible is not distinguished from the act of understanding by which it is understood (ibid. 1, q. 14, a. 4), and (c) the infinite act of understanding is true with respect to itself, not according to a likeness, as though knowing and known were two things, but according to the absence of any unlikeness (ibid. q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m).

(5) The *esse naturale* of the infinite is not something different from its *esse intentionale*, for the *esse naturale* of something is the *esse* by which it is, the *esse intentionale* is the medium by which it is known, and in the infinite the act of understanding by which it is known is the same as the intelligible that is known; and so its *esse naturale* is the same as its *esse intentionale* (ibid. q. 34, a. 2, ad 1m; see q. 27, a. 2 c. and ad 2m). In the terms of *Insight*, the unrestricted act of understanding understands itself and so is the primary intelligible, but besides the primary intelligible there are the secondary intelligibles, since the unrestricted act of understanding grasps everything about everything precisely inasmuch as it understands itself.²⁶ As we will see later, both primary and secondary intelligible are spoken in the eternal divine Word and loved in the eternal divine proceeding Love.

(6) The infinite is completely simple, for one act of understanding is simple, the infinite act of understanding is one act, and this one act is the same as everything that the infinite knows about the infinite.

(7) Although we can conceive the infinite only analogically insofar as we ascend from our own finite act of understanding, nonetheless the infinite act of understanding

22 Lonergan, *Insight* 681, 683.

perfectly understands itself. And it does not understand itself as other than the act of understanding itself but as the same in all respects.

Thus, if the nature of God is conceived as intellect in act with respect to the whole of its object, there follow the infinity of God, the aseity of God, the simplicity of God, and whatever else there is in God that is not known to us. This much we can say, analogically of course, regarding the nature of God, where ‘nature’ means ‘essence.’

As for ‘nature’ understood, not as the essence from which all the rest follows, but as an intrinsic principle of operation, we arrive again at the conclusion that the divine nature is intellectual. For while it is true that our natural knowledge of God yields no real distinctions in God, faith and theology do tell us of real distinctions, namely, the distinctions of persons constituted by relations of origin. But modes of origin are different in different things, according to the nature of each thing, and the distinction of the divine persons corresponds to the divine nature, where the Trinity is distinguished in accord with the procession of the Word from the one who utters it, and Love from the speaker and the Word (ibid. q. 93, aa. 5 and 6), that is, according to emanations of intellectual consciousness.²⁷

27 ‘Quamvis enim nulla prorsus distinctio realis in Deo poni possit, secundum quod Deus naturaliter nobis innotescat, tamen prout Deus nobis per fidem et theologiam cognoscitur, inveniuntur reales personarum distinctiones, quae per relationes originis constituuntur. Iam vero “non est idem modus originis in omnibus, sed modus originis uniuscuiusque est secundum convenientiam suae naturae: aliter enim producuntur animata, aliter inanimata; aliter animalia, et aliter plantae. Unde manifestum est quod distinctio divinarum personarum est secundum quod divinae naturae convenit” [Summa theologiae, 1, q. 93, a. 5]. Sed “increata trinitas distinguitur secundum processionem Verbi a dicente et amoris ab utroque” [ibid. a. 6]. Et ideo, cum origines in divinis sint secundum emanationes conscientiae intellectualis, concludendum est

The point of this entire second step, then, is that we are to conceive of the divine nature, whether as essence or as immanent principle of operation, as intellectual. It is thus that we can affirm with St Thomas that (1) *intelligere Dei est eius substantia*, (2) *Dei natura est ipsum eius intelligere*, and (3) *creaturae intellectuales sunt ad imaginem Dei quia similitudinem specificam habent*.²⁸ It is such a divine nature that is communicated to the Word and to proceeding Love in the emanations that are the Trinitarian processions.

2.3 Emanation of Word and Emanation of Love

Thirdly, however, if we turn to the analogue of intellectual nature that our own cognitive and evaluative processes provide us, we find that there is a difference between the emanation of the inner word and the procession of love. And so, while the divine nature is communicated both to the Son and to the Holy Spirit by virtue of the very processions in which they emanate (the Son from the Father, the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son), still that communication of the divine nature to the Son is distinct from the communication to the Holy Spirit, so that the Son is subject of the one divine intelligent and loving consciousness in a manner distinct from that in which the Holy Spirit is subject of that same divine consciousness.

Lonergan is here working on the analogy ‘from below upward,’ according to which we first understand something, then from the understanding speak a true word

divinam naturam esse intellectualem.’ Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 196, 198.

29 (1) God’s act of understanding is God’s substance, (2) God’s nature is God’s act of understanding, and (3) intellectual creatures are in the image of God because they have a specific likeness to God.

about the thing understood, then from understanding and word spirate a love of the thing, and finally are carried by love toward the loved thing.²⁹

Now, the emanation of the word heads toward the formation of an intentional likeness of what has been understood; a true word about the thing is had insofar as there is formed within the intellect a perfect likeness of the thing.³⁰ But love is had only insofar as the lover is inclined, borne, impelled to what is loved, is united with it, and adheres to it; and so the emanation by which love proceeds heads toward constituting an inclination, impulse, adherence.³¹ These two attitudes or orientations are not only distinct but at least in human consciousness are to some extent opposed. The object of intellect is the true, and the true is found within intellect itself, so that one who is intellectually committed to the interior formation of a true likeness of what is understood can sometimes seem to others to be rather cold, little inclined or drawn toward realities in themselves. On the other hand, the object of the will is the good, and the good exists not within the will but in realities themselves, so that the lover can be so preoccupied with the beloved that people who cultivate the affections rather than true knowledge are said to be blind. A

29 ‘... distingui oportet (1) ipsam rem, (2) intelligentiam rei, (3) verbum rei, et (4) amorem rei. Conscientia enim intellectualis ita se ad rem habet ut, primo, rem intelligat, deinde, ex intelligentia dicat verbum rei verum, tertio, ex intelligentia verboque spiret rei amorem et, quarto, vi ipsius amoris in rem amatam feratur.’ Ibid. 198.

30 ‘... eatenus habetur verbum rei verum, quatenus efformatur intra intellectum perfecta rei similitudo. Qua de causa, illa emanatio, qua verbum oritur, est in similitudinem rei efformandam.’ Ibid.

31 ‘E contra, eatenus habetur amor rei, quatenus amans in rem amatam inclinatur, fertur, impellitur, eique unitur atque adhaeret. Qua de causa, illa emanatio, qua oritur amor, est in inclinationem, impulsum, adhaesionem constituendam.’ Ibid.

complete circle of consciousness, of course, would see to it that one is intelligent enough to avoid the blindness of the lover and committed enough to reality itself to avoid the coldness (to say nothing of the potential unreasonableness) of the intellectual. Such a complete circle of consciousness begins with the intellect's grasp, moves to the representation in a true word of what has been grasped, and proceeds to a love of what is so represented that heads one toward the loved reality as it is in itself and in its own right.³² Each element in this process shares in the knowledge and love constitutive of the entire process, but in its own way. Analogously, each divine person understands and loves with the understanding and love that are the infinite divine consciousness, but each of them in the manner proper to that person: the Father as unoriginate understanding and love, the Word as born of, spoken from, that understanding and love, and the Holy Spirit as the proceeding Gift of the two to one another, the seal, as it were, of the divine perfection. The circumincession of the Trinitarian persons is very remotely analogous to the 'complete circle' of autonomous human consciousness that Lonergan is speaking of at this point in his treatment.

32 *'Quae quidem duo inter se quodammodo opponuntur. Cum enim obiectum intellectus sit verum, cumque verum intra ipsum intellectum inveniatur, ita occupatur intellectus in veram rei similitudinem intus efformandam ut ii, qui scientiis vacent, frigidiores et leviores videantur, cum parum in ipsas res secundum se inclinentur, impellantur, ferantur. E contra, cum obiectum voluntatis sit bonum, cumque bonum non intra voluntatem sed extra et in ipsis rebus existat, ita amans cum ipso amato occupatur ut ii, qui magis affectus quam scientias colant, caeci dicantur.*

'Quod si per intellectum caecitas et per voluntatem levitas evitantur, perfectus quidam conscientiae circulus completur. Ab ipsa enim re incipitur ut intellectu perspiciatur, et perspecta verbo vero repraesentetur, et repraesentata ita amore diligatur ut in ipsam rem secundum se redeatur.' Ibid. 198, 200.

The emanation of the word and the emanation of love differ, then, in that true and false are in the mind, while good and evil are in things. It is because the intellect tends toward an interiorly held truth that the intrinsic intelligibility of the emanation of the word is to head toward the interior formation of a true likeness of what is understood. And it is because the will tends toward a good external to itself that the intrinsic intelligibility of the emanation of love is to head toward actuating an inclination toward the thing itself.³³ A very important reference is given to Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m: ‘Haec autem est differentia inter intellectum et voluntatem: quod operatio voluntatis terminatur ad res, in quibus est bonum et malum; sed operatio intellectus terminatur in mente, in qua est verum et falsum ... Et ideo *voluntas non habet aliquid progrediens a seipsa, quod in ea sit nisi per modum operationis; sed intellectus habet in seipso aliquid progrediens ab eo, non solum per modum operationis, sed etiam per modum rei operatae.*’ The last sentence is crucial: whatever proceeds in the will itself proceeds only *per modum operationis*, whereas in the intellect there are not only *processiones per modum operationis* but also *processiones per modum operati*. The procession of the act of love is, of course, a *processio operati*, but it is not a procession *in* the will; rather, it is a procession from the intellect into the will. This, Lonergan will argue, is a point missed by most commentators on Aquinas. Its importance we will see when we come to the last of the four questions that Lonergan adds to his assertions in the chapter that we are investigating. That question will be for us a springboard into the

33 ‘Quibus perspectis, manifestum videtur quo differant emanatio verbi et emanatio amoris. Verum enim et falsum in mente sunt; bonum autem et malum sunt in rebus. Quia ergo intellectus tendit in verum interius, intrinseca ratio emanationis verbi est in similitudinem rei veram intus efformandam. Quia autem voluntas tendit in bonum exterius, intrinseca ratio emanationis amoris est ut inclinationem in ipsam rem actuet.’ Ibid. 200.

complexity of Lonergan's various treatments of the relationships between knowledge and love. At this stage in his thinking, love still flows from knowledge, but even in this strictly Thomist context, as we will see, there are grounds for conceiving a quite different relationship.

2.4 *The Argument*

The three points on which the argument depends have now been exposed. The argument consists in showing that all the elements of the definition of generation are verified in the divine emanation of the word, but not in the divine emanation of love.

The divine emanation of the word, then, is a procession (*origo*) of what is living (God is living, and the divine Word is God) from a living principle (the Speaker is also the living God) that is conjoined with what proceeds from it (the two are, respectively, principle and term within the same consciousness) into a likeness (it is of the nature of the emanation of the true word that it proceed to the formation of a true likeness) where the likeness is a likeness of nature (the intentional *esse* of God is identical with God's natural *esse*, so that, while other inner words are 'like' only according to their intentional *esse*, the Word of God, by being like according to intentional *esse*, is necessarily also like according to natural *esse*).³⁴

But not all of these elements are verified in the divine procession of love. It is an *origo viventis e principio vivente coniuncto*, and through it God proceeds *secundum esse Dei naturale*, but the emanation of love is not an emanation that heads toward the formation of a similitude of the thing loved but rather an emanation that, proceeding from speaker and word and so possessing their full knowledge, heads toward the constitution

³⁴ This suggests the magnificent argument of Aquinas in *Summa contra Gentiles*, 4, c.

of an impulse or adherence to what is thus known and uttered. While there does arise from this emanation what is similar in nature, the intelligibility (*ratio*) of the emanation is not such that the emanation is headed to the constitution of a likeness.³⁵

2.5 Postponing a Problem

At this point we must digress for a moment, if only for the sake of postponing a problem that may arise for some. In an article in *Theological Studies* on ‘The Starting Point of Systematic Theology,’ I pointed to an internal inconsistency in Lonergan’s presentation at this point in the analogy. It has to do with the character of the analogue for the divine Word as a judgment not of fact but of value. Let me quote:

Even in his trinitarian treatises of the 1950s and 1960s, the word that provides an analogue for the divine Word is not a concept, not even a judgment of fact, but a judgment of value; and yet his unpacking of the processions is still in terms of the emanation of a purely cognitional judgment, a judgment in which there is formed (in Thomas’s words) a likeness (*similitudo*) of what is known to be. The truth of a judgment of value cannot be expressed in this way, for a true judgment of value may disapprove of what is and approve of what is not. And so the work of elaborating what the truth of a judgment of value consists in, even when that judgment is generated in a movement from below, remains to be done. An overhauling even of the early analogy ‘from below’ is required before we can proceed any further. What makes for the truth, not of a judgment of fact, but of a judgment of value? The appropriation of the emanation of a word that is a judgment of value is by no means as clear in Lonergan’s work as is the appropriation of the procession of a true

35 See *ibid.* 200-203.

judgment of fact. We must try to shore up what is still inchoate in his writings, even in the later writings where a new notion of value emerges.³⁶

This is not the place to take up the challenge that this question presents, for while the language of ‘judgment of value’ (*iudicium valoris*) does appear once in the text, namely, when Lonergan presents the meaning of the term ‘spirans,’ still it may be argued that the later notion of judgments of value had not yet emerged. The *iudicium valoris* is still conceived on the lines of a judgment of fact. The question ‘is?’ that leads to the reflective act of understanding grounding a judgment of fact becomes simply the question ‘is to do?’ leading to a reflective act of understanding grounding a judgment of value. We are still within the context of the approach to decision presented in chapter 18 of *Insight*. The ‘judgment’ that in *Insight* precedes a decision is now called a judgment of value, but this is the only difference. The context remains cognitional. The problem that I presented in ‘The Starting Point of Systematic Theology’ is a problem only for the later analogy, not for the analogy presented in *The Triune God: Systematics*, that is, in *De Deo Trino: Pars systematica*. In support of this position I refer the reader to the diagrams that Philip McShane prepared in his work on the 1957 lectures on existentialism.³⁷ Very relevant is McShane’s statement that the diagrams seem to come from lectures that Lonergan gave in 1961, and so about half-way between the *iudicium practicum seu iudicium valoris* of *Divinarum personarum* (1957 and 1959) and the *iudicium valoris* of *De Deo Trino: Pars systematica* (1964). Judgments of value are still represented in terms that barely

36 Robert M. Doran, ‘The Starting Point of Systematic Theology,’ *Theological Studies* 67 (2006) 759.

37 See Bernard Lonergan, *Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism*, ed. Philip J. McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 322-23.

distinguish them from judgments of fact. While the term is used, the understanding of what it means corresponds exactly to the context of chapter 18 of *Insight*. We will not find the later notion of judgments of value until after the breakthrough to functional specialization in 1965.³⁸ It is then that the problem that I raised in ‘The Starting Point of Systematic Theology’ becomes a distinct issue that must be faced.

It still remains important, of course, that the analogue for the eternally proceeding divine Word is a judgment of value, a *verbum spirans amorem*. Even the early analogy, for all its intellectualist overtones and context, represents divine self-transcendence in agapic terms, however disguised they may appear in contrast to the explicit emphases of the later analogy.

3 Enriching the Context

I wish now to return to the discussion at the end of the previous chapter, in order to introduce some considerations that will move our discussion to the kind of Trinitarian theology that I wish to provide on these bases provided by Lonergan. These considerations will themselves become richer and more abundant when we treat the four questions that Lonergan adds to the three assertions of chapter 2 of *The Triune God: Systematics*, and again and again as we attempt to move on from the foundations provided in Lonergan’s text, but they must be introduced now.

I begin with the intriguing suggestion of Jean-Michel Oughourlian, in dialogue with René Girard, that ‘the real human *subject* can only come out of the rule of the

38 An early instance can be found in the 1967 lecture ‘Horizons,’ in Bernard Lonergan, *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, vol. 17 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) 16-19.

Kingdom; apart from this rule, there is never anything but mimetism and the “interdividual”. Until this happens, the only subject is the mimetic structure.’ Girard’s response to this comment is telling: ‘That is quite right.’³⁹

The significance of these remarks in our present context is, of course, that the ‘real human subject’ in his or her autonomous spiritual dynamism is providing the analogy on which we are relying, and what Oughourlian and Girard are saying is that such an analogy is available to us only inasmuch as we have been not only freed *from* the illusions of autonomy that we discussed earlier but also freed *into* a genuine autonomy through transcending the mimetic situation in which all are caught, short of the divine grace. We can proceed no further in constructing a Trinitarian analogy on the basis of such genuine human autonomy until we have explored this rich and fertile suggestion and unpacked at least some of its profound theological significance.

I would identify the ‘real human subject’ to which Oughourlian refers with the authentic subject in Lonergan’s sense: attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, loving. That is to say, Lonergan, more than Oughourlian or Girard, teaches us what is meant by the ‘real human subject.’ Such a subject is characterized by the *processiones operationis* and *processiones operati* that characterize intelligent, reasonable, responsible performance: the emergence of act from potency in the order of inquiry, and the emergence of act from act in the order of actual understanding, judging, and deciding. This ‘real human subject’ arises out of the interdividual situation of mimetic rivalry and violence, or out of Lonergan’s ‘primordial intersubjectivity’ in both its positive and deeply dark and sinister aspects. It so emerges through the grace of the rule of God, and remains the always precariously genuine subject of operations in accord with the

39 Quoted from René Girard, *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World*, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987) 199.

transcendental laws of human integrity, the precepts of watchful attentiveness, creative intelligent inquiry, careful reasonable reflection, demanding existential self-constitutive and world-constitutive deliberation and decision. Some, and only some, of these operations are genuinely autonomous, where autonomy has to do with the procession of act from act and is contrasted with the spontaneity that characterizes the emergence of act from potency, of insight from inquiry.

The so-called 'rule of the Kingdom' because of which there emerges the 'real human subject' is progressively revealed in the course of biblical literature, and it has to do with liberation from the interindividual mimetism that for Girard characterizes all religion except that which undergoes this liberation. Most religion is primitive and even dark intersubjectivity. The religion that emerges from the 'rule of the Kingdom' is interpersonal in the deepest sense, where the three founding persons are the persons of the Trinity. In between the interdividuality of origins and the interpersonal love at the end of the process stands the individuation of the 'real human subject' becoming attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible.

Girard is not, of course, maintaining that such liberation is found only in biblical religions. He *is* claiming, however, and rightly so, that the Bible *reveals* the mimetic situation, the mechanisms of mimetic conflict and violence, and the key to moving beyond it into genuine human autonomy and freedom. As Lonergan would insist, the revelatory text is the word of God precisely as true, and as true it is the source of all doctrinal and systematic theology that is faithful to the revealed word. This means that the revelation of the mimetic situation and of its overcoming is not the only true word spoken in the Bible. But it may well be the most overlooked of those true words, and to the extent that it is overlooked, a dimension of doctrinal and systematic theology has been neglected. The neglect, perhaps, has meant a truncation of the possibilities of these theological functional specialties; and if that is the case, perhaps it is time to address the situation in such a way as to do something about it. Doing something about it will lead

right back into our earlier insistence on transforming systematic theology into a theology of history.

I will, then, go right to the chase and speak about the revelation of the rule of the Kingdom that takes place in the crucifixion of the incarnate Word proceeding from and sent by the One who utters. I assume here the best exegesis currently available on the preaching of the Kingdom by Jesus and on the events that led to his death. For this one can do no better at present, in my view, than N.T. Wright's *Jesus and the Victory of God*. Girard's much less technical understanding of the public ministry of Jesus is in keeping with Wright's magisterial treatment, except perhaps on the exegesis of several passages. The early preaching of the Kingdom by Jesus gave away the secret of the Kingdom, which lies fundamentally in the substitution of love for the prohibitions and rituals of the remnants of the darkly sacrificial religion that still contaminated the Jewish practice in Jesus' day. The love that Jesus preached was one that completely and definitively eliminated all vengeance and reprisal, all retribution, all forms of conduct that depend on violent initiative. Only an unconditional renunciation of violence will bring about the end of violence – and Jesus was addressing a small and vulnerable nation caught in a violent situation and tempted to use violence to overcome violence. It is in the context of a discussion of Jesus' own preaching of the Kingdom that Oughourlian makes his comment about the emergence of the 'real human subject.'

Most people rejected the message of the Kingdom in Jesus' preaching. Even the disciples did not understand it, as is manifest from their vying for the best positions in what they thought was another political movement. It is then that Jesus' more apocalyptic message takes center stage. This message has frequently been misunderstood. It meant precisely and only that if the people to whom the message was addressed were to turn down the peace that Jesus offers, a sacrificial and cultural crisis would eventuate whose radical effect would be the destruction of the nation. Girard insists that precisely that message, while delivered to the people of Israel and their rulers at a specific time under

specific circumstances, is universal. The society born of violence will succumb to violence.

Jesus' passion and death occur for reasons intimately connected with the consequences of rejecting the Kingdom. The reasons for his passion and death are purely historical and have nothing to do with sacrifice as sacrifice is understood either in the Jewish religion of his day or in other, more archaic forms of deviated transcendence. The Word that earlier in this chapter we have tried to understand as generated from the Father's all-embracing and all-loving understanding and wisdom is now revealed, in large part, as the Father's Word about violence and love. Jesus as the incarnation of the Word of the Father suffers the destiny of that divine Word in history. As Girard says, he has revealed violence in the most apparently holy of institutions in his own Jewish religion, namely, in the temple, the last stronghold of sacrificial religion, and the violence turned against him is in direct response to that revelation. That violence also shows the truth of his word. Indeed, it shows that he is indeed the very Word of God itself. His death is not a sacrifice that resulted from a pact between himself and the Father. Such a view, so influential in Christian history and yet so terribly wrong, is put forth by Christians who do not want to admit that human beings alone do these sorts of things, and who thus must invent an irrational requirement of sacrifice that absolves them and all the rest of us for any responsibility for violence in the world. Such a view misses entirely the revelation of the Father that Jesus himself is. Lonergan will speak of the created relation of Jesus' assumed humanity to the divine Word as the created participation in divine paternity that enables the Word spoken by the Father actually to speak himself.⁴⁰ As Girard insists, what that Father, divine paternity, really is, was disclosed, revealed, in the following element of Jesus' preaching of the rule of the Kingdom: 'You have heard that it was said, "You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy." But I say to you, Love your

40 Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 470-73.

enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be children of your Father who is in heaven. For he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust alike' (Matthew 5. 43-45). This is not a Father who insists on the sacrifice of his incarnate Son for the sake of vindicating his honor. While that may be a caricature of some more sophisticated theological understandings, still anything that smacks of such a reading must be entirely discredited. The revelation of the Father takes place in Jesus precisely because of their common divine nature. This is why those who have seen Jesus have seen the Father. He does not die as a sacrifice, but so that there may be no more sacrifices in human history.⁴¹

Girard offers a very interesting and convincing exegesis of the New Testament passage that, more than any other, has influenced the Christian notion of the incarnate Word, namely, the prologue to the Gospel of John. The Johannine Logos is specified in the prologue in a way that includes what Girard calls the scapegoat mechanism in the very definition of the divine Logos. His translation emphasizes his point, which is not brought out so clearly in other translations: 'In him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness, *and the darkness comprehended it not*. He was in the world, and the world was made through him, *yet the world knew him not*. He came to his own home, *and his own people received him not*.'⁴² The Johannine Logos, the Word

41 We will see that Raymund Schwager convinced Girard that there is a legitimate Christian meaning of the term 'sacrifice.' In my view, however, we capture that meaning better if we soft-pedal the use of sacrificial language and learn the language of love. Girard reserves the word 'sacred' for the religions of the hidden scapegoat, and the word 'sacrifice' for participation in such false religion. I tried above to fill out Lonergan's notion of a sacralization to be fostered, but it has to do entirely with the nonviolent message of the Kingdom in history.

42 René Girard, *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World* 271.

of God, is forever expelled, Girard says, forever an absent Logos that has no direct, determining influence over human cultures. It discloses the truth of violence precisely by being expelled. Expulsion is part of its definition. The specificity of the Johannine Logos is to be an outcast. It will always be expelled from a world built on violence. The Logos of Love always allows itself to be expelled by the Logos of violence, which for Girard is the Logos of Heraclitus that lies behind most of Western philosophy.⁴³ Again, for Girard, the expulsion of the Logos of Love is revealed in a more and more obvious fashion through the whole of the Bible, and by the same process the Logos of violence is revealed as what can secure its existence only by expelling the true Logos and feeding upon it in one way or another.⁴⁴

I want these emphases to be included in all that I say here with regard to the procession and mission of the divine Word and of divine Love. God is eternally constituted in the Trinitarian relations that include the missions as identical with the processions and an additional created external term. The existential judgment of value that provides us with the analogue for the proceeding divine Word sets up the possibility of such a theology of divine generation. We make an eternal difference to God's

43 I do not think Girard is aware of the extent to which Thomas Aquinas not only appropriated Aristotle but transformed Aristotelian philosophy. But perhaps this has escaped many Christian and Catholic philosophers and theologians as well. The major transformation, of course, is the introduction of *esse*, the act of existence, as a metaphysical element, the element that Lonergan calls central act. This allows a philosophical theology that includes creation of all contingent existence by a God of love, and a strictly systematic theology that understands that creation as occurring through the very Word that became incarnate in Jesus. What has Jerusalem to do with Athens? Fundamentally, Jerusalem transforms Athens.

44 See Girard, *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World* 270-80.

Trinitarian self-constitution, and the difference is precisely what is revealed in the incarnation of the eternal Word in Jesus. That revelation not only includes, but also is centered in, the disclosure of the truth about violence and love that Girard brings to the heart of any theological understanding of human history. The Word incarnate reveals an element of the structure of history itself. We will have further comments on these matters when we come to the question (section 3.3 below) on the Father's speaking all things in the Word and so on the Word's proceeding from the Father's understanding not only of the Father but also of all creation. For now, I wish simply to suggest the enrichment that this perspective brings to the entire structure of Lonergan's 'normative source of meaning in history,' to that tidal movement that begins before consciousness, and that emerges first into the primordial intersubjectivity or interdividuality that with little persuasion become darkly mimetic, but that proceeds to individuation as one learns attentiveness, genuine inquiry and intelligent response, critical reflection and reasonable judgment, responsible deliberation and self-transcending decision, and that finds its rest beyond these in the threefold interpersonal love of intimacy, human community, and supernatural participation in the intimate relations of the indwelling Trinity. That very emergence on the scale of universal human community is the meaning and purpose, the objective, of the very divine relations that we are seeking, so haltingly, to understand.

4 Four Questions

4.1 Understanding and Word

Lonergan concludes his chapter on the divine processions by asking and answering four questions that are related not only to one another but to the processions and to the analogy employed to understand them. The first is whether, in us, understanding and

inner word are really distinct (*utrum aliud in nobis sit intelligere et aliud verbum*).⁴⁵ If they are not, then the analogy will not work to provide some remote hypothetical understanding of the procession of the divine Word.

Lonergan's argument is metaphysical rather than psychological, but in commenting on it I will introduce several psychological considerations.

Lonergan treats two cases of understanding and inner word: the direct act of understanding and the inner word of concept or definition or hypothesis or supposition that proceeds from it, and the reflective act of understanding and the proceeding inner word of judgment. Despite his use of the expression 'iudicium valoris' for the relevant inner word that provides an analogy for the divine Word proceeding from the Father, his treatment of the relation between insight and the word that proceeds from it does not proceed to that level in this text. It is probably still the case that what he says for judgments of fact is meant to apply also to judgments of value. It is likely that, as in *Insight*, considerations of value remained for him at this point an extension of intellectual activity, even if he has explicitly acknowledged a fourth level of consciousness, which had not yet occurred in so many words in *Insight*.⁴⁶ Even after a clear distinction has been made and a new dynamic process acknowledged at the fourth level of intentional consciousness (something that had certainly taken place by 1968), the structure of judgments of value remains the same for him as that of judgments of fact, as he makes clear in *Method in Theology*.

Judgments of value differ in content but not in structure from judgments of fact.

They differ in content, for one can approve of what does not exist, and one can

⁴⁵ Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 202.

⁴⁶ See Lonergan, *Insight* 619: '... the extension of intellectual activity that we name deliberation and decision, choice and will.'

disapprove of what does. They do not differ in structure, inasmuch as in both there is the distinction between criterion and meaning. In both, the criterion is the self-transcendence of the subject, which, however, is only cognitive in judgments of fact but is heading towards moral self-transcendence in judgments of value. In both, the meaning is or claims to be independent of the subject; judgments of fact state or purport to state what is or is not so; judgments of value state or purport to state what is or is not truly good or really better.⁴⁷

What is not clear, however, even in the later account has to do with the dynamics of the procession of the judgment of value. With the help of St Ignatius Loyola's comments on various times for making decisions, I have concluded that the account in *Method in Theology* corresponds to Ignatius's 'second time,' when one is experiencing affective pulls and counterpulls toward and away from possible value and disvalues. 'Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value,' Lonergan writes, 'lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feelings.'⁴⁸ These apprehensions have to be related to insights, and in fact identified with affect-laden insights, from which there proceed judgments of possible or real value. Lonergan has not clarified this particular step in the process. To clarify it would require, I believe, some detailed analysis of self-transcendent feelings, such as I have tried to begin presenting in my various accounts of psychic conversion.⁴⁹ My present point, however, is that if feelings are intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value, and if it is from such feelings that judgments of value proceed, then the feelings have to be the feelings that accompany insights into possible or, if there really are no further questions, real values. I suspect

47 Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 37.

48 Ibid.

49 See, for example, chapter 2 in Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History*.

most readers have had the experience of judgments of value issuing from affective grasp of possible values and disvalues. But what is required still among Lonergan students is some phenomenology of that procession.

At any rate, the metaphysical basis of Lonergan's argument is the familiar Aristotelian-Thomist principle that acts are distinguished in accord with different specific objects.⁵⁰ Five objects are disengaged in intellectual activity, and four of them are really distinct.

The first is the object as end, that is, being, which is the end or objective of intellectual activity. 'Being is the objective of the pure desire to know.'⁵¹ The second is the object as term of the second operation, which is the true. The third is the object that moves one to this second operation, that is, sufficient evidence. The fourth is the object as term of the first operation, namely, the definition or hypothesis or supposition. And the fifth is the object that moves us to the first operation, namely, the formal intelligibility grasped in the presentations of sense and of consciousness.

Being and the true are not really or specifically distinct, however, since being is attained in the very act in which truth is reached. Truth is the medium in which being is known. So there are four objects of intellectual operation that are specifically distinct: evidence and the true (third level), and formal intelligibility and the simple inner word that proceeds from grasping it (second level).⁵²

Lonergan reverts to specifically Scholastic language on the fifth meaning of 'object': the quiddity or nature residing in corporeal matter. In fact, that is a remote specification of the object of human intelligence. It can get us started, as it got Lonergan

50 'Cum actus ex obiecto sumat speciem, ubi aliud et aliud inveniuntur obiecta specifica, alius et alius actus distingui debent.' Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 202.

51 Lonergan, *Insight* 372.

52 See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 202-205.

started, but to leave it there invites the naive realism of so much thought that claims to take its inspiration from Aquinas; that is to say, it invites cognitional theory to remain in the world of immediacy (corporeal matter) and to assume the criteria of knowledge in the world of immediacy as the criteria of knowledge in full human knowing. The presentations of sense and of consciousness are not raw data but are already patterned and in most instances already informed by meaning. To grasp their formal intelligibility is to grasp a form already provided by other human beings in this world mediated and constituted by meaning and passed on in the sedimentations of ordinary language or public discourse. Lonergan provides the basis of this affirmation in his diagram of the levels of consciousness in *Insight*, where he includes free images and utterances at the level of data, and states that these ‘commonly are under the influence of the higher levels before they provide a basis for inquiry and reflection.’⁵³ (Lonergan, *Insight* 299). This statement should be made central to all presentations of cognitional theory. I will return to this point momentarily.

First, then, the true and sufficient evidence are really distinct, and so, exercising the metaphysical principle that an act receives its specificity from its object, we conclude that it is in one act that we grasp the sufficiency of the evidence and that it is in another that we affirm what is true or deny what is false. The two acts are related by an intellectual and intelligible emanation of the second from the first, since we are able to affirm the true *because* and only because we have grasped the sufficiency of the evidence. The ‘because’ names the element that makes the emanation not only intelligent but also intelligible. It names also the element of authentic autonomy in the procession. Consequently, in the matter of the second operation of the intellect, the one in which we answer the question, Is it so? it is necessary to distinguish between the act of understanding by which the sufficiency of the evidence is grasped and the affirmation of

⁵³ Lonergan, *Insight* 299.

the true, which is the word (yes, no, maybe, possibly, probably, etc.) interiorly spoken.⁵⁴ Newman, even more than Aquinas, was Lonergan's principal inspiration on the matter of what Lonergan called reflective understanding. In fact, it is a legitimate question whether the second *Verbum* article (now chapter 2 in the book *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*) would have been as clear about the distinction of judgment from understanding had not Lonergan previously been schooled in Newman's *Grammar of Assent*. As Lonergan points out frequently, Aristotle and Aquinas are not entire satisfactory on judgment, even if judgment is correlated with Aquinas's addition of the act of existence to Aristotle's account of the metaphysical elements.⁵⁵

Regarding the first act of the intellect, the object that moves us to the act of understanding is the intelligibility immanent in the data of sense and of consciousness. In Scholastic terms this is spoken of as the quiddity or nature existing in bodily matter. On

54 202-205.

55 See, for example, Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 335: 'For Kant understanding (*Verstand*) was the faculty of judgment. It is a view with antecedents in Plato and Scotus and, to a less extent, in Aristotle and Aquinas.' The meaning of 'to a less extent' is then explained: 'For in the latter pair there is emphasized a distinction between two operations of intellect,' giving in effect the distinction of understanding and judgment. Still, as Lonergan says elsewhere, they did not emphasize sufficiently that the second operation is more than a conceptual synthesis. It is, as Lonergan stresses in *Verbum*, the *positing* of synthesis. See Lonergan, *Verbum* 71: 'The act of judgment is not merely synthesis but also positing of synthesis ... [T]he pure synthetic element in judgment arises on the level of direct understanding and consists in the development of insights into higher unities ... [Judgment] is characterized by the fact that in it there emerges knowledge of truth ... knowledge of the correspondence between the mental and the real *compositio*.'

that analysis, first the corporeal and individual matter is disclosed to the senses; then from agent intellect there arises wonder, so that we ask what it is or why it is so; third, there is formed an image, so that the intelligible to be grasped in the sensible might be more clearly brought to light in the sensible itself; fourth, the possible intellect, turned to the image, grasps the intelligible in the image; and fifth, the same possible intellect, now actually understanding the intelligibility, speaks a simple inner word, the definition or the hypothesis.⁵⁶

As I have just emphasized, essentially the same analysis can be applied to a broader base, and in fact must be if we are to accept seriously Lonergan's insistence that the real world in which we live is the world that is mediated and constituted by meaning. The conception of the first, or empirical, level of consciousness as limited to the experience of 'corporeal matter' is far too narrow, and is responsible, I believe, for much of the naive realism that has infected the Thomist tradition. If the real world is mediated and constituted by meaning, then the level of presentations in human consciousness is itself 'meaningful.' It is not a level on which we experience only sheer raw sense data. We hardly ever experience sheer raw sense data. The notion that we do is intrinsically connected, I believe, with the notion of the real as the already out there now, to be known by taking a good look at it. Such a conception defines precisely what is meant by naive realism. I have treated these matters sufficiently for present purposes in several papers and in *What Is Systematic Theology?*⁵⁷ As a result of these analyses, I include far more in the description of empirical presentations than 'corporeal matter.'

⁵⁶ Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 204-205.

⁵⁷ See Robert M. Doran, 'Reception and Elemental Meaning: An Expansion of the Notion of Psychic Conversion,' *Toronto Journal of Theology* 20:2 (2004) 133-57; 'Insight and Language: Steps toward the Resolution of a Problem,' *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education* 15:3 (2004) 405-26; 'Empirical Consciousness

Whether we are dealing with the more elementary notion of empirical consciousness or the more complex notion that I am suggesting, the intelligible grasped in the presentations of sense and consciousness and the intelligible spoken in the word that proceeds from original insight are the same intelligible, but the object when it is grasped and the object when it is spoken are different. For when it is grasped in the more elementary empirical consciousness, corporeal matter is made known through the senses but the intelligibility is made known by the intellect, but in the hypothesis or definition what before were made known in distinct acts are joined into one. The matter that is posited in a definition or hypothesis is not the individual matter in which form was grasped by insight but the common matter involved in all such expressions of intelligibility, and what is defined or understood hypothetically is not just the quiddity, nature, or cause itself grasped by insight, but the ‘thing’ in its intelligibility, that is, according to its quiddity, nature, or cause. Thus, because the objects are distinct, so too are the acts.⁵⁸

in *Insight: Is Our Conception Too Narrow?* in *The Importance of Insight*, ed. John Liptay and David Liptay (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 49-63; *What Is Systematic Theology?* 124-43. The first and third of the papers can now be found on the website www.robertmdoran.com, among the ‘Essays in Systematic Theology’ collected there.

58 Examples are added:

‘What is an eclipse? An eclipse is the darkening brought about on a heavenly body by the interposition of another heavenly body. That is a quidditative definition, for it states what an eclipse is. How, then, does it differ from any other kind of definition? It differs in that not only does it set forth sensible similarities, but also assigns a cause or reason why. For the cause of an eclipse is the interposition of another heavenly body: that cause is grasped in the sensible data themselves, or at

What are we to say when we are considering the more complex notion of empirical consciousness, where devaluated formal and actual intelligibilities are included at the level of presentations? The situation is more complex, in that we have three rather than two instances of the same intelligibility. There is an intelligibility in the empirical presentations precisely as empirical presentations when, for instance, I hear the spoken utterances of another person. This is a devaluated formal intelligibility at the level of presentations, of empirical consciousness. It is an instance of what in *Insight* Lonergan called presentations already under the influence of the higher levels before ever providing a basis for my own inquiry and reflection. Next, there is an intelligibility that proceeds

least in the phantasm, by an act of understanding, before an eclipse can be defined through its cause.

‘What is a circle? A circle is the locus of points lying on the same plane surface and equally distant from a center. That is another quidditative definition. For it does not state that the circle is a perfectly round plane figure; rather, it assigns the cause why the circle necessarily is perfectly round. Moreover, this necessary consequence itself must be grasped in the phantasm by an act of understanding before there can be an intellectual emanation of the definition of the circle.

‘What is a human being? A rational animal. That again is a quidditative definition, because it assigns the cause. For what becomes known through the senses is a certain kind of organic body. A form is understood in this body: the soul that is both sensitive and rational. Because the form is a sensitive soul, the reality is an animal. Because the form is a rational soul, the reality is a rational animal.’ Ibid. 204-207.

Lonergan concludes: ‘Once these things have been grasped, the gnoseological foundation of hylomorphism comes to light: because we conceive realities by means of sensation and understanding, it is necessary that they be composed of matter and form.’ Ibid. 206-207.

from my own inquiry into what has been said to me, as I attempt to understand the meaning of the other who has spoken to me or to understand the ‘thing,’ the ‘matter,’ the *Sache* about which she has spoken. Finally, there is an intelligibility that I utter in manifesting what I have understood both to myself and to my interlocutor as I continue the conversation. It is an intelligibility that I speak in a word that not merely repeats the utterance of the other like a parrot but that issues from my own insight into the meaning of that utterance and that manifests that insight. These three intelligibilities are the same, just as are the intelligibility grasped in the raw data of sense that Lonergan, following Aquinas, calls ‘corporeal matter’ and the intelligibility uttered in my word proceeding from such a grasp. But again the object in each instance is different. When I am presented with the devaluated formal intelligibility of someone else’s meaning, that meaning resides in the sensible appearances of that other person’s utterances, and is understood at the level of presentations, in something like, I believe, at least one of Martin Heidegger’s uses of the word *Verstehen*. Our very empirical consciousness is, if you will, incipiently hermeneutical. When I grasp that meaning in an original insight of my own, I detach it from those sensible appearances and give it something of a generalized significance. When I express it to myself and to my interlocutor I have invested it with my own linguistic and perhaps more elemental carriers of meaning. Thus, when the intelligibility is grasped in the more complex and more usual form of empirical consciousness, presentations invested with ordinary meaningfulness are made known in receiving them; but an original meaningfulness emerges in the insight that follows upon inquiry; and again, the hypothesis that proceeds from original insight joins into one act what before were made known in distinct acts. In these more complex instances, the potential meaning presented in utterances is converted by original insight into the original meaningfulness that moves a conversation or interpretation forward, while what is understood hypothetically in this original meaningfulness is the set of connections constitutive of the situation, language, text, or whatever that is being submitted to original

investigation, and that is expressed in such a way as to make further authentic dialogue possible. Obviously, further phenomenological analyses of such conversational or dialogical encounters are desirable, but the heuristics of the analysis are provided by a simple extension of Lonergan's account of cognitional process so as to include instances in which the presentations are already under the control of higher levels.

4.1.1 Appendix 2, 'The Act of Understanding'

Lonergan refers the reader to appendix 2 of the entire volume for further discussion of the relation between the act of understanding and the inner word. We have already seen one item from this appendix, but now we will treat it a bit more fully.

Appendix 2 is entitled 'De actu intelligendi,' 'The act of understanding.' Understanding is required for the emanation of a word or concept. The object of this prior act from which a word emanates cannot be the word itself that will emanate, and so it must be the case that 'our intellect grasps not only conceptual objects but preconceptual objects as well. Otherwise we would not form conceptions because we understand, but rather, as the Scotists teach, we [would be] able to understand because in some manner conceptions have been formed.'⁵⁹ The issue is very important not only for our self-understanding and self-constitution but also for Trinitarian theology. '... the unconscious formation of the word would destroy that intellectual emanation which we have considered to be the psychological analogy of the Holy Trinity.'⁶⁰ There is no

59 'Relinquitur ergo ut intellectus noster non solum conceptualia sed etiam praeconceptualia obiecta perspiciat. Secus non quia intelligamus conceptiones formarem sed, ut docent Scotistae, quia conceptiones inconscio quodam modo formatae essent, intelligere possemus.' Ibid. 558-61.

60 Ibid. 560-61.

psychological analogy for the divine processions if it is the case that the inner word does not consciously emanate from the act of understanding.

As we have seen, in Scholastic thought correctly understood (and it has often been misunderstood, as in theories of vital act according to which every potency moves itself to its own act), ‘object’ can mean any one of three things. It can refer to something that moves a potency to act, to a term produced by an act, or to the end to which a potency tends through acts, its ‘objective.’ It is because ‘object’ has a causal relation both to potency and to act that ‘an object may be either a mover that brings about an act in a potency, or a term produced by an act, or the end to which a potency tends through acts.’⁶¹ ‘... an object is to the act of a passive potency as principle and moving cause; for color is the principle of vision insofar as it moves the faculty of sight. But an object is to the act of an active potency as term and end ...’⁶² What makes the difference is whether the potency in question is active or passive. The object is to the act of a passive potency as principle and moving cause, but an object is to the act of an active potency as term or end. ‘Object’ is not a primitive notion, then, but is reducible to the notions of potency, act, mover, end, and term.

The issue, of course, grows in complexity as we consider the transposition of the notions of active and passive potency in Lonergan’s later work: ‘... the active potencies are the transcendental notions revealed in questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, questions for deliberation. The passive potencies are the lower levels as presupposed and complemented by the higher.’⁶³ The transposition of the language of object vis-à-vis active potencies seems fairly straightforward, but the relation of object and passive potencies is problematic in this new formulation, in my view, without some

61 Ibid.

62 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1, a. 3 c.

63 Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 120.

careful elucidation. The new formulation, it seems, makes sense within the context of the vertical finality of the lower ‘levels’ as presupposed, complemented, and sublated by the higher, but the horizontal finality of each ‘level’ also exhibits its own character of passivity that not only is the key to the Aristotelian-Thomist analysis but also must be preserved in any transposition, for reasons that are not only cognitional-theoretic but also existential. Not preserving the proper receptivity of consciousness for both sense and intelligence creates an exaggerated autonomy. As we have already seen, the notion of ‘autonomy’ has a quite limited validity. As did ‘vital act’ theories in late Scholasticism, so exaggerated notions of autonomy in modernity miss the point that ‘object’ is not a primitive notion. Lonergan himself can be read as tending in this direction, if the pre-*Insight* context of *Verbum* is neglected in interpreting him. The fact that ‘intelligere est pati’ is not clearly conveyed in *Insight*, and needs to be transposed from *Verbum* into Lonergan’s own cognitional theory.

We will see in a moment, though, that the problem regarding the new meaning attached to the terms ‘active potency’ and ‘passive potency’ can be solved.

As we have just seen, the notion of object as end reflects *Insight*’s second-order definition of being as the objective of the pure desire to know. But the notion of object as term is far more modest: the term produced within the intellect is always the inner word of conception or judgment, the *verbum cordis*, which always represents but a minuscule increment in our advance toward the objective of being. There are two such inner words: the definition or hypothesis and the proposition affirming the true or negating the false. The existence of the inner word is proven from the use of outer words, for when we speak we mean something by what we say, and what we mean proximately is the inner word, which itself means the ‘thing’ intended in the inner word. As Lonergan put it earlier in *Verbum*,

[T]he inner word is what can be meant (*significabile*) or what is meant (*significatum*) by outer words, and inversely, ... the outer word is what can mean (*significativum*) or what does mean (*significans*) the inner word ... [C]ommonly [Thomas] asked what outer words meant and answered that, in the first instance, they meant inner words. The proof was quite simple. We discourse on ‘man’ and on the ‘triangle.’ What are we talking about? Certainly, we are not talking about real things directly, else we should all be Platonists. Directly, we are talking about objects of thought, inner words, and only indirectly, only insofar as our inner words have an objective reference, are we talking of real things. The same point might be made in another fashion. Logical positivists to the contrary, false propositions are not meaningless; they mean something; what they mean is an inner word, and only because that inner word is false, does the false proposition lack objective reference.⁶⁴

The conclusion is drawn succinctly in *The Triune God: Systematics*: ‘Hence primarily and *per se* outer words, whether spoken or written or present in the imagination, signify and are not signified. Things, on the other hand, are signified, but primarily and *per se* do not signify. Inner words, however, both signify and are signified: they are signified by outer words, and signify things themselves.’⁶⁵ This is an early expression of what soon would be affirmed in the statement that the real world in which we live is mediated and constituted by meaning.

But do such inner words really exist? The question is real, as anyone who has so much as begun to read Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* will know all too well. It makes the matter more difficult in the context of linguistic philosophy that Lonergan in *Verbum* demonstrates the existence of inner words from the presence and

64 Lonergan, *Verbum* 14-15.

65 Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 563.

functioning of outer words, which mean the inner words. The same demonstration is presented in *The Triune God: Systematics*.

The existence of these inner words is proven from the meaning of outer words. We speak of ‘man’ or ‘triangle,’ and we surely mean something by these words. Unless, therefore, you believe that universals subsist as real entities, you will necessarily conclude that universals are conceived in the mind and signified directly and immediately by external words. Again, human speech states what is true and what is false. What, then, is signified directly and immediately by a false statement? Unless along with the neo-positivists you maintain that false statements signify nothing, you will necessarily acknowledge a compound word formed inwardly in the mind and signified directly and immediately in an external statement. Finally, we all hold that human speech also signifies things, and yet we do not accept anything unless it is true. But the true and the false are in the mind; truth, in fact, is formally only in a judgment. Again, therefore, one must conclude that outer words signify things, not immediately, of course, but through the medium of inner words that are true.

Hence, primarily and *per se* outer words, whether spoken or written or present in the imagination, signify and are not signified. Things, on the other hand, are signified, but primarily and *per se* do not signify. Inner words, however, both signify and are signified: they are signified by outer words, and signify things themselves.⁶⁶

Again as we have seen, this inner word is not to be confused with the act of understanding or with the acts of thinking, defining, supposing, considering, affirming, or denying. The inner word is ‘that which is understood, is thought, is defined, is supposed,

⁶⁶ *The Triune God: Systematics* 563. The latter paragraph is an early expression of what soon would be affirmed in the statement that the real world is mediated and constituted by meaning.

is considered, is affirmed, is denied – not, of course, according to its natural existence but according to its intentional existence. Intentional existence [*esse intentionale*] is the medium in which a thing is known.⁶⁷

The intellect, however, is a passive potency, and so there must be an object that moves it to its act, to the act of understanding. Since the intellect has two operations, it requires two moving objects. In the case of the second operation, the moving object is the sufficient evidence that moves the intellect to the grasp of its sufficiency in a reflective act of understanding. From the reflective act of understanding there is spoken the word of judgment. In the case of the first operation, the moving object is ‘the actually intelligible as luminous in the phantasm and directly discerned by the intellect.’⁶⁸ This moves the intellect to the act of direct understanding, in a relation of potency to act, and from the direct act of understanding there is spoken, in a relation of act to act, the interior utterance of definition, hypothesis, supposition, or what have you. What is known through the entire process is the *quod quid est*, the ‘what something is.’

The intellect, however, is a passive potency, and so there must be an object that moves it to its act, to the act of understanding. Since the intellect has two operations, it requires two moving objects. In the case of the second operation, which in the order of intentionality analysis would be the level of judgment, the moving object is the sufficient evidence that moves the intellect to the grasp of its sufficiency in a reflective act of understanding. From the reflective act of understanding there is spoken the word of judgment. In the case of the first operation, the moving object is ‘the actually intelligible as luminous in the phantasm and directly discerned by the intellect.’ This moves the intellect to the act of direct understanding, and from the direct act of

⁶⁷ Ibid. 562-65.

⁶⁸ Ibid. 569. This articulation is generic enough to fit better my attempted expansion of the notion of empirical consciousness.

understanding there is spoken the interior utterance of definition, hypothesis, supposition, or what have you. What is known through the entire process is the *quod quid est*, the ‘what something is.’

Again, all of this has to be reimagined and reformulated in the context of the hermeneutical turn to the world mediated and constituted by meaning, in terms of Lonergan’s later appropriation of the notion of historical consciousness through the significance of the *esse intentionale*, intentional existence. But that can be done without violence to the genuine Aristotelian-Thomist analysis. It requires little more than an extension of ‘quod quid est’ to something like ‘what’s up.’ The appropriation of *esse intentionale* is what interiorly differentiated consciousness is all about, and history itself is a function of *esse intentionale*. Thus historical consciousness emerges from what Lonergan calls ‘the transition from substance to subject.’ Once that step from substance to subject has been taken, the *esse intentionale* assumes a far greater importance in any attempts at philosophical or theological synthesis than classical Scholastic philosophy and theology was able to acknowledge. While it presupposes the *esse naturale* of human beings, still, as soon as one asks what kind of a subject one is or is to be, one enters into the order of what we understand, what we think, what we utter, what we consider true, what we choose, what we propose, what our intentions are, what our goals in life are. All of this is within the psychological-intentional order, and it is that order, the *esse intentionale* of our acts of knowing and willing, not our *esse naturale*, that settles our eternal destiny. It is in that order that the various carriers, functions, realms, and stages of meaning take on their significance for human life. That order is not only formally constitutive of human living. It develops. History itself is the history of the development of meanings and orders that are constituted by meaning. Divine revelation is the explicit entrance of God’s meaning, including God’s incarnate meaning, God’s incarnate Logos, into history. The exploration, then, of the realm in which a psychological analogy for the

Trinitarian processions can be elaborated has profound significance for the theological articulation of the meaning of human history.

Within the context of historical consciousness, we can effect a transposition of the notions of active and passive potency that Lonergan has employed to articulate his cognitional theory in Scholastic language. Those notions had reference to faculties, which were thought of as sensitive, intellectual, apprehensive, and appetitive potencies. A good deal of Scholastic psychology was engaged in the questions about the mutual interactions of the faculties. But Lonergan has replaced the Scholastic faculty psychology with an intentionality analysis that distinguishes four levels of intentional consciousness: presentations of sense and of consciousness, understanding, judgment, and decision. The lower levels, as it were, are presupposed and complemented by the higher, while the higher sublate the lower into their more comprehensive concerns. In that context, the transcendental notions themselves assume the role of the active potencies, as these notions are manifest in questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, questions for deliberation, in the operators that, in *Insight's* language, are relentless in transforming any temporary integrations that our interior development, the development of our *esse intentionale*, may have achieved. And the role of 'passive potency' now characterizes each successive lower level of consciousness and all of the operations and correlative objects at those levels, as these levels are presupposed, complemented, and sublated by the higher. This transposition of the notions of active and passive potency in no way detracts from the analysis of objects and operations that Lonergan provides in a more Scholastic context in *The Triune God: Systematics*. Insight remains insight into phantasm, where the intelligibility in the data of sense and of consciousness moves us to understand under the force of the questions for intelligence that are raised by the transcendental notion of the intelligible (which, after all, is partly constitutive, along with the other transcendental notions, of what the Scholastic philosophy called 'agent intellect'). Again, in the context of intentionality analysis, it remains true that the

reflective grasp of sufficient evidence moves one to the inner word of judgment. In all of these instances of transposition, then, nothing of permanent significance is abandoned. What are abandoned are the fruitless questions to which the older conceptuality was prone, in this case the questions concerning the relative priority of the various faculties with respect to one another.⁶⁹

4.2 Can We Demonstrate That There Is a Word in God?

The second question following Lonergan's assertions regarding the divine processions concerns the capability of reason unaided by faith to demonstrate the existence of the divine Word. The First Vatican Council repudiated the semirationalists, who maintained that such a demonstration was possible (DB 1816, DS 3041), but Lonergan's efforts are directed to *understanding* why we are not able so to demonstrate. He proceeds to investigate first why we not only do, but need to, utter an inner word, so as then to argue that there is no similar or analogous reason why there is a demonstrable need for a word in God. The issue does not have to do with the ontological necessity of the Word; everything in God is necessary. The issue is rather whether *we* can demonstrate that there must be a divine Word. As Lonergan puts it in *Verbum*, 'We are not concerned with the necessity *quoad se* of the Word in God; whatever is in God is necessary ... we are concerned with the necessity *quoad nos* of an inner word in divine self-knowledge and in divine knowledge of the other. Why cannot we establish by the light of natural reason that there is a Word in God?'⁷⁰

69 For further details on this transposition, see the section called 'A Technical Note' in Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 120-24.

70 Lonergan, *Verbum* 192.

Why, then, is an inner word required for the integrity of human cognitional process? Four reasons are provided in *The Triune God: Systematics* for the necessity of an inner word in human intellectual process.

Lonergan expresses the first reason in very limited Scholastic terms, but it can be expanded to the hermeneutical context that more accurately reflects his cognitional theory for a world mediated and constituted by meaning and motivated by values. What he says is that we need the first inner word, the word of conception, hypothesis, definition, in order to proceed from the grasped cause or quiddity to a conception of the thing. That is, we are moved to the act of understanding by the causes or quiddities of things, but these causes and quiddities are not the things themselves but parts of the things or perhaps relations. So the first reason a word is necessary is so that we might move from the understood quiddity to a quidditative definition of the thing.

What on earth does this mean? Let's broaden the discussion from Scholastic talk about the quiddity of a 'thing,' 'res,' to speaking about, say, the formal intelligibilities of phenomena studied in science, or the subtle combination of factors that enables one to be on top of a complicated human situation and to know just how to proceed in that situation, or even the meaning of a divine mystery that must be approached only through the analogical understanding of a systematic theologian. Insight is involved in each of these instances. It is through a combination of insights that we will grasp a possible response to the question for understanding. But we never stop there, or at least we can agree that we should not stop there. We experience an inner exigency for a formulated hypothesis that expresses a conception of whatever it is that is under consideration. Only when we have that conception can we proceed to an ever more refined grasp and a further articulation of what it is we are after. We may be moved to our own acts of understanding by intelligibilities in the presentations of sense and consciousness, but these intelligibilities are not the phenomena or affairs or situations or divine mysteries, or whatever, but parts of them, aspects of them, relations within them, and so on. We need

the help of the inner word to proceed from the grasped intelligibility to the intelligible and intelligent conception, hypothesis, definition, supposition, surmise, consideration of the things, affairs, matters, situations, or whatever it is that we desire to know.⁷¹ Late Scholastic philosophy expressed this in terms of the distinction between the ‘species impressa’ and the ‘species expressa.’ The ‘species impressa’ is given with the insight. It is Thomas’s ‘species intelligibilis.’ The ‘species expressa,’ however, is the concept, the inner word of definition, hypothesis, surmise, supposition, from which alone we can proceed really to know whatever it is we desire to know.

Second, we also require an inner word of judgment, a yes or no, if we are to proceed from conception, hypothesis, definition, supposition, surmise, consideration, and even grasp of evidence to the thing *as existing* or, more fully, to the affirmation that we have correctly understood correctly the affairs, matters, situations that we have been trying to figure out. This happens only if from the grasp of evidence there proceeds a true judgment, the intentional medium in which what is, being, is known.⁷²

71 This is an attempt at a contemporary transposition of the following very Scholastic articulation of the issue: ‘Prima ergo necessitas verbi in nobis est ut ex perspecta causa seu quidditate in rem concipiendam procedere possimus. Nam ad actum intelligendi movemur per rerum causas seu quidditates; quae tamen causae seu quidditates non sunt res ipsae sed rerum partes vel relationes; et ideo prima necessitas verbi est ut ex perspecta quidditate in rem quidditative definitam procedatur.’ Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 206, 208.

72 Transposing the following: ‘Altera autem verbi necessitas est ut ex definitionibus et ex perspecta evidentia in res qua existentes procedamus, quod tamen non fit nisi ex perspecta evidentia procedat verum affirmatum in quo tamquam in medio ens cognoscatur.’ Ibid. 208.

Third, we need certain kinds of inner words to develop scientific or theoretical knowledge. Without the formation of technical concepts, our knowledge would be limited to commonsense description of things in their relations to us. Even this knowledge, of course, is dependent on the formation of inner words of supposition, surmise, etc. But a different kind of first inner word is required if we are to know the realities in this world in their relations to one another. Without the formation of exactly defined terms we would risk being carried along by a flow of images as in a mythic mentality, never knowing clearly and distinctly what it is we are dealing with.⁷³

And *fourth*, inner words both of conception and of judgment are required if we are to move by analogy and by the way of eminence to some knowledge of what lies beyond the limits of this world, that is, if we are to move from knowledge of proportionate being to knowledge of transcendent being.⁷⁴

Now the common root of these four requirements is the fact that the object that moves us to understanding is distinct from the object towards which we are tending as an objective or end. What moves our intellect in this life is the intelligibility in the data of sense and consciousness, and what we are tending toward is all of being.⁷⁵ Lonergan's

73 'Tertia autem verborum necessitas est ut scientias excolere possimus. Nisi enim verba universalia formarentur, totum mundum aspectabilem numquam scire possemus, sed ad particularia experta vel imaginata religeremur. Item, nisi verba exacte definita formarentur, fluxu quodam imaginum ad modum mentalitatis mythicae ferremur, cum numquam clare et distincte constaret de quanam re ageretur.' Ibid.

74 'Quarta denique verborum necessitas est ut ultra limites mundi aspectabilis per analogias et viam eminentiae procedamus. Quod sane numquam fieri posset, nisi verba interiora tum definitiva tum iudicativa formarentur.' Ibid.

75 'Quae quattuor necessitates hanc communem radicem habent, quod aliud est obiectum quod nos ad intelligendum movet et aliud est obiectum in quod tamquam in finem

Scholastic way of expressing this, which does not capture the richness of these considerations once the explicit move is made to historical consciousness operating in the world mediated and constituted by meaning, is the following: ‘because we begin from the quiddity, the word is required, first, so that the thing may be defined through its quiddity; second, so that we may judge whether what we have defined exists; third, so that we may be directed away from sensibly perceived particulars toward the entirety of the visible universe; and fourth, so that we may be able to reach beyond the material world to God.’⁷⁶

In *Verbum* the first two of these reasons are expressed as follows:

... to ask about the essential necessity of inner words in us is to ask about the essential necessity of our complementing acts of understanding with inner words to obtain knowledge of external things. The answer will be had by comparing the object of understanding with the external things. Now the first and proper object of understanding, the ‘what is known inasmuch as one understands,’ must be simply intelligible; accordingly, the proportionate object of our intellects is the *quidditas rei materialis*. This quiddity prescinds from individual matter, for individual matter is not intelligible in itself but only in its relation to the per se universality of forms which it individuates. Again the quiddity prescinds from contingent existence, for

tendimus. Quod enim movet intellectum nostrum hac in vita est quidditas rei materialis; finis autem in quem intellectus tendit est totum ens.’ Ibid.

76 ‘Quia enim ex quidditate incipimus, primo requiritur verbum ut res per quidditatem definiatur, deinde requiritur verbum ut res definita utrum existat iudicetur, tertio requiruntur verba ut ex sensibilibus in universum aspectabile convertamur, et quarto requiruntur verba ut ultra mundum materialem in Deum ascendere possimus.’ Ibid., with the translation on 209.

contingent existence is not intelligible in itself but only in its relation to the necessarily Existent which is final, exemplary, and efficient cause of contingent beings. The essential necessity of inner words in our intellects is the necessity of effecting the transition from the preconceptual *quidditas rei materialis*, first, to the *res*, secondly, to the *res particularis*, thirdly, to the *res particularis existens*. The transition from *quidditas rei* to *res*, say, from *humanitas* to *homo*, occurs in conception in which there emerges intellect's natural knowledge of *ens*. In virtue of this step understanding moves from identity with its preconceptual object to confrontation with its conceived object; but as yet the object is only object of thought. The second step is a reflection on phantasm that enables one to mean, though not understand nor explanatorily define, the material singular. In this step intellect moves from a universal to a particular object of thought. Finally, by a reflective act of understanding that sweeps through all relevant data, sensible and intelligible, present and remembered, and grasps understanding's proportion to the universe as well, there is uttered the existential judgment through which one knows concrete reality.⁷⁷

But such a necessity cannot be said to exist in God. The divine intellect is not moved to understanding by something other than itself, nor does it tend toward something else as toward an end. Infinite in perfection, it exists eternally, both comprehending itself and perfectly understanding and knowing all other things in itself.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Lonergan, *Verbum* 193.

⁷⁸ 'Iam vero, eiusmodi necessitas verbi in Deo esse non potest. Intellectus enim divinus a nullo alio movetur neque in ullum aliud tendit tamquam in finem, sed perfectione infinitus existit aeternus, tum se ipsum comprehendens tum omnia alia in se ipso perfecte intelligens atque sciens.' Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 208.

Lonergan then proceeds to respond to arguments that claim to demonstrate a divine Word.

A first argument would be that understanding needs to be expressed in words if it is to be clear and distinct, and that, since God's knowledge is completely clear and distinct, it must not be without its verbal expression. Lonergan responds that an understanding that occurs from the coalescence of many acts is not clear and distinct without words, but that this is not the case with the understanding of a single infinite act. Moreover, since the word is merely the expression of what is made known through the act of understanding, it is not *per se* that the word adds clarity and distinctness to our understanding; rather, it is *per accidens*, that is, when there are many diverse and imperfect acts of understanding, that words are needed for clarity and distinctness. Thus, did we not utter inner words, we would hardly be able to know what we have already grasped and what remains to be investigated.⁷⁹

A second objection would argue that the duality of subject and object is of the very essence of knowledge, and so a divine subject would have to speak a word to know himself; and since God knows himself, God speaks a word. Lonergan responds, of course, by denying the principle of this argument, which for him is grounded in an image of the person looking and the thing looked at. The principle is found in the Platonic positing of the eternal subsistent simple Ideas in a first order or place, and at a second level the gods who contemplate the Ideas. It is found in Scotus's *distinctio formalis a parte rei*, which Lonergan will return to later. It is found in Günther and Rosmini's attempt to demonstrate the necessity of the divine Word. It is found in Jean-Paul Sartre's distinction of *en soi* and *pour soi*, and so in his insistence that a God conscious of himself and at the same time simple is an intrinsic contradiction. It is found in conceptions of consciousness as perception of oneself, a notion that leads to insoluble difficulties concerning the

⁷⁹ Ibid. 211.

consciousness of Christ. On Aristotelian and Thomist grounds, the intelligible in act is the intellect in act, and in that which is without matter the intellect and the understood are the same. The intellect differs from the intelligible only to the extent that each is in potency.⁸⁰

A third objection would affirm that a consciousness that is intellectual and dynamic is so perfect that it must be posited in the infinite perfection of God. Lonergan responds that, of course, the procession of Word in God *is* completely necessary and completely perfect; but in what *we* naturally know of God, there occurs no demonstration that *dynamic* intellectual consciousness is a pure perfection (since, I believe, in our experience of dynamic intellectual consciousness there are movements from potency to act);⁸¹ and so there is no demonstration of the fact that it must be posited in God. Moreover, even with the help of inner words, we cannot arrive at a perfect understanding of what we believe in faith, for the reality of emanation and the consubstantiality of the one who proceeds seem to be at variance with each other, so that only with difficulty can we consider them simultaneously and reconcile them.⁸² (The issue of this reconciliation and its difficulty will be raised again, for it is here that the mystery resides.)

80 Ibid. 210-11. A footnote at this point mentions *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 14, aa. 2 and 4.

81 It is not entirely clear just how Lonergan understands the notion of ‘pure perfection.’ In a discussion session in 1962 he seems to show some agreement with Emerich Coreth’s position that the pure perfections are the perfections that admit infinity. See Bernard Lonergan, *Early Works on Theological Method 1*, vol. 22 in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) page to be determined.

82 Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 211, 213.

The matter is treated in somewhat greater detail in *Verbum*. Two questions are faced: (1) ‘Why cannot natural reason demonstrate the existence of the divine Word from the premise of divine self-knowledge?’⁸³ and (2) Does not divine knowledge of the other seem to require an inner word?

The first question is handled with dispatch.

First, the demonstration cannot be effected by contrasting the proper object of understanding with the divine essence. God is simply intelligible. He is pure form identical with existence. There is no distinction between his essence or his existence or his intellect or his understanding. There is not even a distinction between his *esse naturale* and his *esse intelligibile*. Secondly, the demonstration cannot be effected by arguing that without an inner word there would be no confrontation between subject and object. For one cannot demonstrate that such confrontation is essential to knowledge. Primarily and essentially, knowing is by identity. The natural light of reason will never get beyond that identity in demonstrating the nature of self-knowledge in the infinite simplicity of God.⁸⁴

The second of these arguments matches the second objection and response in *De Deo trino*, but the first is an additional argument, drawing on what has immediately preceded it in *Verbum* itself. What does it mean? We require inner words because there is a contrast between the proper object of understanding, which must be simply intelligible, for us the *quidditas* of the material thing, and any *thing* that we come to know as *res*, as *res particularis*, and as *res particularis existens*; the Scholastic language can be generalized into the expressions we have employed in attempting to move this consideration into a more existential and historical context. But when God knows

83 Lonergan, *Verbum* 201.

84 Ibid.

Godself there is no contrast between the proper object of understanding, the intelligible, and the divine essence that God knows. And so that particular ground of the necessity of the inner word in us does not obtain for God's self-knowledge.

What, then, about the divine knowledge of the other? Does it not seem to require an inner word? After all, 'the other is not simply intelligible, nor always in act, nor identical with the knower. Further, in confirmation of this argument, there is the fact that Aquinas wrote some of his finest passages on *verbum* in the context of divine knowledge of the other. In additional confirmation there is the familiar doctrine that secondary elements in the beatific vision are known *in Verbo*.'⁸⁵

Lonergan treats the two confirming arguments first. They are based, he says, on a traditional association that Aquinas was heir to, namely, the connection between the divine Word and the divine Ideas, a connection that is to be found in the entire Christian Platonist tradition and can be traced back to Philo's conception of the Logos as containing the ideas. More than likely, there was no 'intrinsic exigence of his own thought' that led Aquinas to treat *verbum* in the context of the divine ideas. Where he differs from the Platonist tradition is not in this association but on the basic assumption regarding knowledge. 'The Platonist assumption that knowledge involves confrontation led later Scholastics to attribute to the ideas an *esse obiectivum*. Certainly Aquinas was free from that error, and so he can be expected to apply the Aristotelian theorem of knowledge by identity to reconcile divine simplicity with divine knowledge of the other.'⁸⁶

85 Ibid. 202. The passages from Aquinas that Lonergan mentions are *De veritate*, q. 3, a. 2; *Summa contra Gentiles* 1, c. 53; *Summa theologiae*, 1, a. 15, a. 2.

86 Ibid.

Regarding the issue itself, then, there are two steps that Lonergan takes in *Verbum*. First, he draws distinctions regarding our knowledge. Second, he takes steps to move from this finite model to God.

Regarding our knowledge, Lonergan distinguishes ‘(1) the thing with its virtualities, (2) the act of understanding with its primary and its secondary objects, (3) the expression of both primary and secondary objects in inner words.’ An example is given in *Verbum* that probably is not very helpful to someone who has made the transition from ‘soul’ to ‘subject,’⁸⁷ and so after quoting the example I will suggest what might be a better one.

... the human soul formally is an intellective soul, subsistent, immortal; it is not formally a sensitive soul nor a vegetative soul; but virtually it does possess the perfection without the imperfection of sensitive and vegetative souls. When, however, we understand the human soul, we understand as primary object an intellective soul and as secondary object the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul; both objects are understood formally and actually, but the secondary object is

87 See Lonergan, ‘The Future of Thomism,’ in *A Second Collection*, at 50-51. Lonergan is quick to clarify what he means and does not mean: ‘I do not mean that the metaphysical notion of the soul and of its properties is to be dropped ... But I urge the necessity of a self-appropriation of the subject, of coming to know at first hand oneself and one’s own operations both as a believer and as a theologian. It is there that one will find the foundations of method, there that one will find the invariants that enable one to steer a steady course, though theological theories and opinions are subject to revision and change. Without such a basis systematic theology will remain what it has been too often in the past, a morass of questions disputed endlessly and fruitlessly.’
Ibid. 51.

understood in the primary and in virtue of understanding the primary. Further, once understanding of the human soul has developed, there are not two acts of understanding but one, which primarily is of intellectual soul and secondarily, in the perfection of intellectual soul, is of the sensitive and vegetative souls. Finally, our one act of understanding expresses itself in many inner words in which are defined intellectual, sensitive, and vegetative souls and the relations between them; further, these inner words are the *esse intelligibile* or the *esse intentionale* of soul as distinct both from the *esse naturale* of soul itself and from the *esse intellectum* which is an extrinsic denomination from an *intelligere* of soul whether real or intentional.⁸⁸

A clearer example, in my view, would be the relation between primary and secondary objects expressed in Lonergan's famous statement toward the end of the introduction to *Insight*: 'Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a

88 Ibid. 195. 'Extrinsic denomination' is explained in Lonergan's supplement 'De scientia atque voluntate Dei.' 'God knows that this world exists' is an extrinsic denomination from the existence of this world; for it to be true requires the existence of this world. Two simultaneous truths are posited in this one judgment: 'This world exists' and 'God knows that this world exists.' So too, the proposition, 'The soul, whether in its *esse naturale* or its *esse intentionale* has been understood (*esse intellectum*),' is an extrinsic denomination from the act of understanding. It requires the existence of 'an *intelligere* of soul whether real or intentional' for it to be true. Two simultaneous truths are posited in this one judgment: 'An act of understanding has occurred in which either the *esse naturale* or the *esse intentionale* of soul has been understood' and 'The soul, whether in its *esse naturale* or its *esse intentionale* has been understood.'

fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.⁸⁹

What happens when one moves from this model to God?

... the divine essence formally is itself but eminently it contains all perfection. The divine act of understanding primarily is of the divine essence but secondarily of its virtualities. The divine Word that is uttered is one, but what is uttered in the one Word is all that God knows. Moreover, the divine essence, the divine act of understanding, and the divine Word considered absolutely are one and the same reality; hence there can be no real distinction between 'contained eminently in the essence' and 'secondary object of the understanding' or between either of these and 'uttered in the one Word.' Further, utterance in the one Word does not confer on the ideas an *esse intelligibile* that otherwise they would not possess; for in God *esse naturale* and *esse intelligibile* are identical. It remains, then, that divine knowledge of the other provides no premise whence the procession of the divine Word could be established by natural reason. The plurality of divine ideas within divine simplicity is accounted for by an infinite act of understanding grasping as secondary objects the perfections eminently contained in the divine essence and virtually in divine omnipotence. As we can understand *multa per unum*, all the more so can God.

Hence, though our *intelligere* is always a *dicere*, this cannot be demonstrated of God's. Though we can demonstrate that God understands, for understanding is pure perfection, still we can no more than conjecture the mode of divine understanding and so cannot prove that there is a divine Word. Psychological trinitarian theory is not a conclusion that can be demonstrated but a hypothesis that squares with divine revelation without excluding the possibility of alternative hypotheses. Finally,

89 Lonergan, *Insight* 22.

Aquinas regularly writes as a theologian and not as a philosopher; hence regularly he simply states what simply is true, that in all intellects there is a procession of inner word.⁹⁰

3.3 *Does the Word Proceed from the Father's Understanding of Creatures?*

The third question is related to what we have just seen from *Verbum*. It asks whether the divine word proceeds from (and so contains in its utterance) the Father's understanding of the Father alone or also from the Father's understanding of creatures. Initially, it would seem that the latter could not be the case, since the Word of God is necessary and eternal, and creatures are contingent and temporal. But St Thomas taught that the Father understands himself and creatures in one act of understanding and speaks himself and creatures in one Word, and also that, as the divine act of understanding knows itself, and both knows and creates creatures, so the Word of God expresses God and both expresses and is operative of creatures.⁹¹ Thus it is Thomas's teaching that the Word of God

⁹⁰ Lonergan, *Verbum* 203-204.

⁹¹ Lonergan *The Triune God: Systematics* 213. The reference is to *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 34, a. 3 (*utrum in nomine Verbi importetur respectus ad creaturam*): '... in Verbo importatur respectus ad creaturam. Deus enim cognoscendo se, cognoscit omnem creaturam. Verbum autem in mente conceptum est repraesentativum omnis eius quod actu intelligitur; unde in nobis sunt diversa verba secundum diversa quae intelligimus. Sed quia Deus uno actu et se et omnia intelligit, unicum verbum eius est expressivum non solum Patris, sed etiam creaturarum. Et sicut Dei scientia Dei quidem est cognoscitiva tantum, creaturarum autem cognoscitiva et factiva, ita verbum Dei eius quod in Deo Patre est est expressivum tantum, creaturarum vero est expressivum et operativum.'

proceeds from the Father's eternal understanding of everything about everything and is actively creative of everything that is not God.

One could spend a lifetime meditating on the profound significance of this claim, for our understanding both of God and of ourselves. Do we make a difference to God? In one sense, no, we do not. In another, more profound sense, we make an eternal difference to God. God is eternally what God is because of the unrestricted act of understanding, affirming, and loving that knows, creates, and loves the entire order of the universe and everything in it, including the eternal decree that the Word would become flesh in human history, born of the Virgin Mary, and would disclose to us the secrets of God's reign: secrets intimately connected with the mystery of violence and evil from which the eternal Word become flesh would suffer and because of which he would die; including too the eternal decree regarding the universal mission of the Holy Spirit, sent in time even before the Word but requiring the Word to articulate the message that the Spirit writes in our hearts regarding the God's love for us, the commandment that we love God and neighbor, and the precept regarding nonviolent response to evil.

The problem mentioned at the beginning of this section, namely, that the Word of God cannot proceed from the Father's understanding of creatures because the Word is necessary and eternal while creatures are contingent and temporal, is resolved, Lonergan says, by correctly grasping the nature of the psychological analogy. Our inner word does not proceed from any object. Nobody who conceives the emanation of the inner word as proceeding from the object, in the way the act of seeing proceeds from colors, will ever be able to admit that the divine Word proceeds from creatures. One will have less difficulty admitting this if one conceives the inner word as proceeding from knowledge of the object, since the object then is not the cause *simpliciter* but a kind of co-cause. But one will have no difficulty whatsoever if one grasps the nature of intellectual consciousness itself. The proper principle of an intellectual and intelligible emanation is not the object but the subject. The emanation of the inner word is possible only to the

extent that the subject is intellectually conscious in act. How much more is this the case with God, who is the first principle of all things.⁹²

Moreover, the *necessity* of the emanation of the word and of the emanation of love, or better, the *exigency for these autonomous spiritual processions*, arises not from the object understood and loved but from the conscious spirituality of the subject: because intelligent consciousness is bound, owes it to itself (*sibi debet*), truly to express its understanding to itself, what is understood must be truly expressed; because it is bound to bestow its love in a morally good way, what is truly judged to be good must also be loved. We are bound to judge on the basis of evidence and to choose on the basis of judgment, even to the extent that, should our understanding be deficient or our judgment in error, an unknown obligation does not hold us to act contrary to conscience; rather, the known obligation binds us to judge on the basis of evidence and to choose on the basis of judgment.⁹³

This brings us back to the notion of spiritual autonomy. And lest it be thought that this is to exaggerate the autonomy of intellectual consciousness, Lonergan is quick to add, first of all, that the divine autonomy (which is really what we are considering here) is absolute and so cannot be exaggerated; and second, even the autonomy of human

92 Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 212.

93 ‘... emanationis intelligibilis necessitas non ex obiecto provenit sed ex conscia intellectualitate subiecti. Quia enim conscientia intellectualis sibi debet ut suam intelligentiam vere sibi exprimat, consequitur ut id quod intelligitur vere exprimi debeat. Quia conscientia intellectualis sibi debet ut honeste suum amorem largiatur, consequitur ut quae vere bona iudicantur etiam amari debeant. Quod si per accidens vel intelligentia deficit vel iudicium errat, non praevalet debitum ignotum ut quis teneatur contra conscientiam agere, sed debitum cognitum ut quis teneatur secundum evidentiam iudicare et secundum iudicium eligere.’ Ibid. 214.

consciousness, which supplies the analogy for the divine processions, is subordinate *not to any object*, and, we might add in the context of our considerations from Girard, not to any mediator of objects, but *only to the infinite subject* in whose image it is made and which it is bound to imitate.⁹⁴ Its autonomy resides precisely in the image in which it is made, the image of divine autonomy understanding, affirming, and loving; its authenticity resides in its fidelity to that image. The Gospel reveals in what that fidelity lies: ‘You must be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect,’ where the context is mercy and forgiveness in the face of evil.

The next part of Lonergan’s discussion may seem more remote and less pertinent to the kind of theology we are seeking to develop, but I hope to show that this is not the case.

Different objects enter, Lonergan argues, in different ways both into the act of understanding whence there proceeds the divine Word, and into the act of understanding and Word whence there proceeds divine Love. The primary object of divine understanding is the divine Trinitarian act of existence itself. All other objects are secondary objects. Moreover, these secondary objects are connected with the primary object in different ways. They may be possibles under the formality of being, possibles under the formality of possibility, or past, present, and future actual realities.

Possibles under the formality of being are identical with God’s active power, the power that can create them. Thus the Father understands and speaks the possibles insofar

94 ‘Quod si obicitur exaggeratam esse hanc conscientiae autonomiam, respondetur dupliciter. Primo, enim, ipsa divina autonomia, cum absoluta sit, exaggerari non potest: et cum de hac autonomia intelligenda agatur, obiciens extra ipsam quaestionem ad alia vagari videtur. Deinde, subordinata quidem est autonomia conscientiae humanae, non tamen omnibus et quibuscumque obiectis, sed subiecto infinito ad cuius imaginem facta est et quod imitari tenetur.’ Ibid.

as he understands and speaks God's own power, which is one with God's own essence and act of understanding.

Possibles under the formality of possibility are in the Father's understanding and speaking in the manner of what Lonergan calls an implicit being of reason: a being of reason, because the entire reality of the possibles is the divine active power itself; an *implicit* being of reason, because God does not speak as many distinct words as there are distinct possibles, but only one Word, and so the possible as possible are spoken in the one Word. Nonetheless, they are all and each distinctly in God insofar as the Father, by understanding God's own power, clearly and distinctly understands each and every possible being, and by speaking God's own power, clearly and distinctly speaks in one infinite Word each and every possible being.

Finally, all past, present, and future actual beings God intuits by understanding and speaks by the Word and loves with the Love that proceeds from Understanding and Word. If another world existed, God would intuit and speak and love those other beings as actual, not because God can be now this and now that, and not because divine intellectual emanations can be now this and now that, but because the knowledge and affirmation and love of actual beings add only a relation of reason to the infinite act of understanding and affirming and loving.⁹⁵

Thus the emanation of the divine Word depends on the divine intellectual consciousness and on the infinite act of understanding. Because these are one not only with one another but also with the divine act of existence, the divine essence, and the divine power, the divine emanation of the Word depends as well on the divine essence and power. Furthermore, because divine understanding includes the possibles as possibles in the mode of an implicit being of reason, the divine emanation of the Word has an exigency to speak the possibles as possibles in the mode of an implicit being of reason.

95 See *ibid.* 214-17.

Again, because the divine understanding, due to the addition of a relation of reason over and above the infinite act, understands all actual beings as they are, the emanation of the divine Word has an exigency that, with this addition of a relation of reason, all these actual beings be spoken by the Word, and the divine emanation of Love has an exigency that, again with the addition of a relation of reason, all actual beings be loved with the Love that proceeds from understanding and Word. Finally, because the divine understanding clearly grasps that the divine Word and the divine Love do not depend on a relation of reason, because it clearly perceives that all actual and possible beings depend on divine understanding, on the divine Word, on divine Love, the divine Word proceeds from an understanding of creatures in such a way that creatures are spoken as truly and eternally dependent on the Word, and the divine Love proceeds from the divine understanding and affirmation of creatures in such a way that the creatures are truly and eternally loved as dependent upon this divine love.⁹⁶

None of this affects the truth of the statement that we made earlier, that in a very definite sense we do make an eternal difference to God. For while the divine Word and the divine Love do not depend on, are not changed by, relations of reason, while all actual and possible creaturely realities depend rather on divine understanding, on the divine Word, and on divine Love, still among the creaturely realities included in this dependence are the *esse secundarium incarnationis* and the gift of sanctifying grace, both decreed from eternity as created participations in and imitations of divine life itself.

3.4 The Presence of the Beloved within the Lover: Is It Constituted or Produced by Love?

3.4.1 The Treatment in *De Deo Trino*

⁹⁶ Ibid. 217.

The fourth question to which Lonergan devotes special attention in his chapter on the divine processions has to do with the analogical conception of the procession of the Holy Spirit as the procession of love, and principally with the analogy itself, with the procession of love in human dynamic intellectual consciousness. The question is raised in the context of an intramural debate among Thomists, namely, a debate regarding the theory of John of St Thomas regarding vital act. According to this position every vital act is produced by that potency in which it is received, and so love must be produced by the will itself in which it is received. This is not the position of St Thomas, but it has been held by many Thomists. Lonergan's treatment of the issue in *De Deo trino* is an extensive refutation of this position, drawing both on the authority of Aquinas and on Lonergan's own arguments from our experience of the procession of love in human consciousness. Our own concern will be quite different from the context of the Thomist debate.

Lonergan's position on the relation of knowledge and love, which is at the heart of his position as expressed in *De Deo trino*, changed in the course of his career, and this is the issue that will occupy us here. This is the point, then, at which the issue of the early and later analogies for the procession of the Holy Spirit must be raised. Again, the question is most relevant to the discussion of the so-called fifth level of consciousness, or better of that level that is beyond, and a higher integration of, the four levels of presentations, understanding, judgment, and decision. The fifth level, the level of love, is itself interpersonal. It is the level of total self-transcendence to another, whether in the love of intimacy or in love in the community or in the love of God, or in some combination of these.

These are questions that will be treated in detail in our next chapter. First, however, we must investigate in full the position expressed in *De Deo trino*, including the support that Lonergan finds in Aquinas for his own position.

The context, then, demands that Lonergan ask the question in the following form: Is the presence of the beloved in the lover *constituted* by love, or is it *produced* by love?

That is, is it really the same as love, as the act of loving (and so constituted by love), or is it really distinct from love and something that proceeds from love and so is produced by love in the mode of a *processio operati*? Does love ‘operate’ something, namely, the presence of the beloved in the lover, or is that presence constituted by the very procession of love from the grasp of sufficient conditions and the judgment of value that follows upon that grasp?

The first question we might ask is, What difference does it make? If the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted by love, then the beloved is in the lover through the procession of love, and the issue is to understand that procession itself. The beloved would be in the lover through the procession, just as the ‘thing,’ the situation or state of affairs spoken is in the one who understands through the conception of the word. If the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted by love, then the beloved is in the lover through the procession of love; the presence of the beloved in the lover is the same as love itself, the same as the act of loving itself. Then, within the context of the faculty psychology that Lonergan is employing at this point, the Trinitarian analogy is based on a first procession within the intellect, the procession of act from act manifest in the emergence of the word from understanding, and a second procession *from the intellect into the will*, a procession of act from act manifest in the emergence of love from the grasp of sufficient evidence and the consequent judgment of value. We judge *because and to the extent that* we have grasped sufficient evidence (procession of the word), and we choose or love *because and to the extent that* we have judged (procession of love). The ‘thing spoken or understood’ is constituted in the one who understands through the word itself; the ‘beloved’ is constituted in the lover through the proceeding love itself.

If, on the other hand, the presence of the beloved in the lover is produced by love, then the presence of the beloved in the lover is something distinct from the act of loving, and then the Trinitarian analogy is based on a *processio operati* within the intellect and a distinct *processio operati* not from the intellect into the will but within the will itself.

From the act of understanding there comes forth a conception of the understood presentations in the one who understands, and similarly from one's love there comes forth a distinct impression of the beloved reality in the affections of the lover. The word is produced through the act of understanding, and the presence of the beloved in the lover is produced through the act of loving. This second position is in accord with John of St Thomas's theory of vital act, which Lonergan maintains, correctly, is not found in Aquinas's works.

We might ask, What difference does it make? The immediate relevance of the question for Lonergan has to do with the psychological analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit. If the second of these ways of thinking about the presence of the beloved in the lover is the correct way of thinking about it, then the analogy that Lonergan has set up breaks down. For that analogy states that the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is analogous to the procession of the presence of the beloved in the lover as flowing from understanding and word, and so the analogy is drawn from the first of these ways of thinking rather than from the second.

We have already seen in passing, in our discussion of Lonergan's treatment of the previous question as to whether the Word proceeds from the understanding of creatures, the general approach that he will take to the procession of Love within God. All past, present, and future actual beings God intuitus by understanding and speaks by the Word and *loves with the Love that proceeds from understanding and Word*. Thus the analogy has Lonergan opting for the view that the presence of the beloved in the lover is *constituted by a love that proceeds from understanding and word, and so not by a love that is produced by a distinct act in the will*. He views this as the position of St Thomas, and in so doing he differs from John of St Thomas and Thomists in general.

Two different theoretical systems are represented in the question. The position that Lonergan rejects bases its conception on the assumption that there are in our dynamic intellectual consciousness two processions, one within the intellect and the other within

the will; in the first, the act of understanding produces the word, and in the second the act of loving produces the presence of the beloved in the lover. This is the position of John of St Thomas and of most Thomists. Lonergan's own position is based on the *experience* of two processions, of which the first is within the intellect and the second is *from* the intellect *into* the will. By reason of the first procession we judge because and to the extent that we grasp sufficient evidence, and by reason of the second procession we choose because and to the extent that we judge. Lonergan's own articulation of this position precisely in terms of experience and so of self-appropriation, occurs most sharply, I believe, in chapter 18 of *Insight*, and so the model that he is working from is what I have identified as the general form of one of three possible 'times' of making decisions.

Actually, Lonergan begins by quoting two texts from St Thomas, one of which seems to favor Lonergan's position, and the other the opposed position.

In the first text (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 27, a. 3 c.) the beloved is said to be in the lover *by the procession of love* (*processio amoris, secundum quam amatum est in amante*), just as the thing spoken or understood is in the one who understands through the conception of the word (*sicut per conceptionem verbi res dicta vel intellecta est in intelligente*). As the thing spoken or understood is in the one understanding through the word, so the beloved is in the lover through the love that proceeds.⁹⁷

97 '... in divinis non est processio nisi secundum actionem quae non tendit in aliquid extrinsecum, sed manet in ipso agente. Huiusmodi autem actio in intellectuali natura est actio intellectus et actio voluntatis. Processio autem verbi attenditur secundum actionem intelligibilem. Secundum autem operationem voluntatis invenitur in nobis quaedam alia processio, *scilicet processio amoris*, secundum quam amatum est in amante sicut per conceptionem verbi res dicta vel intellecta est in intelligente. Unde et praeter processionem verbi, ponitur alia processio in divinis, quae est *processio amoris*.' ('...in God there is procession only according to action that does not tend

But in the second text (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 37, a. 1 c.), from the fact that someone understands there emerges in the one who understands the conception of the thing understood, and similarly from the fact that someone loves there emerges a certain impression of the beloved in the affections of the lover. For the word is produced through the act of understanding, and in parallel fashion the presence of the beloved in the lover is produced through the act of loving.⁹⁸

toward something extrinsic but remains within the agent itself. But such action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect and that of the will. The procession of the word is considered in connection with the action of the intellect. However, another procession is found in us in connection with the operation of the will, namely, the procession of love, whereby the beloved is in the one who loves, just as the reality spoken or understood is in the one who understands through the conception of the word. Hence, in addition to the procession of the Word, another procession is to be posited in God, namely, the procession of Love.’) See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics* 219.

98 ‘Sicut enim ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit, provenit quaedam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectae in intelligente, quae dicitur verbum; ita *ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quaedam impressio, ut ita loquar, rei amatae in affectu amantis*, secundum quam amatum dicitur esse in amante, sicut et intellectum in intelligente. Ita quod, cum aliquis seipsum intelligit et amat, est in seipso non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente, et amatum in amante.’
 (‘Just as from the fact that someone understands something, there comes forth in the one who understands some intellectual conception of the reality understood, which is called the word; so from the fact that someone loves something, there comes forth in the affection of the lover some impression, so to speak, of the reality loved, whereby the beloved is said to be in the one who loves, just as what is understood is in the one

Which of these positions is correct? Are there in us two processions, one of which is in the intellect and the other of which is in the will, so that according to the first the act of understanding produces the word and according to the second the act of loving produces the presence of the beloved in the lover? Or is it rather our *experience* that there are in us two processions of which the first is in the intellect – we judge because we grasp sufficient evidence and in accord with the evidence grasped – and the second is from the intellect into the will – we choose and love because we judge and in accord with the judgment of value that we have made? Clearly, Lonergan’s position favors the second of these options. And his analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit depends upon it.

The issue is one of experience itself, and precisely of experience in that domain of interiority in which we have located whatever genuine autonomy the human subject can achieve. In treating the option that he prefers, Lonergan uses the words ‘in nobis experimur.’ Similarly, he says that he rejects the mainline Thomist view ‘tum quia *ab experientia nostra interna* praescindit in concipienda analogia trinitaria et psychologica, tum quia *ab experientia nostra interna* praescindit in interpretandis textibus S. Thomae de re psychologica.’⁹⁹

who understands. So it is that, when one understands and loves oneself, one is in oneself not only by an entitative identity, but also as what is understood is in the one who understands, and as the beloved is in the one who loves.’) Ibid.

⁹⁹ ‘We take the trinitarian analogy from the fact that we experience in ourselves two processions, the first of which is within intellect, while the second is from intellect toward will ... Thus, we do not follow the opinion of Thomists in this matter, both because it prescinds from our internal experience in its conception of the psychological trinitarian analogy, and because it prescinds from our internal experience in its interpretation of the texts of St Thomas on psychological reality.’ Ibid. 221.

So Lonergan proceeds to cite other passages from St Thomas, texts that show that for St Thomas the beloved is present in the lover because love is present, not because anything is produced in the will through the act of love. In *Summa contra Gentiles*, 4, c. 19, §3560, the beloved is in the lover by reason of the love itself that is the moving principle in the lover. Moreover, the presence of the beloved in the will of the lover differs from the presence of the beloved in the lover's intellect in that the latter is 'by reason of a likeness of its species' whereas the former is 'as the term of a movement' or relation. Nothing is said of a term immanently produced by this love. It is the term *in*, not produced by, its proportionate moving principle, that is, love.¹⁰⁰ Again, in *Summa contra Gentiles*, 4, c. 19, §3563, the beloved is in the lover because the beloved is loved, not because something is produced by love in the will.¹⁰¹ *De malo*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 13m, states

100 'Sic igitur quod amatum non solum est in intellectu amantis, sed etiam in voluntate ipsius: aliter tamen et aliter. In intellectu enim est secundum similitudinem suae speciei: in voluntate autem amantis est sicut terminus motus in principio motivo proportionato per convenientiam et proportionem quam habet ad ipsum.' ('... what is loved is not only in the intellect of the lover, but also in the lover's will, yet not in the same way in the two instances. What is loved is in the intellect by reason of a likeness of its species; but what is loved is in the will of the lover as the term of a movement is in its proportionate motive principle through the suitability and proportion that the principle has to the term.') Ibid. 223.

101 'Cum autem ostensum sit quod amatum necesse est aliquo modo esse in voluntate amantis; ipse autem Deus seipsum amat: necesse est quod ipse Deus sit in sua voluntate ut amatum in amante. Est autem amatum in amante secundum quod amatur; amare autem quoddam velle est; velle autem Dei est eius esse ... Unde oportet quod Deus, secundum quod consideratur ut in sua voluntate existens, sit vere et substantialiter Deus.' ('... it has been shown that it is necessary that the beloved be in

that love transforms the beloved into the lover inasmuch as the lover is moved by love toward the very one that is loved. The presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted by love insofar as the lover is moved to the beloved, not insofar as something is produced in the will by love.¹⁰² Finally, in *Compendium theologiae*, c. 49, that by which the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted is *secundum quod amatur actu*, and the principles from which there proceeds the presence of the beloved in the lover are the potency for loving and the word one has conceived concerning the one loved.¹⁰³ Nor, says Lonergan, can the passage be twisted to assert that the presence of the beloved in the

some way in the will of the lover. But God loves himself. It is necessary, then, that God himself be in God's own will as the beloved in the lover. But what is loved is in the lover inasmuch as it is loved; an act of love is a kind of act of will; God's act of willing is God's own act of existence ... Hence, it must be that God, inasmuch as he is considered within his own will, is truly and substantially God.') Ibid.

102 '... amor dicitur transformare amantem in amatum, in quantum per amorem movetur amans ad ipsam rem amatam.' ('... love is said to transform the lover into the beloved inasmuch as the lover is moved by love toward the very object that is loved.') Ibid.

103 '... id quod amatur est in amante secundum quod amatur actu. Quod autem aliquid actu ametur, procedit et ex virtute amativa amantis, et ex bono amabili actu intellecto. Hoc igitur quod est amatum esse in amante, ex duobus procedit: scilicet ex principio amativo, et ex intelligibili apprehenso, quod est verbum conceptum de amabili.' ('... what is loved is in the one loving inasmuch as it is actually being loved. The fact that an object is actually loved proceeds from the lover's capacity to love, and also from the lovable good actually understood. Accordingly, the fact that the beloved is in the one loving proceeds from two principles: from the loving principle and from an apprehended intelligible, which is the word that has been conceived concerning the lovable.') Ibid. 223, 225.

lover is produced *by* love, or that it is not produced by the word, or that it is other than love itself.

Those four texts had to do mainly with the analogy, that is, with the procession of love in us. Further texts are cited that argue that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the divine Word as love proceeds in us from a mental word. *Super I Sententiarum*, d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4m: ‘... the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word the way love proceeds from a mental word.’¹⁰⁴ *Super I Sententiarum*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 speaks of a word that spirates love.¹⁰⁵ *Summa contra Gentiles*, 4, c. 24, §3617 states, ‘Love proceeds from a word, inasmuch as we cannot love anything unless we conceive it in a word of the heart.’¹⁰⁶ Next, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 4, c. 19, §3564 actually states the analogy: ‘... that something is in the will as what is loved is in the lover (means that) it has a certain relation to the conception by which intellect conceives it and to the thing itself whose conception by the intellect is called the word: for nothing would be loved unless it were in some way known ... It is necessary, therefore, that the love by which God is in the divine will as the beloved in the

104 ‘... a Verbo procedit Spiritus sanctus, sicut a verbo mentali amor.’ Ibid. 225.

105 ‘... quia potest esse duplex intuitus, vel veri simpliciter, vel ulterius secundum quod verum extenditur in bonum et conveniens, et haec est perfecta apprehensio; ideo est duplex verbum: scilicet rei prolatae quae placet, quod spirat amorem, et hoc est verbum perfectum; et verbum rei quae etiam displicet ... aut non placet.’ (‘... since there can be two apprehensions, either of truth by itself or of truth as expanded to take in the good and the fitting – and this latter is a complete apprehension – hence there are two words, namely, of something pleasing that is set forth, a word that spirates love – and this is a complete word – and the word of something also that displeases ... or does not please.’) Ibid.

106 ‘Nam amor procedit a verbo: eo quod nihil amare possumus nisi verbo cordis illud concipiamus.’ Ibid.

lover proceed both from the Word of God and from God whose Word he is.’¹⁰⁷ Next, *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 36, a. 2 c.: ‘It is necessary that love proceed from the word: for we do not love anything except inasmuch as we apprehend it in a mental conception. Accordingly, from this too it is clear that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.’¹⁰⁸ Next, Lonergan refers to but does not quote *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m: ‘... while in God will and intellect are identical, still it is in accord with their immanent

107 ‘Quod autem aliquid sit in voluntate ut amatum in amante, ordinem quendam habet ad conceptionem qua ab intellectu concipitur, et ad ipsam rem cuius intellectualis conceptio dicitur verbum: non enim amaretur aliquid nisi aliquo modo cognosceretur ... Necessesse est igitur quod amor quo Deus est in voluntate divina ut amatum in amante, et a Verbo Dei, et a Deo cuius est Verbum procedat.’ Ibid. Two passages from *De potentia* are suggested. *De potentia*, q. 9, a. 9, ad 3m (2^{ae} ser.): ‘... nihil enim potest amari cuius verbum in intellectu non praeconciatur; et sic oportet quod ille qui procedit per modum voluntatis sit ab eo qui procedit per modum intellectus, et per consequens distinguatur ab eo.’ (‘... nothing can be loved whose word is not first conceived in the intellect; hence, the one who proceeds by way of the will must be from the one who proceeds by way of the intellect, and consequently is distinguished from that one.’) Ibid. *De potentia*, q. 10, a. 5: ‘Non enim potest esse nec intelligi quod amor sit alicuius quod non est intellectu praeconceptum; unde quilibet amor est ab aliquo verbo, loquendo de amore in intellectuali natura.’ (‘It cannot be, nor can it be understood, that there is a love for something that has not first been conceived by the intellect; therefore, every love is from some word, when one is speaking of love in an intellectual nature.’) Ibid.

108 ‘Necessesse est autem quod amor a verbo procedat: non enim aliquid amamus, nisi secundum quod conceptione mentis apprehendimus. Unde et secundum hoc manifestum est quod Spiritus sanctus procedat a Filio.’ Ibid.

intelligibility that processions that occur in accord with either occur in a certain order; there is no procession of love except in relation to a procession of the word; for nothing can be loved by the will if it has not first been conceived in the intellect. Thus just as there is a certain order of the word to the principle from which it proceeds, even though in God the substance of the intellect and the conception of the intellect are the same, so, while in God will and intellect are the same, still, since it is of the essence of love that it proceed from the conception of the intellect, the procession of Love in God has a distinction of order from the procession of the divine Word.¹⁰⁹ Next, *De rat. fidei ad Cantorem Antioch.*, c. 4: ‘It is clear that we are able to love nothing with an intellectual and holy love that we do not actually conceive by means of the intellect. But the conception of the intellect is the word; hence, it is necessary that love come forth from the word. Now, we say that the Word of God is the Son; it is clear, then, that the Holy Spirit is from the Son.’¹¹⁰

109 ‘... licet in Deo non sit aliud voluntas et intellectus, tamen de ratione voluntatis et intellectus est quod processiones quae sunt secundum actionem utriusque se habeant secundum quendam ordinem: non enim est processio amoris nisi in ordine ad processionem verbi; nihil enim potest voluntate amari nisi sit in intellectu conceptum. Sicut igitur attenditur quidam ordo verbi ad principium a quo procedit, licet in divinis sit eadem substantia intellectus et conceptio intellectus, ita, licet in Deo sit idem voluntas et intellectus, tamen, quia de ratione amoris est quod non procedat nisi a conceptione intellectus, habet ordinis distinctionem processio amoris a processione verbi in divinis.’

¹¹⁰ ‘Manifestum est autem, quod nihil amare possumus intelligibili et sancto amore, nisi quod actu per intellectum concipimus. Conceptio autem intellectus est verbum, unde oportet quod amor a verbo oriatur. Verbum autem Dei dicimus esse Filium, ex quo patet Spiritum sanctum esse a Filio.’ Ibid. 227

Further texts go beyond the affirmation that as love proceeds from word, so the Holy Spirit proceeds from the divine Word, to state that the Holy Spirit *is* proceeding Love itself, not something else produced by proceeding love. The principal locus is *Summa theologiae*, q. 37, a. 1. In the ‘Sed contra’ we read: ‘The Holy Spirit himself is Love.’¹¹¹ In the corpus it is stated: ‘Insofar as we use these words (*amore, dilectione*) to express the relationship to its own principle of that reality which proceeds after the manner of love, and vice versa, so that by “love” proceeding love is understood . . . , and so Love is the name of a person.’¹¹² In the ‘ad 3m’ we find: ‘The Holy Spirit is said to be the bond of the Father and the Son insofar as he is Love, since, because it is with one love that the Father loves himself and the Son, and vice versa, there is included in the Holy Spirit, insofar as he is Love, the relation of lover and beloved between the Father and the Son, and vice versa. But from the fact that the Father and the Son mutually love each other, the mutual love that is the Holy Spirit must proceed from both. Therefore, as regards origin, the Holy Spirit is not the medium, but the third Person in the Trinity; but as regards the relation we have just spoken of, he is the bond between the two, as proceeding from both.’¹¹³ And the ‘ad 4m’ of the same article says, ‘Although the Son

111 ‘Ipse Spiritus sanctus est Amor.’ Ibid.

112 ‘In quantum vero his vocabulis [*amore, dilectione*] utimur ad exprimendam habitudinem eius rei quae procedit per modum amoris ad suum principium et e converso; ita quod per amorem intelligatur amor procedens . . . sic Amor est nomen personae.’ Ibid.

113 ‘Spiritus sanctus dicitur esse nexus Patris et Filii in quantum est Amor, quia cum Pater amet unica dilectione se et Filium et e converso, importatur in Spiritu Sancto, prout est Amor, habitudo Patris ad Filium et e converso ut amantis ad amatum. Sed ex hoc ipso quod Pater et Filius se mutuo amant, oportet quod mutuus Amor, qui est Spiritus Sanctus, ab utroque procedat. Secundum igitur originem Spiritus Sanctus non

understands, it is not proper to him to produce a word, because understanding belongs to him as to the proceeding Word; so too, although the Holy Spirit loves, taking love as an essential term, still it is not proper to him to spirate Love, which is to take love as a notional term, because the Holy Spirit loves essentially as proceeding Love, not as that from which love proceeds.¹¹⁴ The theme continues in the next article as well. Q. 37, a. 2 c. has: ‘The Father and the Son are said to be loving through the Holy Spirit or through proceeding Love.’¹¹⁵ The ‘ad 3m’ states: ‘The Father loves not only the Son by the Holy Spirit but also himself and us; because ... to love, taken notionally, not only means the production of a divine person but also the person produced, by way of love, which has a relation to what is loved. Thus as the Father utters himself and every creature in the Word that he begets insofar as the begotten Word adequately represents the Father and every creature, so he loves himself and every creature in the Holy Spirit insofar as the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Love of the prime goodness whereby the Father loves himself and every creature. And thus it is also clear that relation to the creature is implied both in the Word and in proceeding Love, as it were in a secondary way, insofar as divine truth and goodness is the principle of understanding and loving every creature.’¹¹⁶ In q. 38, a. 1 c.

est medius, sed tertia in Trinitate persona; secundum vero praedictam habitudinem est medius nexus duorum ab utroque procedens.’ Ibid.

114 ‘... sicut Filio, licet intelligat, non tamen competit producere verbum, quia intelligere convenit ei ut Verbo procedenti; ita, licet Spiritus Sanctus amet essentialiter accipiendo, non tamen convenit ei quod spiret amorem, quod est diligere notionaliter sumptum, quia sic diligit essentialiter ut Amor procedens, non ut a quo procedit amor.’

115 ‘Pater et Filius dicuntur diligentes Spiritu sancto vel Amore procedente.’ Ibid. 227.

116 ‘... Pater non solum Filium, sed etiam se et nos diligit Spiritu Sancto; quia ... diligere prout notionaliter sumitur non solum importat productionem divinae personae, sed etiam personam productam per modum Amoris qui habet habitudinem ad rem

we have: ‘... partaker of the divine Word and of proceeding Love.’¹¹⁷ Q. 38, a. 2 c. contains the statement: ‘... since the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love.’¹¹⁸ In the same article, ad 1m, we read: ‘... the Holy Spirit, because he proceeds as Love from the Father.’¹¹⁹ And finally *De veritate*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m, is cited to show that for St Thomas there is in the will no procession in the mode of *rei operatae*. Lonergan denies that Thomas ever retracted the position expressed in this text, as others have claimed. ‘There is this difference between intellect and will: the operation of the will terminates at things, in which there is good and evil; but the operation of the intellect terminates in the mind, in which there is the true and the false ... Consequently, the will does not have anything going forth from itself, except what is in it after the manner of an operation; but the intellect has in itself something that goes forth from itself, not only after the manner of an operation, but also after the manner of a reality that is the term of the operation.’¹²⁰ If

dilectam. Unde sicut Pater dicit se et omnem creaturam Verbo quod genuit in quantum Verbum genitum sufficienter repraesentat Patrem et omnem creaturam, ita diligit se et omnem creaturam Spiritu Sancto in quantum Spiritus Sanctus procedit ut Amor bonitatis primae secundum quam Pater amat se et omnem creaturam. Et sic etiam patet quod respectus importatur ad creaturam et in Verbo et in Amore procedente quasi secundario, in quantum scilicet veritas et bonitas divina est principium intelligendi et amandi omnem creaturam.’

117 ‘... particeps divini Verbi et procedentis Amoris.’ Ibid. 227.

118 ‘... cum Spiritus sanctus procedit ut Amor.’ Ibid.

119 ‘... Spiritus sanctus, quia procedit a Patre ut Amor.’ Ibid.

120 ‘Haec autem est differentia inter intellectum et voluntatem: quod operatio voluntatis terminatur ad res, in quibus est bonum et malum; sed operatio intellectus terminatur in mente, in qua est verum et falsum ... Et ideo *voluntas non habet aliquid progrediens a seipso, quod in ea sit nisi per modum operationis; sed intellectus habet in seipso*

nothing proceeds within the will *per modum operati*, then the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted and not produced by love.

As I indicated earlier, the principal argument for the opposed position is the opinion of John of St Thomas concerning vital act: every vital act is produced by that potency in which it is received, and so love must be produced, not by the intellect nor by the word, but by the will itself in which it is received. This is not the position of St Thomas, but it has been held by many so-called Thomists. Lonergan concludes that St Thomas explicitly taught: (1) the second procession is one of love from the word; (2) the Holy Spirit is both ‘amatum in amante’ and proceeding love; (3) there is not a procession in the will except *per modum operationis*; and (4) the beloved is present in the lover because the beloved is loved (*secundum quod amatur*). The opposed position, if it were to be faithful to St Thomas, would have to show that as his work developed, he came to opposed positions on each of these points, so that: (1) the second procession is not the procession of love from the word, but of ‘the beloved in the lover’ from love, (2) the Holy Spirit is ‘beloved in the lover’ but not proceeding love, (3) there is in the will a procession *per modum rei operatae*, and (4) the beloved is in the lover, not because the beloved is loved but because from this love there proceeds something really distinct from the love, which is called ‘the beloved in the lover.’ It may be that the elements of the other position can be found implicitly here and there in St Thomas’s writings, but certainly nothing more. And Lonergan’s position is clearly that which he finds to be the more consistent position in the writings of Aquinas.

3.4.2 ‘Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum’: Is This True?

aliquid progrediens ab eo, non solum per modum operationis, sed etiam per modum rei operatae.’ Ibid.

One of the more surprising developments in Lonergan's later years was his calling into question the basic order of operations on which the analogy for the divine processions is based. More specifically, what Lonergan questions is the assertion that we do not love anything except inasmuch as we apprehend it in a mental conception. The shift, however, affects not the procession of the Holy Spirit as such but rather the starting point of the entire analogy. While the shift occurred before the publication of *Method in Theology*, it punctuates that book, and I will present here the principal instances of the shift in *Method in Theology*, locating each of the instances in its proper context.

The shift in question is introduced in the discussion of faith in the chapter on religion. Faith is distinguished from beliefs, and is defined as 'the knowledge born of religious love.' Lonergan explains:

... there is a knowledge born of love. Of it Pascal spoke when he remarked that the heart has reasons which reason does not know. Here by reason I would understand the compound of the activities on the first three levels of cognitional activity, namely, of experiencing, of understanding, and of judging. By the heart's reasons I would understand feelings that are intentional responses to values; and I would recall the two aspects of such responses, the absolute aspect that is a recognition of value, and the relative aspect that is a preference of one value over another. Finally, by the heart I understand the subject on the fourth, existential level of intentional consciousness and in the dynamic state of being in love. The meaning, then, of Pascal's remark would be that, besides the factual knowledge reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying, there is another kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a person in love.¹²¹

121 Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 115.

That further knowledge will be of different kinds, depending on the love from which it is born. Faith is that further knowledge when the love is God's love flooding our hearts.

The theme is picked up several pages later in the concluding section of the chapter on religion, where Lonergan is explaining the consequences of the shift from a theology that acknowledges only the two realms of common sense and theory to one that distinguishes four realms of meaning, namely, common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence.

... the older theology, when it spoke of inner experience or of God, either did so within the realm of common sense – and then its speech was shot through with figure and symbol – or else it did so in the realm of theory – and then its speech was basically metaphysical. One consequence of this difference has already been noted. The older theology conceived sanctifying grace as an entitative habit, absolutely supernatural, infused into the essence of the soul. On the other hand, because we acknowledge interiority as a distinct realm of meaning, we can begin with a description of religious experience, acknowledge a dynamic state of being in love without restrictions, and later identify this state with the state of sanctifying grace.

... It used to be said, *Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum*, Knowledge precedes love. The truth of this tag is the fact that ordinarily operations on the fourth level of intentional consciousness presuppose and complement corresponding operations on the other three. There is a minor exception to this rule inasmuch as people do fall in love, and that falling in love is something disproportionate to its causes, conditions, occasions, antecedents. For falling in love is a new beginning, an exercise of vertical liberty in which one's world undergoes a new organization. But the major exception to the Latin tag is God's gift of his love flooding our hearts. Then we are in the dynamic state of being in love. But who it is we love, is neither given nor as yet understood. Our capacity for moral self-transcendence has found a fulfilment that

brings deep joy and profound peace. Our love reveals to us values we had not appreciated, values of prayer and worship, or repentance and belief. But if we would know what is going on within us, if we would learn to integrate it with the rest of our living, we have to inquire, investigate, seek counsel. So it is that in religious matters love precedes knowledge and, as that love is God's gift, the very beginning of faith is due to God's grace.¹²²

Again, we have the following on religiously differentiated consciousness, introduced in a section whose main purpose is to discuss the 'more benign yet still puzzling variety' of pluralism that 'has its root in the differentiation of human consciousness.'¹²³

... let us consider religiously differentiated consciousness. It can be content with the negations of an apophatic theology. For it is in love. On its love there are not any restrictions or conditions or qualifications. By such love it is oriented positively to what is transcendent in lovableness. Such a positive orientation and the consequent self-surrender, as long as they are operative, enable one to dispense with any intellectually apprehended object. And when they cease to be operative, the memory of them enables one to be content with enumerations of what God is not.

It may be objected that *nihil amatum nisi praecognitum*. But while that is true of other human love, it need not be true of the love with which God floods our hearts through the Holy Spirit he has given us (Rom. 5, 5). That grace could be the finding that grounds our seeking God through natural reason and through positive religion. It could be the touchstone by which we judge whether it is really God that natural reason reaches or positive religion preaches. It could be the grace that God offers all

122 Ibid. 120-23.

123 Ibid. 276.

men, that underpins what is good in the religions of mankind, that explains how those that never heard the gospel can be saved. It could be what enables the simple faithful to pray to their heavenly Father in secret even though their religious apprehensions are faulty. Finally, it is in such grace that can be found the theological justification of Catholic dialogue with all Christians, with non-Christians, and even with atheists who may love God in their hearts while not knowing him with their heads.¹²⁴

The transcultural aspect of the shift is highlighted in the following passage.

... God's give of his love ... has a transcultural aspect. For if this gift is offered to all men, if it is manifested more or less authentically in the many and diverse religions of mankind, if it is apprehended in as many different manners as there are different cultures, still the gift itself as distinct from its manifestations is transcultural. For of other love it is true enough that it presupposes knowledge – *nihil amatum nisi praecognitum*. But God's gift of his love is free. It is not conditioned by human knowledge; rather it is the cause that leads man to seek knowledge of God. It is not restricted to any stage or section of human culture but rather is the principle that introduces a dimension of other-worldliness into any culture. All the same, it remains true, of course, that God's gift of his love has its proper counterpart in the revelation events in which God discloses to a particular people or to all mankind the completeness of his love for them. For being-in-love is properly itself, not in the isolated individual, but only in a plurality of persons that disclose their love to one another.¹²⁵

124 Ibid. 278.

125 Ibid. 282-83.

Finally, we have the following, in a section on the consequences of moving beyond faculty psychology to intentionality analysis.

... there arises the possibility of an exception to the old adage, *Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum*. Specifically, it would seem that God's gift of his love ... is not something that results from or is conditioned by man's knowledge of God. Far more plausibly it would seem that the gift may precede our knowledge of God and, indeed, may be the cause of our seeking knowledge of God. In that case the gift by itself would be an orientation towards an unknown. Still, the orientation reveals its goal by its absoluteness; it is with all one's heart and all one's soul and with all one's mind and all one's strength. It is, then, an orientation to what is transcendent in lovable-ness and, when that is unknown, it is an orientation to transcendent mystery.¹²⁶

The significance of the shift for the Trinitarian analogy is, in one sense, enormous. And yet the only real change in the analogy itself is in the starting point.

The psychological analogy ... has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.¹²⁷

It has been objected to my use of this passage that I was too facile in interpreting Lonergan's reference in this passage to 'the dynamic state of being in love' as denoting

126 Ibid. 340-41.

127 Lonergan, 'Christology Today: Methodological Reflections' 93.

religious love.¹²⁸ While I have conceded to the objector that the psychological analogy presented in Lonergan's later work may properly begin from any of the three kinds of love that Lonergan emphasizes – the love of intimacy in the family, love in the community, and the love of God – still I have argued that it is legitimate to conceive an analogy that begins with religious love. I must add, though, that there are serious exegetical grounds for the position that I have taken. In the quotation just given, there is mention of 'the dynamic state of being in love,' and in one of the quotations from *Method in Theology* that I have cited, that expression is reserved for 'God's gift of his love flooding our hearts. Then we are in the dynamic state of being in love.'¹²⁹ At any rate, in response to the objections I have presented my argument for continuing to develop an analogy in the order of grace, and I take my stand on that argument¹³⁰ and continue to attempt to mine the riches of the hypothesis that such an analogy allows. As I have argued elsewhere, there are definitely two distinct but structurally related analogies in Lonergan's work for understanding the divine processions, the first being the analogy presented in *The Triune God: Systematics*, which we have been presenting here, and the second being the analogy suggested in his later work. I will continue to attempt to develop the latter analogy, recognizing as I do so that the development depends on first grasping the earlier analogy. If I am correct that the later analogy proceeds within the supernatural order, then understanding it depends on working out the earlier analogy in the order of nature and making the necessary transpositions to the order of grace.

128 Charles Hefling, 'On the (Economic) Trinity: An Argument in Conversation with Robert Doran,' *Theological Studies* 68 (2007) 653.

129 Lonergan, *Method in Theology* 122.

130 Robert M. Doran, 'Addressing the Four-point Hypothesis,' *Theological Studies* 68 (2007) 674-82.

I have indicated above and especially in chapter 1 how the analogy that I wish to develop would proceed. I think it is sufficient in the present context to indicate that the shift in the relation between knowledge and love that is so prominent in Lonergan's later work does not affect so much the analogical understanding of the procession of the Holy Spirit as it does the very starting point of the analogy. The procession of the Holy Spirit is still conceived on the analogy of love proceeding from knowledge, including the *verbum spirans amorem* of the judgments of value of someone in the dynamic state of being in love. What I would like to add in the present context is a discussion of further evidence in Lonergan's work regarding developments to be affected in the psychological analogy. These include, first, the scriptural warrants for the analogy that Lonergan mentions in the dogmatic part of *De Deo trino*; and second, the attempt found in the Lonergan archives to develop a seventh chapter in the systematic part of *De Deo trino*. The further notes found in the archives regarding the four-point hypothesis have already been reviewed.

It is time, however, to bring this lengthy chapter to a close. The developments just mentioned are best summarized in and commented on in a chapter devoted exclusively to them, in which I will attempt to spell out in some detail the analogy that will feature prominently in the ensuing discussion.